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Exhibit 20 
the 
Stress monitors were installed to 
llar after a violent rock 
16, These stress we as 
for examination of stress levels in the damaged pillar. Of the three 
stress gauges instal the East Low gauge never read stress The 
company continued to record inaccurate rea on the East Low gauge until 
another violent rock burst occurred on the East wall that seriously injured 7 
miners. The company has more than 
igence in that they were the East Low stress gauge was 
and assigned miners to work in an area without knowing if the East 
building stress. This order is an 
9. Violation 
10. Gravity: 
B. Section 
of Act 
A. Injury or Illness (has) (is): No Likelihood O 
B. Injury or illness could rea-
sonably be expected to be: 
C. Significant and Substantial: 
11. Negligence (check one) 
12. Type of Action 104d2 
14. Initial Action 
A. None 
A. Citation B. Order @ C. Safeguard 
15.AreaorEquipment The I-Drift 
17. Action to Terminate 
MoDa Yr 
Unlikely O 
C. Part/Section of 
Title 30CFR 
Reasonably likely 0 
Lost Workdays Or Restricted Duty 
C. Moderate 
E. Citation/ 
Order Number 
5900 level. 
18. Terminated A. Date B. Time {24 Hr. Clock) 
Section IV--Automated System Data 
19. Type of Inspection 20. Event Number 
(activity code) E07 1159243 21. Primary or Mill p 
22. Signature Rodric B. Breland 
See Continuation Farm (MSHA Form 700D-3a) 
57.3401 
Highly Likely 0 Occurred 
Permanently Disabling @ 
Number of Persons Affected: 007 
E. Reckless Disregard 1\11 
Safeguard 
8565555 F. Dated 
I 23. AR Number 
I 
Written Notice 
4169 
Mo Da Yr 
12/19/2011 
MSHA Form 7000-3, Apr 08 (revised) In accordance with the provisions of !he Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, U1e Small Business Administration has 
established a National Small Business and Agriculture Regulatory Ombudsman and 1 o Region a! Fairness Boards to receive comments from small businesses about federal agency 
enforcement actions. The Ombudsman annually evaluates enforcement activities and rates each agency's responsiveness lo small business. If you wish to comment on the 
enforcement actions of MSHA. you may call 1-888-REG-FAIR (1-888-734-3247), or write the Ombudsman at Small Business Adrnintstration, Office of the National Ombudsman, 409 3rd 
Street, SW MC 2120, Washington, DC 20416. Please note, however, that your right lo file a comment with the Ombudsman is in addition to any other rights you may have, including 
!he right to contest citations and proposed penalties and obtain a hearing before the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission. 
L 1 
Section Ill-Subsequent Action Taken 
8. Extended To Mo Da Yr 
A. Date B. Time (24 Hr. Clock) 
Section IV-Inspection Data 
9. Type of Inspection E07 
i 1 Signature 
Rodric B. Breland 
MSHA Form 7000-3a, Mar B5 (revised) 
l·rn. Event Number 1159243 
AR.Number 
4169 
a 
Date 
standard. 
See C_ontinua!ion Form 0 
0 C. Vacated D. Terminated 
3. Time (24 Hr. Clock) 
1045 
E. Modified 
Exhibit 21 
SUBJECT: 
Modeling of drift pillar was condncted to selecting dimensions for final 
implementation. The !imitations of this modeling were recognized and, as a result, tThe 
stability of the ft circular pillar surrounding the 5900 level access through the orebody 
has always been some concern. As a result, this pillar was instrumented in mid-2005 
to determine stresses in the pillar back and ribs, as well as closure across and along this 
pillar. Instrumentation readings have continued, with the last readings taken 08/18/2011. 
The stress data basically shows that the stress increased in the pillar rapidly after the 
pillar was formed, but as mining continued the rate of increase decreased, and since 2010 
the stress has dropped in the pillar except for a continuing slight increase on the east 
The stress gages also responded to bursting in the pillar, the last burst occu1Ting 12/09. 
While it was clear that nearb.y mining was no longer stressing the pillar, it was known 
that the pillar was still being loaded by stope closure as a result of continued mining in 
the Gold Hunter. 
Drift closure across and along the 5900 pillar was gradual until the 12/09 burst, and since 
has slowly but steadily increased to the 1.3 inch range. 
Both the stress and closure values agreed well with the computer model simulations of 
mining from the 5900 level in the Gold Hunter. Itasca concluded that the 5900 piilar was 
stable and too big to fail suddenly and violently, behaving more like a stabilizing pillar. 
This conclusion appeared to be confirmed by the observations all along the 5900 pillar 
itself, as well as from inspection of the E and W observation boreholes drilled the 
pillar. While there was apparent stress deterioration at the back edge along the west end 
of the pillar, as well as very minor stress effects around the 5900 drift, the 5900 pillar was 
basically intact, and its appearance had not basically changed since mining began. 
Two of the three bursts that were located along the back edges of the pillar did not cause 
observable damage, but the last burst, 1.9 magnitude on 12/09/10, minor damage to 
the 5900 level drift along the pillar, as well as the to some sections of the back and left rib 
of the chevron drift, just south of the 5900 pillar. This damage consisted of minor 
spalling and shakedown which was all contained by the installed ground support. 
rehabilitation was required. 
The ground support consisted of a combination of Dywidag bolts and split sets \Vith chain 
mesh. This reinforcement was supplemented by cable bolts in the back of the 5900 
thoughts 
burst, as well as the present stability of the 5900 pillar. 
Mechanism of 5900 Pillar 2.8 (USGS Magnitude) Rockburst 
At 01 :07:26, a 2.8 magnitude rockburst occurred as the last hole of the round from the 
overlying 5500 level underhand stopc was blasted. The burst magnitude was determined 
by the USGS national earthquake center, however, on the nearby Montana Tech seismic 
sensors, the burst appeared to be larger, in the 3.0 range. While the damage from this 
burst blocked off the 5900 access drift, there was also extensive damage to the footwall 
access ramp system all the way up to the 5550 level, but particularly to some of the 5750 
and 5700 sub level openings. Such widespread damage is not characteristic of a simple 
pillar burst. 
The numerical model results indicate that small bursts around edges of the pillar 
could be expected \Vith magnitudes up to 2.0. We did have such bursting, with the lagest 
a magnitude 1.9. Themodel results also indicated that the only way the pillar could fail 
was if the height to width ratio changed and the pillar lost confinement, in which case a 
foundation failure might occur. The model assumed a 10: l width to height ratio. The 
foundation failure would occur out in the walls, rather than in the core of the pillar. And 
further, the model results did not include any geologic structures intersecting the pillar. 
With the observed stress deterioration along the inner and outer edges of the pillar, likely 
in the 10 ft range, the width:height ratio of the in place doughnut shaped pillar is actually 
3.5, assuming a 10 ft. vein thickness. This pillar is borderline stable based on mining 
history at Lucky Friday/Gold Hunter. 
The in situ stress in the 5900 pillar area before mining was some 1.2 psi/ ft of depth for 
the vertical stress, and 1.5 times this value for the horizontal stress. The actual vertical 
distance to surface above the Gold Hunter is in the 7000 ft range, hence the vertical stress 
would be 8400 psi. and the maximum horizontal stress, N40°W direction, is 12,600 psi. 
From the stress gages we know that the stress increase in the pi) lar from mining off of the 
5900 level, taking into account the ore and waste rock modulus values, was also some 
12,600 psi. Hence, the stress in the pillar was very near the Lmconfined compressive 
strength of the pillar, and any further loss of confinement could lead to a pillar failure. 
It \:Vas initially presumed that the 2. 8 rockburst in the 5900 pillar would represent a 
' if 
~aa•-U=H~H> of of was a 
type occur when the pillar is much than 
wall rocks, as is case for Gold Hunter. Shear failures in the place 
going out from edges of the pillar. Itasca modeling concluded that this failure 
mechanism could occur in the 5900 pillar, as well as the diminishing 5500-5700 sill 
pillar. Favorably oriented structure tln·ough the pillar would frnther reduce the strength 
of either pillar 
A 3.8 magnitude sill pillar burst at the Macassa Mine in 1996 was determined to be a 
foundation failure. There was major damage out in the footwall, and only minor 
observable damage along the pillar or out in the hanging wall. In this case the pillar was 
some 200 ft long by some 80 ft high. There was over 2 inches of closure measured 
across the overcut immediately above the sill pillar. 
Our 2.8 burst did major damage to the pillar, as well as major damage along some 
openings up and to the east along the footwall. The majority of the energy released, as 
well as the resulting damage, was due to instantaneous wal1 closure over the entire mined 
out area around the pillar, not from the release of all the stored strain energy the pillar. 
For this reason the 5900 pillar is still somewhat intact and partially loaded. The closure 
· process is continuing to load this pillar, thus, there is the possibility of small strain bursts 
still occurring in this pillar. 
We need to measure the closure induced by this burst along the 5900 level drift. If none 
of the existing closure points survived, then we can resurvey existing spads in the back 
along the main drift to determine their displacements as a result of the burst. It is likely 
that several inches of closure across the vein resulted from this burst. 
Stability of 5900 Pillar 
It is apparent that the 2.8 burst in the 5900 pillar did not completely destress this pillar. 
Hence, it is possible that futiher small bursts could occur in this pillar as it continues to 
be loaded by ongoing wall closure from continued mining off of the 5900 level. It is also 
apparent that the remaining intact pillar has been significru1tly reduced in size, hence, the 
amount of stored strain energy now in the pillar has also been significantly reduced. To 
deal ,vi.th any future bursts, ground support is being installed in and along the 5900 pillar 
to contain the effects of any further bursting. 
In addition to the combination of longer Dywidag bolts, split sets, chain link mesh and 
cable bolts, the back and ribs will be sprayed with 2+ inches of shotcrete. The addition of 
the shotcrete adds 2 more kJ/m2 to the 9 .3 kJ/m2 to result in a total dynamic support 
l'-'uL:,c,c,.u,,v of some 1 burst at a 
distance 7 m. to 
Summary 
The 5900 USGS Richter magnitude, was most likely a foundation 
failure since this pillar was not completely destroyed. Deterioration and a few small 
bursts around the edges of this pillar resulted in reducing the pillar confinement, and 
hence, its strength. It is not known whether any geologic structure through the pillar 
contributed to the occu1Tence of this burst. 
The large amount of energy released by this burst, as well as the resulting damage, was 
due to the instantaneous wall closure over the entire mined out area surrounding the 5900 
pillar. Wall closure will continue to load the remaining 5900 pillar as mining continues 
in the underhand stopes currently being mined below. 
The ground support installed during rehabilitation of the 5900 pillar will contain the 
damage from any further small bursts that might be induced by continuing closure. 
Installing some type of tunnel sets tlu·ough this pillar, and isolating them from the pillar 
something like TechFoam, will insure the long term stability of the access through 
pillar. While I would conclude that the occurrence of another large 2.8 magnitude burst 
in this pillar is very unlikely, it cannot be totally eliminated. 
Exhibit 22 
was 
area. 
s states that operator conduct 
two daily 
movement 
surveys at start and of the first shift to determine weather 
r 
the same time. 
reading just 
to stress levels are The 
a plan re a day at 
On December 14, the operator the last 
r to another ent rock burst 
uries to seven 
could not be taken 
The Mine Superintendent 
because steel liner was 
15. Area or Eqllipment 
17. Action to Terminate 
In accordance with the provisions of the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Ao! of 1996, lhe Small Business Administration 
has established a National and Agriculture Regulatory Ombudsman and 10 Regional Fairness Boards to receive comments from small businesses about federal 
agency enforcement actions. The'Ombudsman annually evaluates enforcement activities and rates each agency's responsiveness to small business. If you wish lo comment on lhe 
enforcement actions of MSHA. you may ca!l 1-888-REG-FA!R {1-888-734-3247), orwrile !he Ombudsman al Small Business Administration, omce of !he National Ombudsman, 409 
3rd Street, SW MC 2120, Washington, DC 20416. Please nole, however, that your right ID file a comment with Iha Ombudsman is in addition lo any other rights you may have, 
including the righl !o conies! citations and proposed penalties and obtain a hearing before lhe Federal Mine Safety and Heal!h Review Commission. 
1 1 
Continuation of 8. Condition or Practice 
gauge and the gauges could not be read. 
the s ss gauges were with extended wire so that 
be read during the installation of the liner. If this was 
taken it 
2nd rock 
substant 
than a 
may have indicated high levels, which have removed from the 
burst. This condition has not been des ed as "significant and 
the conduct violated a sion of the rather 
ry sa or heal s 
Section 111--Subsequent Action Taken 
8. Extended To Mo Da Yr 
A. Dale B. Time (24 Hr. Clock) 
Section IV--lnspeciion Data 
9. Type of Inspection E07 10. Event Number 1159243 
1 i . Signature 
Ronald L. Eastwood fc 
MSHA 7000-3e, Mar 85 (revised) 
I AR Number 1537 
12. Date 
See Continuation Form 0 
0 C. Vacated O D. Tenninated E. Modified 
Mo Da Yr 
12/21/2011 
1 
13. Time (24 Hr. Clock) 
0800 
Exhibit 23 
being issued 
on 12/14/2 
rescue and recover work 
of the federal 
Administration 
1 at approximately 19:40 
s necessary this order is 
and Act of 1977 to 
of all persons at s . This order is being issued 
ion of any evidence which would assist in investigating 
the cause or causes of the accident. It prohibits all activity in all 
underground areas of mine except to the extent necessary to rescue an 
individual or an imminent until MSHA has 
determined it is safe resume normal mining operations underground. This 
applies to all persons engaged in the rescue and recovery operation 
persons on . This order was initially issued orally to the mine 
at 21:00 pacific standard time 
A. Injury or Illness (has) (is): No Likelihood Reasonably 
B. 
C. Significant and Substantial: 
11. Negligence (check one) A. None C. Moderate 
12. Type of Action 103.i 
14. Initial Action E. Citation/ 
A Citation O B. Order C. Safeguard D. Written Notice Order Number 
15. Area or Equipment All underground portions of the mine 
16. Termination Due Mo Da Yr A. Date 
Section 111--Termination Acllon 
17. Action to Terminate 
B. Time (24 Hr. Clock) 
18. Terminated A. Date MoDa Yr B. Time (24 Hr. Clock 
Section N-Automated System Data 
19. Type of lnspecilon 20. Event Number 
(activity code) E07 · 1159243 
22. Signature Scott G. Amos 
21. Primary or MIii 
p 
See Confinuetion Form 
Highly likely 
D. Number of Persons Affected: 
D E. Reckless Disregard 
. Order 0 Safeguard D 
F. Dated Mo Da Yr 
23. AR Number 4496 
MSHA Form 7000.3, Apr OB (revised} In accordance With the provisions of the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act. of 1996, the small Business Administration has 
established a National Small Business and Agriculture Regulatory Ombudsman and 10 Regional Fairness Boards lo receive comments from small businesses about federal agency 
enforcement actions. The Ombudsman annually evaluates enforcement actMUes and iates each agency's responsiveness to small business. If you wish lo comment on the 
enforcement acikms of MSHA, you may can 1-388-REG-FAIR (1-868-734-3247), or write Iha Ombudsman al Small Business Administration, Office of \he National Ombudsman, 409 3rd 
Street, SW MC 2120, Washlnglon, DC 20416. Please note, however, that your right to tile a comment wilh the Ombudsman ls in ac!d!Uon to any other lights you may have, including 
\he rtght to contest citations and proposed penames and obtain a heanng before lfle federal Mine Safety and Health Revfew Commission. 
Secllon 111....SubsequentAcilon Taken 
8. Extended To A 
I 
Mo Da 
. Dae 
Section IV-lnspecfion Data 
9. Type of Inspection E07 
i. Signature 
Scott G. Amos 
MSHA Form i'000..3a, Mar 65 (revised) 
the mine) and has now been reduced to 
Yr . B. Time (24 Hr. Clock) 
10. Event Number 1159243 
AR Number 
4496 
12. Date 
C. Vacated 
Mo Da Yr 
12/14/2011 
See Gontlnuatlon Form 0 
D. Terminated 0 E. Modified 
13. Time (24 Hr. Clock) 
2100 
Exhibit 24 
U.S. Department of Lal 
Mine Administration 
Change From To 
8. Condition Or Practice 
Reason The initial order is modified to reflect that MSHA is now proceding under the authority of section 103k of the federal Mine 
Safety and Health Act of 1977. This section 103k order is intended to protect the safety of all persons on site including those 
involved in rescue and recovery operations or investigation of the accident The mine operator shall obtain prior approval from 
an authorized representative of the secretary of all actions to recover and restore operations in the mine. Additionally, the mine 
operator is reminded of it's existing obligations to prevent destruction of evidence that would aid in investigating fue cause or 
causes of the accident. Item 12 is modified to a 103k order. 
12. Type of Action1 103j 103k 
Reason The initial order is modified to reflect that MSHA is now pro ceding under the authority of section 103k of the federal Mine 
Safey and Health Act of 1977. 
The initial order {s modified to reflect _that MSHA is now proceding under the 
authority of section 103k of Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977. 
This section 103k order is intended to protect the safety of all persons on 
including those involved rescue and recovery operations or 
stigation of the accident. The mine shall obtain approval 
from an authorized representative of the secretary of all actions to recover 
and restore operations in the mine. Additionally, the mine is 
reminded of it 1 s existing obligations to prevent destruction of evidence 
would aid in investigating the cause or causes of the accident. Item 12. is 
modi to a 103k order. 
Section Ill-Subsequent Action Taken 
8. Extended To Mo Da 
A Date 
Section lV-lnspection Data 
9. Type of Inspection E07 
Signature 
Scott G. Amos 
MSHA Form 7000-3a, Mar 65 (revised} 
Time (24 Hr. Clock) 
10. Event Number 1159243 
AR Number 
4496 
12. Date 
Se<!! ContJnuaUon Form 0 
0 C. Vacated OD. Temiinated ~ E. Modified . 
Mo Da Yr 
12/15/2011 
i3. Time (24 Hr. Clock) 
1113 
Exhibit 25 
Mine U.S. Department of Lal 
Mine and Healtl1 
(Contractor) 
at of a massive 
the occurrence 
burst. Rock Burst in serious uries to seven miners were 
the I Drift Pillar work from a rock that 
occurred on 11/16/2011. method in place dur the accident was to 
the main sill pillar above the 5900 I-Drift pillar. The company was 
warned that the rehabilitation should with caution, and that a better 
understanding of the cause of the burst, relation to mining into 
the Sill Pillar, was needed. Mine Management engaged in aggravated conduct 
constituting more than ordinary negligence in that they were aware that mining 
main sill could cause added stress to 5900 I-Drift pillar 
but directed the mining to be done. 
9. Violation A. Health D 
SafetyO 
otherD 
Sectlon :: .. ·-~----· ~ 1:va1uetJon 
10. Gravity: 
8. Section 
of Act 
A. Injury or Illness (has) (is): No Likelihood D 
B. Injury or illness could rea-
sonably be expected to be: 
C. Significant and Substantial: 
11. Negligence (check one) 
12. Type of Action 104d2 
14. Initial Action 
A. None 
A Citation O B. Order ~ C. Safeguard 
15.AreaorEquipment The I-Drift 
16. Termination Due A Date 
Mo Da Yr 
Section Ill-Termination Action 
1}. Action to Terminate 
Unlikely D 
C. Part/Section of 
Title 30 CFR 
Reasonably Likely D 
Lost Workdays Or Restricted Duty 
C. Moderate 
B. Time (24 Hr. Clock) 
E. Citation/ 
Order Number 
5900 level. 
18. Terminated /\.. Date MoDa Yr B. Time (24 Hr. Clock) 
Section IV-Automated System Data 
19. Type of Inspection 20. Event Number 
(activity code) EO? 
22. Signature Rodric B. Breland 
1159243 21. Primary or Mill p 
See Continuation Form (MSHA Form 700Q..3e) i;zJ 
57.346lbl 
Highly Likely D Occurred~ 
Pennanently Disabling ~ Fatal 
D. Number of Persons Affected: 007 
E. Reckless Disregard ~ 
Safeguard 
8565555 F. Dated 
23. AR Number 
Written Notice 
4169 
Mo Da Yr 
12/19/2011 
MSHA Form 7000·3, Apr 06 (revised) In accordance with !he provisions of the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, the Small Business Administration has 
established a National Small Business end Agriculture Regulatory Ombudsman and iO Regional Fairness Boards to receive comments from small businesses about federal agency 
enforcement actions. The Ombudsmen annually evaluates enforcement activities and rates each agency's responsiveness to smell business. If you wish to comment on the 
enforcement actions or MSHA, you may ca!J 1-88B·REG·FAIR (1·886·734·3247), orwrite !he Ombudsman at Small Business Administration, Office of !he National Ombudsman, 409 3rd 
Stree~ SW MC 2120, Washington, DC 20416. Please note. however, that your right lo file a comment with !he Ombudsmen is in addition to any other rights you may have, including 
the right to contest citations and proposed penarnes and obtain a hearing before the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission. 
Continuation of 8. Condition or Practice 
an unwarrant fa to 
s violat is an unwarrantable e to 
Seclion lll-Subsequeht Action Taken 
8. Extended To D Mo Da Yr . 
A. ate B. Time (24 Hr. Clock) 
SecUon IV-lnspecUon Data 
9. Type of Inspection E07 10. Event Number 1159243 
11. Signature AR Number 
Rodric B. Breland 4169 
MSHA Form 7000,3a, Mar 85 {revised) 
C. Vacated 
12. Date Mo Da Yr 
05/15/2012 
See Continuation Form 0 
D. Terminated O E. Modified 
13. Time (24 Hr. Clock) 
1035 
Exhibit 26 
Mine 
{Contractor) 
occurred at this mine on 15, 2011, when a 
struck by falling material while working in the 6150 15-3 West stope. 
substantial quantity of material (measuring approximately 25 in width, 74 
feet in length, and 25 feet in height) fell 10 feet from the stope back after 
portions of a supporting pillar were removed to extract ore. Ground support 
was necessary in the stope to mine safely; but the ground support utilized was 
not adequate. The ground c·ontrol was not designed,. installed and/or 
maintained in a manner that was capable of supporting the ground in such a 
wide.stope when the support pillar·was removed. Mine management has engaged 
in aggravated conduct constituting more than ordinary negligence by directing 
the. pillar to be mined as the stope advanced and allowing miners to work under 
inadequately supported ground. This is an unwarrantable 
See Continuation Form (MSHA Form 7000-3a) @ 
9. Violation A Health 0 
Section" 
10. 
SafetyO 
OtherO 
B. Section 
of Act 
A. Injury or Illness (has} (is); No Likelihood 0 
B. Injury or Illness could rea• 
sonably be expected to lie: No Lost Wort<days 
C. Significant and Substantial: Yes@ No 
Unlikely O 
C. Part/Section of 
Trtle30CFR 
Reasonably likely 0 
Lost Workdays Or Restricted Duty 0 
57.3360 
Highly Likely O Occurred 0 
Pemianently Disabling Fatal 0 
D. Number of Persons Affected: 001 
11. Negligence (check one) A. None[] ·B.Low 0 c. Moderate D. High 0 E. Reckless Disregard 0 
12. Type of Action· 104dl 13. Type of Issuance (check one) Citation 0 Order Safeguard D Written Notice 
14. Initial Action 
A. Citation D B. Order CL Safeguard O D. Written Notice O 
15. Area or Equipment 
16. Telmination Due A Date 
.Seciion 111-T ermlna11on Action 
17. Action to Terminate· 
Mo Da Yr 
0&/12/2011 B. Time (24 Hr. Clockj 
18. Terminated A Date MoDa Yr B. Time (24 Hr. Clock) 
Section IV-AulDma:led System Data 
· 19. Type of Inspection 20. Event Number 
(activity eode) E06 1155254 
22. Signatur1:: Rodric B. Breland 
E. Citation/ 
Order Number 
0800 
21. Primary or Mill · 
p 
F. Dated Mo Da Yr 
23. AR Number 4169 
MSHA Form 7000-3, Apr 08 (revised) In accomance with the provisions of 1he Small Business Re9u1ato;y Enforcement Fairness Act. of 1996, the Small Business Administration has. 
eslab!ished a National Small Business and Agriculture Regulatory Ombudsman and 10 Regional fairness Boards to receive comments from small buSinesses about federal agency 
enfcit::ement actions. The Ombudsman annually evaluates enforcement acfMties and rates eaci1 agency's responsiveness to small business. If you wish to comment on the 
enforcement actions of MSHA, you may call 1-888-REG-FAIR {1-<!86-734-3247), or wrtte the Ombudsman at Small Business Administration, Office of the National Ombudsman, 409 3rd 
Stree~ SW MC 2120, Washington, DC 20416. ·p1ease_note, however, ihatyourrigtrtro file a comment with the Ombudsman is in addition lo al)Y other rights you may have, including 
lhe right to conies! citations and proposed penatties and obtain a hearing before the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission. 
700580-11 
MSHA 001850. 
Section Ill-Subsequent Aciion Taken 
8. Extended To · Mo Da · Yr · 
A Date B. Time (24 Hr. Clock) 
Section 11(-lnspection Data 
9. Type of Inspection E06 
11. Signature . 
Rod.ric B. Breland 
MSHA Form 7DD0-3a, Mar 85 (revised} 
10. Event Number 1155254 
AR Number 
4169 
DC. Vacated 
12. Date Mo Da Yr 
0&/08/2011 
See Continuation Form 0 
D. Terminated O E. Modified 
· 13. Time (24 Hr. Clock) · 
0930 
MSHA 001851 
· Exhibit 27 
U.S.Deoartmentofu. 
(Contractor) 
occurred at this mine on April 15, 2011 when a miner was 
by falling material while working in the 6150-15-3 West stope. A 
substantial quantity of material (measuring approximately 25 feet in width, 74 
in length, and 25 in heigh~) fell 10 feet from the stope back after 
portions of a supporting pillar were removed to extract ore. Management failed 
to adequately examine and t~st the ground conditions to determine if 
additional measures needed to be taken. This was necessary due to constantly 
changing ground· condition.s, they were mining a wide stope and removing the 
pillar. The operator has engaged in aggravated conduct constituting 
more than ordinary negligence, as they needed to make·exal.1\inations and conduct 
tests to ensure that all feasible precautions were taken. This is an 
unwarrantable failure to comply with a mandatory 
9. Violation A. Health 0 
SafetyO 
OtherO 
Section !I-Inspectors Evaluation 
10. Gravity:: 
B. Section 
of Act 
A Injury or illness {has) (is): No Likelihood O Unlikely 0 
C. Part/Section of 
Trtle 30CFR 
Reasonably Likely 0 
B. Injury or illness could rea-
. sonably be expected to be: No Lost Wo~days 0 Lost Workdays Or Restricted Duty 0 
C. Significant and Substantial: 
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occurred at 17, 20 , when 
by blocked material in a bin. victim and a coworker 
bin to remove the from below them when the material gave way, 
thei.~ in the material~ The entered the bin 
harnesses and self-retracting lanyards, but they did not have 
suitably fastened. A second person per lifeline, similarly equipped, was not 
present. Mine management have been working underground with the 
contractor on a shift to shift basis since the beginning of the contract with 
Cementation, and have been in the bin when miners were working on potential 
falling/sliding material while only being tied off by self-retracting 
lanyards. Mine management engaged in aggravated conduct constituting more 
than ordinary negiigence in that they 
9. Violation A Health O B. Section 
SafetyQ of Act 
otherLJ 
10. Gravity; 
A.. Injury or illness (has) (is): No Likelihood O 
C. Part/Section of 
Tl1ie30 CFR 
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ls. Injury or illness could rea-
sonably be expected to be: No Lost Workdays Lost Workdays Or Restricted Duty 
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MODEL 
WITH 
IDAHO I S WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ,\ND 
OCCUPATION DISEASE COMPENSATION LAWS 2 • 
BY 
E, B. SMITH 
Analys a workmen 1 s compensation law must neces 
II. 
III. 
Its 
Its 
of admini 
Can the law be administered 
(1) The general overall 
(2) Is re separation the 
functions from the quasi-j 
or des 
Is it a harmonious whole or has 
jointed "topsy" fashion? 
The coverage 
(A) Classes of industries and emp 
and exempted from coverage 
(B) Medical 
(C) Rehabilitation 
(D) Burial 
IV. Income Benefits 
V. Insurance 
. grown a 
covered 
1. "The Model Code 11 is an abbrevia.ted reference to the proposed 
Workmen's Compensation and Rehabilitation Law compiled under the 
ces of the Council of State Governments for suggested state 
s 
Idaho's laws will times be referre to as 
the "Idaho Lawn or the 11 Law 
p 
fess of person the work 
The Code extends extra-territorial coverage, covers 
s of lC tutions under a of p 
party l and also preserves 
The Code spe covers minors whether lawfully or 
" 
unlawfully employed or under apprenticeship; executive officers 
of corporations; members of volunteer or police departments; 
s, and every person members or of the Defense 
regularly selling or di newspapers and deemed employees 
of the news agency or the p 
The Code does not apply where ury to an was 
occasioned 
to ure or kill 
by his or by his wilful intention 
or another. Thus, unlike the Idaho 
Law, though intoxication may play a substantial in caus 
the injury, compensation is not 
sole cause. 
d if is not the 
The word "wilfuln rules out acts - even though loosely called 
intentional - which are motivated by such things as intense p 
or similar results of industrial ury. Mere 11 intentionll is not 
enough, inasmuch as nwilful" connotes deliberation or calculated, 
determined and stubborn persistence in a particular course in 
order to satisfy the will of the actor. 
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DIEP 
VS. 
) 
) Case CV 2002 5424 
CITY OF COEUR D ALENE, et al. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
ORDER DENYING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT IN PART AND 
GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
IN PART 
Defendants. 
I. INTRODUCTION. 
On June 21, 2001, Plaintiff Diep To 's seven year old son drowned at the City 
Beach in Coeur d'Alene. ived with his mother Diep To at St. Margaret's Shelter1 in 
Spokane, Washington. Defendant Bal'bara Vere lien, another resident of the shelter took her 
grandchildren along with and his siste to the City Beach to swim. Six 
lifeguards were on duty at the Coeur d'Alene beach at the time. The head lifeguard at the time 
was Christopher Taylor. Also using the city beach at the time in question was "PAAK in the 
Park" which involved a large number of children that are supervised by counselors involved with 
PAAK in the park. drowned in the area under the supervision of lifeguard tower four. 
The lifeguard manning tower four at that time was Thomas Allen. 
The Defendant City of Coeur d'Alene (city) has moved for summary judgment. The 
standard of review on summary judgment is as follows: 
A trial court in passing upon a motion for summary judgment views all facts and 
inferences from the record in favor of the nonmoving party to determine whether 
the motion should be granted. The burden of proving the absence of material 
facts is upon moving , the adverse party not rest upon 
1 Defendant St. Margaret's Shelter was previously summary based on a lack to plaintiff. 
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Judgment shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, admissions, 
affidavits on file there is no of material 
Lizard Butte Water Corp. v. Howell, 122 Idaho 679,681,837 P.2d 805,807 (1992), 
(citations omitted). More on point is the following: 
In reviewing the affidavits submitted in support of and in opposition to the motion for 
summary judgment we must liberally construe the facts in favor of the child and resolve 
all doubts against the city. The motion should be denied if conflicting inferences could 
have been drawn from the facts alleged in the affidavits, and if reasonable people might 
have reached different conclusions as to whether the city was willful and wanton. 
Jacobsen v. City of Rathdrum, 115 Idaho 266, 271, 766, P.2d 736, 741 (1988). 
The city moves for summary judgment based on the immunity provided by Idaho's 
Recreational Use Statute, § 36-1604. The city claims the acts the were not willful or 
wanton and therefore the city is entitled to the immunity granted by the Recreational Use Statute. 
Additionally the city claims to be protected by LC. § 6-904A for the actions of its employees 
while acting with in the course and scope of there employment. Finally in their Supplemental 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, the city claims they are protected 
from claims related to relocating the end buoy or adding a guard stand by the Discretionary 
Function exception in LC. § 6-904(1 ). 
The plaintiff argues the city is not entitled to protection under the Recreational Use 
Statue because this is not a premises liability case, but is instead based on the negligent, reckless, 
willful and wanton conduct of the city and its employees. Plaintiffs Response Memorandum in 
Opposition to Defendant City of Coeur d' Alene's Motion for Summary Judgment (Plaintiff's 
Memorandum), p. 5. Plaintiff also argues that the defendant is not protected by LC. § 6-904A 
MEMORANDUM DEC!SIO:-i AN!l ORDER DENYING SUMMARY Jl!DG,m:NT IN PART AND GRANTIKG SIJ~lMARY JUDGMEi'ff !'ART Pagel 
§ 
Statute, § 36-1604. 
A. Applicability of tbe Recreational Use Statute to This Case. 
Idaho's Recreational Use Statute applies to public entities. McGhee ex rel. McGhee. City 
of Glenns Ferry, 11 l Idaho 921, 729 P.2d 396 (1986). Landowners are not reiieved of all 
liability, they owe users the same duty as is owed to trespassers, which is the duty to refrain from 
willful or wanton conduct. Jacobsen v. City of Rathdrum, 115 Idaho 266, 766 P.2d 736 (1988). 
The plain language of the Recreational Use Statute claims its purpose is to encourage 
landowners to make land and water available to the public for recreation without charge by 
limiting the land owner's liability to users. I § 36-1604. There is no that the City of 
Coeur d'Alene City Beach is open to the public free of charge. Plaintiff argues that this action 
does not come under the Recreational Use Statute because this action is a regular wrongful death 
lawsuit or simply a "premises liability" lawsuit. Plaintiffs Memorandum, p. 5. The tenninology 
used by plaintiff has no significance. The cases cited by plaintiff, Scott v. Wright, 486 N. W.2d 
40 (Iowa 1992) and Young v. Salt Lake City Co1p., 876 P.2d 376 (Utah 1994) both involve active 
torts of the property owners (where the property owner did some affinnative negligent action) 
not the conditions of the property itself. Plaintiff's Memorandum, p. 5, Reply Memorandum in 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Defendant's Reply), p. 2.2 The Court is not 
persuaded by plaintiffs arguments that this case should not come under the Recreational Use 
Statute because it is a "premises liability" case or a "wrongful death" case. This case involves 
the condition of the property itself The facts of this case are squarely within I.C. § 36-1604: 
2 The city raises another distinction between these two cases and the present case. The recreational use statutes 
Iowa and Utah do not have the equivalent of LC. § 36- That effect of that distinction is discussed below. 
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owns the land used 
§ 36-1 The lake 
Cami Recreational Statute applies to the. facts case. 
Idaho Supreme Court justices were somewhat divided on other issues in Jacobsen, they 
were unanimous that the Recreational Use Statute applied to the facts in Jacobsen. This Court 
finds the facts in Jacobsen to be analogous to those in the present case. 
Even though the Recreational Use Statute applies to the facts of this case, that does not 
mean that the land owner is absolutely immune to all liability. Jacobsen, 115 Idaho at 269, 766 
P.2d at 739. The landovvner is not immune from willful or wanton conduct. 
B. Willful.and Wanton Conduct. 
It used to be that "willful and wanton" conduct involved only intentional conduct. 
Jacobsen, 115 Idaho at 270, 766 P.2d at 740 citing the prior applicable jury instruction IDH 225 
(1985). Idaho Juty Instruction 225 read as fo Hows: 
Willful and wanton misconduct is present if the defendant intentionally does or fails to 
do an act, knowing or having a reason to know facts which would lead a reasonable man 
to realize that his conduct not only creates unreasonable risk of harm to another, but 
involves a high degree of probability that such harm would result. 
Id ( emphasis added). 
The recent Idaho Supreme Court case O'Guin v. Bingham County, 139 Idaho 9, 14, 77 
P.3d 849,854 (2003), n. 1, notes that the Idaho Civil Jury Instructions have recently been 
revised, and that IDJI 2d now defines Willful and Wanton as follows: 
The words "willful and wanton" when used in these instructions and when applied to 
the case, mean more than 
intentional or reckless taken 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER DENYING !:WMMARY JUDG;\!ENT IN PART ..\Ml GRANTING SUMMARY JUDG~!ENT IN PART Page .f 
0 at 
wanton" used to be an and now it can an act or a reckless act 
Fmiher confusing this area is the circular concept that now "reckless" appears .to be the 
equivaient of "willful and wanton", and that the word "reckless" is more understandable 
according to the Idaho Supreme Court Civil Jrny Instructions Committee. Comment to IDJI 2d 
3.J 9, citing Comment to Instruction 2.25. The logical way to make sense of this situation is to 
look at the definition of "reckless", and equate that definition with the tenns "willful and 
wanton". 
"Reckless" has been defined as "creation of a substantial and unjustifiable risk of harm to 
others and by a conscious (and sometimes deliberate) disregard for or indifference to that risk". 
Black's Law Dictionary, i 11 Ed., p. 1276 (1999). "Recklessness" is defined as: 
Conduct whereby the actor does not desire hannful consequence but nonetheless 
foresees the possibility and consciously takes the risk. Recklessness involves a 
greater degree of fault than negligence but a lesser degree of fault than intentional 
wrongdoing. The state of mind in which a person does not care about the 
consequences of his or her actions. 
Id p. 1277. (italics added). This definition includes an affirmative act that creates the unreasonable 
risk and a probability that harm wiii actualiy result. While short of intentional conduct, this is still a 
very high level of "bad conduct". The Idaho Supreme Court has stated that foreseeability is an 
element of willful and wanton. Hams v. State Dept. of Health, 123 ldaho 295,299,847 P.2d 1156, 
1160 (1992), citing Jacobsen v. City of Rathdrum, 115 Idaho 266, 766 P.2d 736 (l 988). This 
foreseeability is more than a mere possibility. Id Whether an injury is the result of willful and 
3 This Court realizes that on October 27, 2003 the Idaho Supreme Court entered an Order In re: Civil Jury 
Instructions where it stated it will not approve any instruction but will simply address individual 
instructions though appellate review. Since the Idaho Supreme Court mentioned IDJf 2d 2.25 in O 'Guin a:nd did 
not disapprove of the this Court views that as the Idaho Supreme Comt's acceptance of !DJ! 2d 2.25. 
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to statements 
to training and of the lifeguards and the Deposition of 
Christopher Taylor attached. to the Gaffaney Affidavit describes the operation of the beach and 
swimming area. The plaintiff has submitted the affidavit of Gerald M. Dworkin, who claims to 
be an "expert consultant in aquatics safety and water rescue." Dworkin Affidavit, p. 1. This 
Comi found this affidavit admissible for the purpose of summary judgment. Dworkin concludes: 
"Therefore, it is my opinion that the City of Coeur d'Alene was grossly negligent, reckless, 
willful and wanton in their actions which proximately caused the drowning death o  
Id., p. 9. 
Since "willful and wanton" conduct is a question for the jury (0 77 P.3d at 854) 
and Dworkin concludes the city was willful and wanton in their actions, one would think 
summary judgment should clearly be denied in this case. However, the Dworkin affidavit, while 
admitted for summary judgment, needs futiher analysis under J.C. § 36-1604. First of all, gross 
negligence is not sufficient to get around the immunity LC.§ 36-1604 provides, so Dworkin's 
conclusion to that extent has no merit. Second, Dworkin's conclusion that the city was 
''reckless, willful and wanton" in its conduct is not clearly supported by specific "facts" in his 
affidavit. Dworkin does not come right out and state "why" he came to that conclusion that the 
city's conduct was "reckless, willful and wanton", so the Court looks to the rest of his affidavit. 
One paragraph that gives insight as to "why" he came to that opinion reads: 
It is my opinion that as a result of the City's failure to prevent this 
incident; its failure to recognize the potential as well as the incident itself; and its 
failure to manage the inciden died as a result of a prolonged submersion 
which went undetected by Lif rsonnel for several minutes. And, once 
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Affidavit, p. 9. None of this lists "intentional" acts, nor does list 
actions that were done knowingly, with utter disregard for foreseeable consequences which were 
highly likely to result from those actions." 
That does not end the analysis. The above explanation by Dworkin is based on 24 
separate items that Dworkin lists in his affidavit. While Dworkin's affidavit lists acts of 
negligence, probably even gross negligence on the part of the city (if all acts were true, which 
the Court appreciates the city contests the truth of those alleged actions, but at this juncture it is 
sufficient that there is a dispute of fact), it is a much closer call as to whether Dworkin lists 
"reckless" or "willful and wanton" acts to support Dworkin's conclusion of willful and wanton 
behavior on the part of the city that proximately cause  death. 
Reviewing the 24 acts Dworkin identifies, the Court has determined plaintiff through the 
Dworkin affidavit has created a jury issue as to whether these acts are "willful and wanton". The 
Court's reasoning is as follows. These acts if believed (understanding the city disputes that, but 
that is a jury issue for the finder of fact), are at least negligent, probably grossly negligent, and 
perhaps willful and wanton or reckless. These acts if true, are bad acts. It is really up to the jury 
to decide if as to one or more of these 24 acts, the city 1) knew of the deficiency and 2) could 
have forseen the possibility a drowning and 3) the possibility drowning was highly likely to 
occur with that deficiency and yet 4) the city consciously proceeded to act knowing the risk 
caused by that deficiency created a high likelihood of drowning. Each of those has to be proven 
as to at least one claimed act. Additionally, the plaintiff the burden of proving proximate 
cause, and wil I have to address contributory and the of 
The acts listed by Dworkin which do not suppott "intentional" or 
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8. not from a lifeguard. being 
provided by one qualified to so, there is no concept in law that a I ifeguard ls required to 
break in and perform resuscitation. p. 5, ,r l 6, p. 6 ,r 19. There is no requirement in the law 
that the city must eliminate dangers at City Beach". Id., p. 3, 'lf 2. There is no showing how 
the city's "equipment" was proximately related to the death o  Id P. 5, ,r 12, 13, 16. 
At this juncture, the case boils down to the allegations of the failure to detect the 
drowning. Paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 10, 17 and 18 ofDworkin's affidavit address the alleged failure to 
detect the drowning. Dworkin states the city failed to establish appropriate Surveillance 
Protocols by the lifeguards to scan their zones of responsibilities, failed to establish acceptable 
lifeguard to patron ratio, failed to adequately assess and supervise Christopher Taylor as head 
lifeguard, failed to conduct emergency response drills and failed to develop an incident 
command structure for emergency situations. Dworkin opines that because of these alleged 
deficiencies, the lifeguards failed to recognize the incident. Id., p. 8. These allegations, if 
believed by a jury, provide a jury issue sufficient to survive summary judgment. In a willful and 
wanton failure to act case (as opposed to willful and wanton commission of an affirmative act 
such as in Scott and Young above) such as this, recklessness/willful and wanton conduct may 
well be extremely difficult to prove. Justice Bakes noted that in his specially concurring opinion 
in Jacobsen. Justice Bakes felt that since "willful and wanton misconduct" were required to be 
proved, the factual record must be evaluated on a higher standard than in an ordinary negligence 
case. J 15 Idaho 266, 273, 766 P.2d 736, 743. He the record in that case presented "a very 
as to or not affidavits 
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as to whether 
misconduct. Bakes felt 
which arguably constitute such willful and wanton misconduct that "reasonable minds might 
reach different conclusions as to whether the city was guilty of willful and wanton conduct." 
115 Idaho at 274, 766 P.2d at 744. Illustrnting the fact that reasonable minds might reach 
different conclusions, Justice Shepard in his dissenting opinion, came to the opposite conclusion 
that the Jacobsen facts did not support a finding of willful and wanton conduct. 115 Idaho at 
275, 766 P.2d at 745. This Court in the present case reaches that same conclusion as the 
majority of the Idaho Supreme Court in Jacobsen. 
This Court determines that disputed facts in this case, viewed in the light most 
favorable to the plaintiff, the non-moving party, are analogous in general terms to the undisputed 
allegations presented by the injured party in Jacobsen. In Jacobsen plaintiffs presented evidence 
that was not disputed by the city at summary judgment, that the city had placed playground 
equipment very close to a ditch that seasonally had rapidly running deep water, and that the ditch 
was spanned by a bridge with a single rail three feet off the bridge deck that a child could slip 
under, causing the injury. The Idaho Supreme Court wrote: 
Considering these facts and the reasonable inferences from them that can be 
drawn in favor of the child, and resolving all doubts against the city, reasonable minds 
might reach different conclusions as to whether the city was guilty of wilful and wanton 
conduct in nor protecting children who came to the park from the dangerous condition in 
the part created by the ditch and the bridge. Jt is reasonable to infer that the city knew of 
the dangerous condition that existed in the park in the springtime when the ditch was 
swollen with rapidly running water, that the City knew of the condition of the bridge, and 
that aUov,1ing the ditch and the bridge to remain in that condition in the spring would 
create unreasonable risk of harm to children and would involve a high degree of 
probability that harm would result. Justice Huntley said in his dissent in Johnson: 
The most element of wantonness is knowledge, and that element need not 
be shown by direct evidence; rather, it may be made to by showing 
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766 at 742. same 
expert Dworkin, at ieast as to to the 
drmvning. If summary judgment in Jacobsen was inappropriate back in the day when intentional 
conduct had to be found in order for there to be willful and wanton behavior, then summary 
judgment would be even more inappropriate now that intent may have been removed as an 
element of willful and wanton behavior, via the jury instructions. 
Even that does not end the inquiry. Idaho Code § 36-1604 is different now than at the 
time Jacobsen was decided. Idaho Code§ 36-1604(c) was not in existence at the time Jacobsen 
was decided in 1988. Many of these 24 acts by the city were acts made by city personnel who 
performed those acts "for the purpose of improving the safety of others" and under LC. § 36-
1604( c ), such acts simply do not" ... create liability on the pait of the owner of land where there 
is no such basis for such liability." LC.§ 36-1604(c) also states: " ... not the failure to maintain 
or keep i"n place any ... modification made to improve the safety, shall create liability on the part 
of an owner of land where there is no such basis for such liability." At first glance, such 
language would result in elimination of liability by the city. However, I.C. § 36-1604(c) pertains 
to there being no dutv to warn by the landowner, as the subsection is captioned "Owner Exempt 
from Warning". that reason, the Court interprets that as limited to the 
issue of failure to warn, and this is not a case of failure to warn. For that reason, the distinction 
made by the city as to comparable Utah and Iowa statutes, is not persuasive. Under the city's 
reading of LC. § 36-1604( c ), even if the city was grossly negligent in performing those acts, no 
liability would This interpretation of LC. § 604( c) would mean that even 
was willful and wanton in its canying out acts "made the purpose 
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§ 36-1604( c ): " ... not the failure to maintain or keep in place any ... modification made to 
improve the safety, shall create liability on the part of an owner land where there is no such 
basis for such liability." That interpretation would gut existing law on recreational use statutes, 
and it would ignore the fact that LC. §36-1604(c) pertains to failure to warn situations. 
At trial, plaintiff will have to prove "willful and wanton" conduct as to each bad act 
alleged to have been committed. Plaintiff will have to prove the act was either intentional or, at 
least an affirmative action that was done knowingly, with utter disregard for foreseeable 
consequences which were highly likely to occur as a result of those -~,.,v,,v As pointed out by 
themajority decision in Jacobsen: :'Themostcriticalelement of wantonness-is knowledge, and 
that element need not be shown by direct evidence; rather, it may be made to appear by showing 
circumstances from which the fact of knowledge is a legitimate inference." l 15 Idaho at 272, 
766 P.2d at 742. 
Accordingly, while the Idaho Recreational Use Statute clearly applies to the facts of this 
case, summary judgment on behalfof the city on the basis of the Idaho Recreational Use Statute 
is DENIED due to a jury issue on willful and wanton conduct. 
III. Idaho Code§ 6-904A Does Not Provide the City With Immunity. 
Idaho Code § 6-904A provides immunity for "a governmental entity and its employees 
while acting within the scope of employment and without reckless, willful and wanton conduct." 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held: purpose LC. § 6-904A, which is to limit the liability 
under or care." 
JUDGMENT 
was not under time if he 
was under care, § 6-904A specifically § 6-904A(2) holds immune. 
Memorandum in Support Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 14. That argument misses the 
point. Immunity arises from the status of the person causing the injury, not the status of the 
person injured. Coonse, 132 Idaho at 806, 979 P .2d at 1 l 64. In Hei v. Holtzer, 139 Idaho 81, 73 
P.3d 94 (2003), the Idaho Supreme Court found that when a teacher had an improper sexual 
relationship with a student, the school district was not supervising the teacher. Id. Because the 
district was not supervising the teacher, the statute did not apply. 73 P.3d at I 00. Because J.C. § 
6-904A did not apply to the unsupervised teacher, the student was able to bring a claim against 
the district for negligent supervision. Id. Plaintiff argues Hei indicates: this case the City, 
through its employees, is the negligent party. The City was not supervising any person within 
the meaning of the statute [LC.§ 6-904A]." Plaintiff's Brief, p. 11. In oral argument, counsel 
for plaintiff argued Hei makes it clear the city in this case is the bad actor. This unsupported 
claim that the city, not its employees, is the negligent party, is directly contradicted by the list of 
acts by "the City of Coeur d'Alene and its employees" enumerated only three pages earlier in 
piaintiff's briefing. Plaintiff's Brief, pp. 8-9. Plaintiffs claims are directly contradicted by the 
Dworkin affidavit quoted above, which sets forth nothing but the acts of people supervised by 
the city. 
Plaintiff's claims of the city being the bad actor do not ring true. These claims are 
obviously made to skiit the application of I.C. § 6-904A. Plaintiff claims that only the city is 
responsible, but then plaintiff presents a long string actions in the affidavits that deal directly 
with the actions parks and are all 
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LC.§ 6-904A to the facts that docs not end the 
ciiy has immunity under § 6-904A all acts except those that are willful and 
wanton. The plaintiff further claims that even if LC. § 6-904A does apply the city's behavior 
was reckless, willful and wanton so they still have a claim. Plaintiff's Brief, p. 11. The analysis 
in section II above is applicable here. The Court notes that LC. § 6-904C requires reckless or 
willful and wanton to be intentional as well. While Jacobsen dealt with the analysis of a 
different statute, its analysis of willful and wanton at a time when "intent" was an element of 
vvillful and wanton is instructive. Jacobsen tells us it is a jury question. 
Accordingly, while the 6-904A applies to the facts of this case, summary judgment 
for the city upon that statute is DENIED due to a jury issue on willfu!and wanton conduct 
IV. Idaho Code§ 6-904(1) Provides the City with Immunity As To Its Planning 
Decisions of 1) Whether to Construct a Fifth Lifeguard Stand and 2) Location of 
the Swim Area Buoys. 
As to its decision whether to construct a fifth lifeguard stand and the location of the swim 
area buoys, the city claims it is immune under the discretionary function exception. A 
government entity is not liable for any claim based upon the exercise of a discretionary function 
or duty of the government, \.vhether or not the discretion was abused. Tomich v. City of 
Pocatello, 127 Idaho 394,397,901 P.2d 501,504 (1995). To determine if the action qualifies as 
a discretionary function a planning/operational test is used. Id. Under that test matters not 
requiring evaluations of policy factors are likely to be operational and not given immunity. Id. 
no as to 
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Plaintiff claims Recreational Director Steve Anthony have chosen to 
move the buoy line but did not, thus it is an operational decision for which immunity would not 
Plaintiffs p. 12-14. Plaintiffthen "Mr. Anthony didn't need any authority or 
approval to move in the buoy line. (See Deposition of Steve Anthony, Pages 45 and 46, attached 
as Exhibit U). Id. pp. 13-14. Anthony testified that he !!§...director had the ability to move the 
swim boundary before June 200 l. Exhibit U, pp. 45, LL 20-25. As shown below, Anthony's 
rank as Recreation Director for the City of Coeur d'Alene (Supplemental Affidavit of Steve 
Anthony, p. 1, ~ I), is an indicia that this is a planning or policy Ransom v. City of 
Garden City, 1 I 3 Idaho 202, 204, 743 P .2d 70, 72 ( 1987). The city argues the matter regarding 
buoy location was discussed at higher level meetings with the City Beach staff, the Parks and 
Recreation Commission, and those discussions and recommendations were referred back to the 
staff for a meeting with the Parks and Recreation Commission Chainnan and the City Manager, 
Ken Thompson. Defendant's Reply Brief p. 12. But as defendants themselves note: 
'planning/operational' test does not necessarily tum upon the status or rank of the actor." 
Ransom v. City o_f Garden City, 113 Idaho 202, 204, 743 P.2d 70, 72 ( 1987). However, greater 
rank or authority will most likely coincide with greater responsibility for planning or policy 
formation decisions. Id. 
The determination of the applicability of the discretionary function exception is a two-
step process. Id., 113 ldaho at 205, 743 P.2d at 73. First, the Court must examine the nature 
matters not the 
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the 
Steve Anlhony sets facts showing the 
decision on the buoy line location was set initially by those at high levels of the city government 
after consideration of financial and other effects, and that even though he as Recreation Director 
for the City of Coeur d'Alene had authority to move that line, his decision not to do so is a 
planning or policy decision. This finding by the Court is due to the nature and quality of that 
action, and also due to Anthony's position as Recreation Director of the city. Second, the Couit 
must consider the tvvo policies underlying the discretionary function exception: 1) permit those 
who govern to do so without being unduly inhibited in the performance of that function by the 
threat of liability for tortuous conduct; and 2) to limit judicial re-examination of basic policy 
decisions properly entrusted to other branches of government. Id., 113 Idaho at 205, 743 P .2d at 
73. Those policies give the Court no reason to find that Anthony's decision not to move the 
buoy line is an operational decision. The Court's finding that Anthony's decision not to move 
the buoy line is consistent with those policies. 
Accordingly, summary judgment is GRANTED in favor of the city as to its decision to 
not construct a fifth lifeguard stand and its decision not to move the buoy line. 
V. ORDER. 
IT IS HEREBY ORD RED tllat defendant City of Coeur d' Alene's Motions for 
Summary Judgment as to the immunity provided under Idaho Code § 36-1604 and Idaho 
Code § 6-904A arc DENIED, although those statutes are applicable to the facts of this case, 
and defendant Coeur d Motion for Summary Judgment as to the immunity 
,\JEMORANDUM !l£CIS10N ANO OIW£R DEi'fflNG SUMMARY JUllGMfcNT !N l'..\!H ANO GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT Pnge I5 
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a summary instrumentation and 
u,,.,,""'"'' pillar the 30 vein at the Gold Hunter operation 
A drift protection pillar, siightly over l 00' in diameter, was left in place to provide access to 
the footwall of the orebody from the hangingwall and Silver Shaft. The circular pillar was created 
by adjusting the lengths the adjacent overhand and underhand stopes as they mined 
above and belov-i the 5900 drift. The drift was supported heavily, but not unusually, usirtg close-
spacing resin rebar and mesh. Due to tbe critical nature of maintaining stability of this drifl:, it has 
been continuously monitored with instrumentation and its stability observed. To date (after 
completion of the pillar creation), the drift has performed well and is stable with little observable 
damage. Two basic types of instrumentation \,Vere installed in the pillar-IRAD stressmeters to 
monitor the vein-perpendicular stress at a depth of about 20' into the pillar walls and back, and 
closure measured across the 30 vein. Additionally, the mine-wide microseismic system provides 
coverage of acoustic emission of the pillar. The stressmeters showed slowly increasing stress 
change until the pillar was "detached" from the surrounding 30 vein, at which time the stresses 
increased rapidly to significant levels. After a recent seismic event in tbe wall rock (Dec, 2009), the 
stressmeter values have fallen off slightly and do not appear to be rising. The west side stressmeters 
show higher stresses (by about 40 to 50%) than the east side stressmeters, with the highest induced 
stresses at about 16,000 psi. This stress change is about a 50% increase over the in situ maximum 
horizontal stress. The total maximum stress would also be about 50% higher than the estimated 
uniaxial compressive strength of the silicic qumtzite tested (about 16,000 psi). As described in the 
report, the IRAD stressmeters, although useful for understanding whether stress is increasing or 
decreasing, and approximately how "large the increase, have limitations that must be recognized if . 
they are to be used for detailed calibration or for understanding stress transfer mechanisms. 1n 
pa1ticular, the stressmeter output is dependent on: a) the calibration factor (for conversion of wire 
vibration frequency to stress) which is rock modulus-dependent, b) the gauge-borehole contact area, 
and, c) the orientation of the gauge load axis. Of these dependencies, the gauge factor is particularly 
important in the 5900 pillar as a single factor is used for all gauges, even thought the particular rock 
unit may be of significantly-different modulus (e.g., siderite vs. quartzite), and this could account 
for unexpected variability in gauge readings in the pillar. 
After completion of the pillar creation, two observation holes were drilled into the west and east 
walls of the drift, radially in the pillar to its outer extent. The west hole was drilled down the axis of 
the 30 vein, while the east hole was drilled slightly off the vein itself in the wall rock between the 30 
and 40 veins. The core was disced over most of its length (with the exception of the region directly 
near the drift), with the thickness of discs varying significantly from fairly wide-spaced to intense 
discing. The east hole showed no discing for the last l 0' or so of the core. As described later, the 
reason is probably because this portion of the hole is in good-quality silicic rocks. The west hole had 
lost or rubblized core for about the bottom 10' of the hole (at the edge of the pillar). The west hole 
has showed significant breakouts over the bottom half to 2/3 of the hole, although the hole, itself, is 
open and passable. The east hole shows minor breakout damage. 
The mining of the major strike pillar above 5900 Level is underway and will continue through 2015, 
and Hecla desires to have a numerical stress analysis modd available that can be with some 
degree of confidence in examining the stability of this pillar during various extraction scenarios. 
m 
The questions the 5900 pillar are as 
• Is the pi!!ar currently in a failed or unfailed state? 
• Do the monitored stresses make sense given the expected in situ stress field measured at 
the Lucky Friday mine, and the stress concentration factor due to the pillar creation? 
• Given the high stress values monitored, why is the drift not showing more damage? 
• Is the discing and hole breakout observed what might be expected given the monitored 
stresses? 
• Why is the response of the pillar apparently difterent on the t\VO sides of the 5900 drift? 
The 3DEC model of Itasca was used to simulate the 30 vein and mining to create the pillar. The 
model is different from previous modeling work by Pikalnis (2009) in that it allows inelastic failure 
and stress redistribution to occur. Although very little site-specific laboratory strength test data was 
available, literature values were used for some rock mass parameters. In addition to the limited lab 
testing, in situ rock quality characteristics observed in the 30 vein stopes were used to estimate rock 
mass strength parameters. The orebody rock mass was assumed to behave in a relatively brittle 
fashion characterizea by a peak and residual strength. The wall rocks were assumed to behave as a 
thinly-bedded material (a directional shear failure model) with bedding assumed parallel to the 
orebody. The mining sequence was represented in the model in a step-by-step fashion, and the stress 
state monitored at the location of the stressmeters. A sensitivity study was conducted in which the 
orientation of the major in situ stress was varied as well as the uniaxial compressive strength (from 
siderite to quartzite). Failure of the pillar and the sun-ounding stope backs and floors were also 
predicted. Although discing and borehole breakout behavior is poorly-understood, some research, 
particularly laboratory testing to simulate borehole drilling in stressed rock samples, have resulted in 
estimates of the stresses that are required to produce these phenomena. Stresses from the model 
were compared to the stress relationships estimated to produce discing and borehole breakouts 
through the pillar along the length of the observation boreholes. 
A summary of the calibration results are as follows: 
1) A reasonable match of the model to measured stress change was achieved, taking into 
account the considerable uncertainty of the IRAD stressmeters. The match to stress data 
is best for an assumed range of major in situ stress direction of N40W to NJ 5W. This 
direction matches the range of measurement of stresses within the Coeur d'Alene district 
in general. 
2) The reason for the variation in monitored stress on the east and west side of the 5900 
drift is unknown, however, the measurements fall within the typical uncertainty of the 
IRAD gauge The most is the 
iv 
the to stress 
calibration factor is dependent on the the rock in which the 
gauge is installed. The high variability of the rock modulus (vitreous quartzite to 
siderite-argillite) means that a wide range of calibration factors should theoretically be 
used for reduction of the gauge readings based on core obtained from the hole. Since the 
same gauge factor is used for all gauges, considerable uncertainty in the conversion to 
stress from location to location can occur. Other uncertainties involve installation 
orientations and hole roundness (contact seating area). Because of these uncertainties, 
the match of data to model is, in general, considered to be very good. 
3) The model predicts that the outer boundaries of the pillar (about 10' to 15' thick) will 
fail in a brittle extensional and shearing mode. This relieves the stresses from these areas 
and transfers them further into the confined core of the pillar. Although prediction of 
discing and borehole breakouts is highly uncertain, literature laboratory results have 
been used to estimate the stress conditions necessary to obtain discing and breakouts in 
brittle rocks. These stresses were compared to the stress predicted in the pillar along the 
west and east observation holes. This compadson shows that the stresses, with the 
exception of the zone around the 5900 drift, are sufficient to produce discing and 
borehole breakouts, particularly in the weaker siderite zones. The observation holes 
show extensive discing whose intensity appears to vary by rock type, but discing occurs 
throughout most of the holes away from the 5900 drift. Breakouts occur in both holes, 
and are strongest in the west borehole,.although both holes are. open and passable to the 
camera The bottom l O' of the west borehole is rubblized and core lost, which 
corresponds to the depth of extensive failure predicted by the modeling. The bottom 10' 
of the east borehole, conversely, shows little non-failed core in what appears to be strong 
silicic material. The east hole actually is drilled in the stronger rocks between the 30 and 
40 veins, and this could account for the better condition of the core. The studies indicate 
that breakout occurrence is predicted to be marginal in the strong quartizites. 
4) The model indicates that the yielded region around the 5900 drift is relatively small; 
about J drift radius in the back and sidewalls of the drift. The model indicates that the 
drift should be stable under the given stress conditions, largely because it is driven 
parallel to the major principal stress that flo,vs vein-perpendicular. 
5) The rock strength prope1iies chosen for the stronger silicic rocks result in approximately 
the correct yielding zone of brittle fracturing in the back and floor observed in the 
overhand and underhand stopes (about 3 to 5' of back fracturing). 
6) The model indicates a closure of the orebody (hangingwall to footwall) at the 5900 drift 
of about 1.5" which is similar to that measured by the tape extensometer. This is not a 
very accurate calibration measure, but at least the modeling appears to have used, 
roughly, the con·ect applied N-S stress and Young's modulus of the material. 
of Overall 
The mode[ calibration is considered to be reasonable in comparison to observations the 
uncertainties in the rock prope1iies (lack of lab data) and measurements. The important question at 
this point is: what is the stability state of the pillar, and how might it be expected to respond in the 
future? The model clearly indicates that the core of the pillar is still in an unfailed, elastic state with 
the yielded regions Jimited to about JO to 15' of the outer limits of the pillar and the area around the 
5900 drift. The rate of stress change observed in the stressmeters is reproduced by the model and is 
what should be expected-the most rapid increase in stress occurs during the final stages of 
separation of the pillar from the surrounding 30 vein. Although modeling of the continued mining of 
the 30 vein was not performed, it is expected that stress change in the pillar should stabilize. It is 
expected that a pillar of this dimension should have an elastic core. As discussed in the document, 
the pillar has a width:height ratio of around 8 to 10: 1. Experience at other sites and research studies 
have shown that pillars with w:h ratios in brittle rocks become elastic for w:h ratios greater than 
about 3. This is because the edges of the pillars will spall and fracture parallel to the free surface 
(like discing) and undergo large dilation (i.e., the fractures will attempt to open in extension). Since, 
for squat pillars, this rock cannot displace, it tends to confine the interior of the pillar, allowing large 
stresses to build without yielding since the rock strength increases dramatically with confining 
pressure. These pillars can sti!I produce small seismic events in the highiy-stressed regions around 
the periphery, but are unlikely to crush out completely. Time-dependent yielding in this periphery 
area can still lead to small seismic events as the pillar slowly adjusts to the stress redistribution. 
Larger seismic events associated with this type of pillar (sometimes experienced in South Afi:ican 
gold mines in shaft protection and strike or dip-stabilizing pillars) are most often attributed to 
foundation shear failure-i.e., "punching" of the pillar into the softer foundation rocks with 
associated shear fractures forming in the hangingwall or footwal! rocks along the edges of the 
pillars. Since the wall rock at the Gold Hunter is argillite, it may continue to deform along this 
boundary. It would seem that the most likely cause of seismicity in the wall rock would be 
unfavorably-oriented fault structures affected by the stress redistribution rather than events 
specifically in the pillar itself. Potential for these types ofevents can be examined during the next 
phase of analysis of the mining of the pillar above the 5900 level. 
It is recommended that monitoring of the stressmeters be continued as they provide a good 
indication of any time-dependent, or unusual changes in stress applied to the pillar. It is expected, 
however, that these stresses should continue to stabilize as the mining front moves away from the 
immediate pillar area. Small scale seismicity can still be expected in the periphery of the pillar and 
in the immediate footwall and hangingwall at the pillar boundary as it continues to attempt to 
"punch" into the walls. For this reason, the 5900 drift could be subjected to repeated vibration. The 
primary function of the ground support would seem to be retainment of the loosened 5' or so of 
failed rock in the back of the drift. Grouted bolts and mesh would appear to be adequate for this 
purpose, but continued re-evaluation of the drifi: condition and support adequacy should be made. 
Use of closure measurements in the drift and possibly one or more ve1tically-oriented extensometers 
in the drift back would help to identify whether loosened zone is and thus 
length of the insta!led support is adequate. 
vi 
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This reviews of the 3DEC numerical 
and borehole and drift stability observations in 5900 drift at the mine in 
Mullan, Idaho. The 5900 drift crosses from the Silver Shaft through the 30 and 40 veins to the 
footwall ramp development and is required to be stable for access to the stopes from the Silver 
Shaft A 50-60' radius circular drift protection pillar was left in place through the 30 vein with 
the 5900 drift at its center. The pillar was created by adjusting the ends of adjacent cut and fill 
stopes such that a circular shape was created. After driving of the 5900 drift, IRAD stressmeters 
were installed in short boreholes drilled vertically up and horizontally into each wall of the drift 
at the orebody intersection. These stressmeters are oriented to monitor stress change resulting 
from the pillar creation in the vein-perpendicular (roughly N-S) direction. In addition to the 
stress data, two horizontal observation diamond drill holes were dri lied in the sidewalls of the 
drift down the axis of the vein after the pillar was completed. The core was examined to record 
initial pillar condition and have been scoped with a digital borescope a number of times to record 
damage accmmilatfon. 
A previous study of the stressmeter data and pillar failure observations was conducted by 
Pikalnis (2009). This study utilized an elastic numerical model (MAP3D) to perform a prediction 
of stress change in the pillar as a function of estimated orientation and_ magnitude of the in situ 
stress components. The conclusion of this study 'i-Vas that an E-W major horizontal stress 
component with a value of 15 times the vertical (gravitational) stress provided the best fit to the 
stressmeter data. Empirical damage criteria, based on the ratio of either the maximum shear 
stress (Gt - v3) or the maximum induced stress (cr1) to the uniaxial compressive strength (ac), 
were used to compare to observations of borehole discing, reportedly showing good correlation 
to the discing. However, to achieve this correlation, stresses obtained from two different major 
stress orientations (E-W and Nl SW) ,vere used to explain differences in observations between 
the east and west observation holes. 
In this study, the 3DECmodel is used to the and pi! creation assuming 
the orebody rock mass behave as yielding materials. The induced stresses and damage 
to stressmeter data and borehole that the 
reasonably well to the data and observations, that the major 
stress is at an azimuth of roughly N40W. The conclusion from the analyses indicates that the 
pil1ar is yielded around its perioherv. but that the interior of the oillar remains at an unvielded. 
- - "" "' .,. ' • l, ., , 
elastic state. It is felt that the pillar stresses will not increase dramatically from the current state. 
It is still possible to have relatively low-level seismicity occuning around the periphery of the 
pillar where the stresses are high, but the potentially-larger events would be expected to occur 
due to pillar foundation failure or slip on faults in the wall rocks around the pillar periphery. 
2 
The numerical 
This program is to 
used here is based on 
three-dimensional 
3DEC program Itasca 
geometries and uses a 
"discontinuum" method. This means that the program is capable ofrepresenting the failure of the 
rock mass (i.e., the general rock mass consists of intact rock and in situ jointing) as well as 
movement along major fracture or fault surfaces. To represent rock mass mechanical response, it 
is typically subdivided into blocks separated by the major fault traces. The blocks, which consist 
of intact rock blocks separated by fracture or bedding surfaces, are typically represented by a 
rock mass failure criterion (that takes into account the weakening effects of the general rock 
fracturing). Specific, important faults may be represented explicitly as breaks in the model that 
separate rock mass blocks. In this project, the rock mass is represented without specific fault 
surfaces, and as a rock mass only. The orebody and argil!itic wall rock are represented as distinct 
units with different properties and mechanical behavior The rock mass is subdivided into a large 
number of tetrahedral finite-difference elements in which the stress state and deforn1ation are 
determined. 
The 5900 pillar and surrounding 30 and 40 vein stoping are represented in the 3DEC 
modeL DXF files of the 30 and 40 veins and the access and stope development were supplied by 
Lucky Friday staff, and these were used to form the numerical model. The 30 vein stopes were 
subdivided as per the DXF file and exh·acted stope-by-stope in the actual sequence that occurred 
in the mine. The stopes that formed the basic circular shape of the pillar were mined in a series of 
23 steps (termed Phase I as was used by Pikalnis, 2009), followed by extraction of the remaining 
ore above and below the pillar in 2 steps, tenned Phase U and m. Figures l through 3 show large 
scale and close-up views of the 5900 pillar from the hangingwall. Here, the actual DXF slope 
outlines are shown in transparent mode with the 3DEC model representation given behind. The 
infrastructure development is also given showing the correspondence of the model to the actual 
geometry. 
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Figure l Outer boundary of the model showing 3DEC block structure. The model is about 
3300' on a side, with the y ax:is pointing north. The orientation of the 01·ebody 
(dip 90°, dip direction 17°) can be seen in the blocks. The 30 vein is located deep 
inside this model. 
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(note, the non-pillar areas of tbe 30 and 40 veins a1·e removed from the 3DEC 
model for visual clarity). 
5 
Ronne! E. Barrette, eta! vs Helca Mining Co., etal Docket No, 43639 560 of 1172 
561 of 1172 
3DEC4.10 
0'Jf.(J1}ta-;~ ConJ'~Crooip. lno. 
Step 2COJ 
3/21/20 10 5:07:25 PM 
Block 
Colotby: Region 
I ' 
~1 
, , ~ 
33 
I~ 31 :); 27 24 :15 23 22 
. . • 39 
JI 35 I 42 
31; 
II n I 28 
i~l ":{J I 2 
41 
~ 44 
• ~5 
3 
l\'l 0 
Axe.1 
D:\'F 
))Vn Asbuills Sofids.d,f 
X= 1,fi .66<1 to 91A.586 
V= 92.0>00 lo 268.38 
Z= -1815.97 lo ·1315.06-
La1_ar names: (1 l,yers.ALL are visible) 
II 30VE1N _ASBUILT _ S0U0S 
DYE' 
0e¥eiopment_A•built • _ So~ds. dxf 
• 
~~ 
rt'ITASCK 
Denver, Inc. 
Figure 3 Close-up view of the 30 vein and infrastructure geometry superimposed on the 
3DEC model of the 30 vein 5900 pillar area. The 3DEC model is subdivided into 
stopes as seen to form the 5900 pillar. 
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3.1 [AL TO REPRESENT THE MAJOR ROCK UNITS 
The Gold Hunter rock mass is represented in this calibration .model as material types: 
the orebody and the footvvall and hangingwall argillites. For the level of this analysis, it is felt 
that the orcbody and host rock are not required to be further subdivided into various rock types 
since we don't have detailed mapping ofthe variability. However, a sensitivity study is made to 
look at variability in the ore strength and separate models are run assuming a silicic quartizite 
and siderite ore. 
3.2 OREBODY REPRESENTATION 
The orebody, which is composed of vein material and silicified rocks, siderites and 
quartzites, is represented as a material that is elastic until its peak is reached, followed 
by yielding and reduction in strength to residual strength failure. This type of model is 
termed a "strain-softening" or "strain-degradation" model in that the strength is degraded with 
increasing shearing strain after peak strength. The strength of the ore is defined using a standard 
method using the Hoek-Bmwn failure criteria (Figure 4). 
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Figure 4 The Hoek-Brown failure envelope is a parabolic function describing the rock 
mass failure condition in ternts of the major principal stress. Stress states below 
the criteria indicate an elastic rock mass, while stress states on the criteria 
. indicate a failed state. Stress states above the cdteria are riot possible dhe to 
yielding and stress redistribution. 
A Hoek-Brown strength critetion defines the peak strength of the rock mass in terms of 
the principal stresses (cr,, the major, or driving, principal stress; and cr3, the minor or confining 
principal stress). During excavation, the stresses in the 5900 pillar will evolve from the in situ 
stress, typically increasing in the center, confined portion of the pillar as a result of stress relief 
and concentration from the mining. If the stress state reaches the failure condition, yield in that 
region will occur, and the stresses will decrease based on how much strain occurs in the rock 
mass. Figure 4 illustrates conceptually, "stress paths'' for rock at the failing edge of the pillar and 
in the confined, elastic core of the pillar. Figure 5 shows a schematic of the assumed stress~strain 
behavior of the rock mass which is typical of strong, brittle rocks, such as quartzite. This figure 
indicates that after peak strength, the rock will yield and the strength will decay to a residual 
level over some amount of shear strain. The "brittleness" (or, violence) of the failure response is 
governed by hmv quickly strength decays from peak to residual strength. If this strength 
very stnal l levels the response 
lTI over this occurs is the 
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response is more "ductile" in nature and is le ss violent and typi cally is accompanied by large 
deformation. In the 3DEC ana lyses, it is assumed that the ore resµonds as a relatively brittle 
material which could respond in a seismic nature. This is an assumption based on experience in 
the s il icic, Coeur d' Alene rock types. 
S tro~1 
· PEokSt r~ngth 
R,;;;idu~I .Strength 
~ 
c' 
-
S1rii. i11 
- - -Figure ~ The 6reb-od5,- rock m-ass is-i·epresented \vith a peak and residual strength, termed 
a "strain softening" model. The brittleness (i.e., the violence of the failure 
response) is controlled by the slope of the failure response going from peak to 
residual strength. In this report, it is assumed that the response is relatively 
bt·ittle to reflect the brittle fracturing response observed in the orebody. 
3.3 ARGILLITE W ALLROCK REPRESENTATION 
The argillite, on the other hand, is assumed to behave in a ductile fashion in which the 
response is dominated by the weak cleavage planes which are assumed to strike sub-parallel to 
the orebody. A material model, termed tbe ubiquitous joint model, is used in 3DEC to represent a 
thinly-bedded rock mass like the argi[lite. This material model assumes that the rock mass has a 
large number of bedding planes or joints oriented parallel to the ore body, and that these joints are 
weak (i .e., no cohesive strength-in other words, they can be pulled apart easily) and that the 
friction angle along them is low, as a result of the typical s lickensides and chloritic/talcy 
minerals on the ir surfaces. This model al lows shear to occur in the direction of the cleavage 
planes, and large defo rmation (buckling) into the excavat ions. 
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As stated above, the Hoek-Bmwn is used to the stress level at 
failure for the orebody. The Hoek-Brown criterion is a parabolic relationship between the major 
and minor stress at failure (Figure 4). Rock mass properties are estimated by the following 
approach: 
l) The Hoek-Brown failure criteria for intact (laboratory-scale) rock specimens is 
defined by curve-fitting the criteria to uniaxial (UCS) and triaxial compression data. 
The HB failure criteria is expressed as follows: 
Two parameters describe the failure envelope for intact samples of rock: the UCS 
(crci) and m; which defines the amount of curvature of the envelope. In our case, we 
have little actual laboratory data to describe the various rock types. Currently, a few 
tests of the UCS (provided by NIOSHf indicate a significant variability in orebody 
strength based on content of siderite, quartzite and argil!ite. The UCS of the siderite 
samples averages around 50 MPa (about 7000 psi) whereas the vitreous quartzite is 
around l 7,000 psi or 115 MPa. To fit the HB envelope to the intact rock sample data, 
the curvature parameter, mi> shown in the above equation is required. 1n the absence 
of triaxial data on these rock types, from which m1 is typically derived, approximate 
literature values for quatizite are used. Here, a value of mi of 20 is assumed. A 
laboratory program consisting ofuniaxial and triaxial testing in the primary rock units 
at the Gold Hunter will be recommended in a separate letter report. It should be 
noted that the UCS testing conducted for Gold Hunter falls at the !o,ver end of the 
range for ore types in the Lucky Friday mine as reported by Whyatt et al. ( 1996). 
They the following average values of mechanical properties for the Lucky 
Friday mine (Table l): 
to 
TABLE l 
Values of Rock Mass Strength and Modulus for 
(Whyatt et al., 1996) 
luel<y Fi.i,y, 
Vitreous quartzite (FW)-4250 . > • ~ ••••••• < l<S S,8,300 17~ 2.500 662 
Vl1toou• qu01ui11 (HWJ·S100. 5300 •..•.••.. l&l 23.400 NO NO 76.5 
Vrtu,aus quartzite (H\V--tuuled f1acture} -42$0 . , 151 21,900 ND ND 5$,:Z 
Soticitic quartzlt• IFW).,,250 
·-·-
., .... .. )1,1 <S,500 17.2 2,500 SJ.I 
9.6 
11.1 
e.o 
7.7 
•• rl,,'fJrTASCA" 
Mine 
0.2? NO 
NO 0.15 
NO 0.08 
0.22 NO 
Note: Table I was reproduced directly from Whyatt et aL (1996). There appears to be a typo in the MPa-psi 
conversion for the first enu-y of compressive stl'ength. TI1ese values arc all taken from the Lucky Friday 
Mine. 
As seen in this table, the rock UCS values are significantly higher than estimated by 
Pikalnis based on limited testing (10 UCS tests) of Gold Hunter rocks. Thus, it is 
likely that the UCS for quartizite in the Gold Hunter could have a significantly larger 
range (and perhaps higher strength) than assumed in the Pikalnis report. 
Observations in a site visit to the Gold Hunter certainly indicated beds of quartzite 
near the orebody whose UCS likely exceeded the 16,000 psi (l 15 MPa) assumptions 
made here. 
2) Obviously, the strength response for small, intact rock samples does not represent the 
actual strength of the in situ rock mass. The Hoek-Brown approach provides for a 
methodology for adjusting the failure envelope of the intact rock to in situ values 
based on the "quality" of the rock mass. This quality is typically expressed in terms of 
the GSI (Geologic Strength Index - approximately equal to the RMR) of the rock 
mass, which is based on the degree of fracturing and the coatings on fractures. Figure 
6 shows a chart illustrating the method of determining GSf. Pikalnis (2009) 
performed an analysis of the GSI for the ore, which was confirmed during my visit to 
the mine in Feb. 2010. The orebody is typically a good quality material with clean 
and rough natural fractures, i·esuiting in a GSI estimate of around 55 to 60. The 
resulting estimate of the Hoek-Bro\vn failure criteria for the ore body base condition is 
given in Figure 4. 
11 
567 of 1172 • 
GS/ System 
Mn.s.~iv;- ~ very wolf intartod<ed 
undisturb~d rock mass bla:ks klrmad 
by lhroo or less disoooti1'JitySals 
with very 1vlde join I SP3ciog 
Joim .spacing > HJO cm 
Blocky - w,ry well Iola r1cckM 
undisluJb•d rock mass consl!!lng 
ol wbical t:lod<s formod bJ thm• 
orthogon,I dlsronlinutty sots 
Joint spacing 3() - 100 an 
Very Blocky • intorlod<oo, partially 
disturbGd rock rno.ss v,~h rnulilacolod 
engu!arbh:cks lomied I>/ lour or mom 
discouUnuity s@ls 
Jofnt spseiflg 10 - 30 cm 
~ 
" 't: ii! 
V 
l 
i 
" ti 
_g 
t 
'C 
~ 
.. 
Ti & SI ~ ~ a, ~ !Z :?:-q JI ~ ~ :,. ~ = II) 13 -ig 
~i E " 
,> C J;"' 
-ai~ ~ g -a &5 g ;20') ! (!) a: ·-
• f ,-1,f""'ITASCA' Denver, Inc . 
.c I .i:; 
·~ E ·:;: 
,. Cl 
" g~ a o-"k 
-"' H, :, 
"' 
-g Ii 'C g 
GO i E' "'~ 
,! "' g= ~ ti l'"' 
€~ 
"'-z 0 
"'"' lgi :c g 
ti'·~ ,,~·; 
~8 ~ 0 - 'C u 
~ "2 8 'ill >-0. C <1 
._l a. ?:; ~ ~~§ <> = C, > UJ /It 
1.E+07 
LE+05 
1.E,,04 f 
E 
!:,, 
;:; 
> 
- -------------'------1--.,__,__ ..,__,.__.._...,__.; _ _,_-1.-1.E+-D3 ~ 1 drn3 
Blocky/disturbed - toldoo andlc>r 
laullad with angular blod<.s fo1me:I by 
rnany inlersec1ing dls::ooonulty !!l9!s 
Joint.spacing 3 , .. 10 cm 
Dl•lntegrated - peony intartoclood, 
hoavUy broken rcci< rnnss wah a 
mi>ctum or angular and roondGd 
rock.piocas 
Joint spQcrlg < :J cm 
FoU.,to<lllominatodl, hoared-lhioly I 
larninotoo or foliato<! , tactonically shgan,d 
w•ak rod<; clos;ly Sl"'cod !rl\lslooily l 
pfllllaHs CN9r any othar dis::ontinulty S<>L 
rB9Jlllng in complale laol. ol blockiness 
Joinl sp.1cing < 1 an 12 
WA NIA 
4 
' 
, . 
' 
' ' ' 
' 
) 
' f ' ' ) 
' ' I ' / ' ' ' ·, 
' 
/ 
' 
/ 
1.5 0 ,67 
Jc=JR IJA 
i 
ti 
0 
1.E+02 ai 
LE+O l 
' ' 11.&00 1 crri3 ' / ' ' / /5 I 
· t .E-Oi 
0.25 0.09 
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12 
Ronne! E. Barrette, eta! vs Helca Mining Co., eta! Docket No. 43639 567 of 1172 
IN 
The in situ stress state in the d'Alene district has been reported 
(1 as shown in Table 2. This correlation is based on stress measurements at the 
et al. 
and 
5300 levels of the Lucky as well as the 7300 level the Star mine. The measurements 
indicate a cr1 direction of about N40W and a ratio of cr 1/av of approximately 1.5. The maximum 
stress direction is reinforced by numerous observations of breakouts in boreholes, shafts and 
raises as summarized in Figure 7. Pikalnis (2009) estimated a maximum stress direction of E-W 
based on a best-fit back-analysis of the 5900 pillar IRAD stressmeter readings. To my 
knowledge, the available stress measurements and raise breakouts district-wide show a range in 
cr 1 direction of approximately N20W to N40W (Whyatt, 2001). The borehole breakouts typical 
of the Lucky Friday (and other mines in the Coeur d'Alene district) need to be compared to 
breakouts observed in the Gold Hunter side of the mine. This was not done for this calibration 
report. In commenting on this report, Gold Hunter staff report that breakouts in the Gold Hunter 
are often bedding-related rather than necessarily being stress-related. This makes sense since the 
\.vea1(bedding orienfatioh may dominate the failure 111echanisf1.i of a raisebore and thus "cloud" 
the stress-related spalling mechanism that is often seen in hard and brittle rocks. It was felt, 
therefore, that observation of breakouts in the Lucky Friday and other Coeur d'Alene mines, 
unaffected by the weak bedding, provide a better true picture of the stress orientation. It is 
important to note that the major stress direction in the district is relatively consistent, and a 
function of the movement on the Osburn Fault. It is difficult to imagine that the stress direction 
can have a major change in direction in the Wallace Formation due, presumably to bedding 
anisotropy. 
The in situ stress state applied to the model was varied from Nl5W to N40W, with 
the vertical stress component based on 1.2 psi/ft depth and a ratio of cr 1/crv of l .5. 
<1n.s·~~·-··· -~~~~-· 
Q S'V •• - •• - •••• - - • ~. 
o • ............. 
1,,.,,., .. 
T ns;/v • ~ • • · · · • -
T ,;dv . • . . . ...•.. 
o, .......... . 
02 ...... .. 
TABLE 
Mine In Situ Stress Estimate 
(Why:att et at, 1995) 
57 2..5 
49 2.2 
35 l.6 
-15 --0.6 
2 0.1 
-'IO -0.4 
70 3:1 N40' W 
42 1.8 S41' W 
1Magnttude is a function of overtlurcJen depth. 
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Figure 7 Breakout observations at the Lucky Friday and Star mines (Whyatt et aL, 1995) 
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A of model analyses were run for comparison to stressmeter measurements, 
discing, and borehole breakout observations. These are summarized below: 
I) In situ stress variation 
a) Base case model assumes 0 1 direction ofN40W and 0i/0v of 1.5. 
b) Alternative stress model assumes (Ji direction ofN1 SW and cr1lov of 1.5. 
2) Strength variation 
a) Assumes a base case stress condition. 
b) Base case assumes a UCS strength for ore body of 115 MP a (16,900 psi) and 
GSJ (or RMR) of 60. This is the "fair to good quality silicified orebody'' 
assumption. 
c) Alternative case assumes a UCS strength of the orebody of l l 5 MPa, but a GSf 
of 50, which is a "poor to fair quality silicified orebody" assumption. 
d) Alternative case assumes a siderite orebody with UCS of 50 MPa (7350 psi) and 
-GSf of 50, representing a poor-fair quality siderite. 
The initial in situ stress variations were run for comparison to the stressmeters, followed 
by variation of the strength for the N40W base case to examine the impact of strength variability 
of the ore on pillar failure extent and mechanisms. 
4.1 STRESS V ARIA TIO N 
A series of plots showing the evolving maximum principal stress (vein-perpendicular) 
and the regions of failed rock are contoured through the center of the 5900 pillar are given in 
8-11 for the base case stress state and As seen in these plots, 
the immediate edges of the pillar as well as the back (and floor) of stopes yield in shear and 
extension as the stopes are mined. This creates a thin "rind" of failed material initially about five 
feet thick and pushes the stress concentration into the confined regions of the rock mass. This 
failure depth corresponds reasonably well with the slabbing observed in the face of overhand 
stopes which was induced by fracturing in the back of the previous stope. This slabbing is due to 
both 
stresses that 
and and is a result of the stress concentration from the 
from model some 
16 
the of the 
may a assumed (l 5 
As the mining progresses, the depth of failure within the pillar increases until it reaches a 
thickness about 15 to 20' This is essentially the depth of spalling or failure that rn ight be 
expected at the completion of Phase HI. Jnspection of the stress state shows that the stresses are 
more-or-less symmetric on either side of the 5900 drift-in other words, there is not large 
variation in induced stresses on the east or west side of the pillar, and no large influence of the 40 
vein can be seen. 
17 
573 of 1172 
JDEC'4.10 
eao;lN:'I~,.._ ...... 
St'l'I' 1 19ll 
~,r.o10-S:7'1'JiFt,, 
"-"'' D.W 
O-!op;ntcnt."4b~1ih_S11has.;jd 
;(.,,.71,c5Jld\5:!,IU 
Y• -12St.S,114 3».ir...6 
Z.. -1631 i610 · f.2CJ } J 
•tr=~!;?;.~~~lde) 
YYS tttU 
':.11c1 •'.:"tlllt"'11t1o9 V:m:~.lAC. 
Min:w.,p<llit. Minne,~~ fJS.,.. 
3DEC4.10 
!D\)turac.........,... ~.,... 
Sttp,:': \!l:C 
J/21DJIO '5:23:38" PM 
Blo<k 
Pu1rt (I' 
•:~01~:, St,t~ 
a 'lt..tt•.C 
~.tf'tU1•Pf101M!fl'p 
l-.ht»-nJhu1·pJ•nti11,..p thUMl thur-~ ltn;1on-11mo1-v tf1tJion1 1hut-n 
"""' DXF
o,,,..1~ -n.,r,1)'1bvl:•_Se,.d! ,thi 
»e~J3"110 ISJAJl 
"l's- 12SC,9Alo ~.€6,I; 
~ ·18)176 Ut • l~)!n 
L\lft'=1;~;~;~~~ble) 
~n.;.l Cnnaa1snql'; ,c,,,,p,lll(.. 
""""'P'P'lti,.,.fi~nnf)I~ US;.. 
Denver, Inc. 
Figure 8 Base case stress state and failed regions at mining step 14 (Nov/2006) Stresses 
are in Pa (le6 Pa= 147 psi). At this stage, the stress concentratfons are mostly 
near the pillar edges with destressing in the local back of the 5900 drift. The 
pillar edges and immediate back of the 5900 drift are yielding (blue=nonfailecl, 
elastic). Note the stope backs and tloo1· yield to a depth of approx. 5' with 
these strength properties assumptions . 
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Figure 9 Base case stress state and failed regions at mining step 23 (May/2007 - end Phase 
T). Stresses are in Pa (1 e6 Pa = 147 psi). At this stage, the stress concentrations 
have migrated inward from the failed pillar edges with destressing in the local 
back of the 5900 drift. Approximately same yielding conditions as previous; note 
inner core of pillar is elastic. 
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Figure 10 Base case stress state and failed regions at mining step 24 (March/2008, end Phase 
II). Stresses are in Pa (le6 Pa = 147 psi). The depth of failure in from the edges of 
the pillar reached about 10 to 15', depending on location. The greatest stress 
concentration is formed in a sharp band in from the yielded rim due to the 
confined nature of the pillar core. 
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Figure 11 Base case stress state and failed regions at mining step 25 (current, end Phase III). 
Stresses are in Pa {le6 Pa == 147 psi). The depth of failure in from the edges of the 
pillar stabilized at about 10 to 15', depending on location. The greatest stress 
concentration is formed in a sharp band in from the yielded rim due to the 
confined nature of the pillar core. 
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case and are 
to the stressmeter measurements in 
stress that over and the in situ stress) is plotted as a function (i.e., 
step). As seen, the stress is slightly higher (about 1500 to 2000 or about 10%) on the 
west side of the pillar than on the east side. The range in stress for all three stressmeter locations 
for the two stress cases are given by the shaded boxes. The base case (N40W) indicates induced 
stresses at the end of Phase III mining ranging from about 12 to 16,000 psi and about 9 l l ,000 
psi for the N 15 W case. The measured stresses fall in this same range, with the west gauges 
falling within the range of the N40W case we! l and the east gauges falling within the NL SW case 
reasonably well. In general, it is felt that this correspondence is actually very good, given the 
typical sensitivity ofIRAD stressmeter calibration and results to factors such as: 
• Gauge factor the calibration factor of the gauges is sensitive to the modulus of the 
rock mass. The high variability of the rock along the GH boreholes, from siderite to 
vitreous quartzite results in a high variability of modulus. Depending on exactly 
where the gauge is installed, the calibration factors could vary significantly. For 
accurate stres_s sha_nge measurement, the gauges are typically calibrated for the 
particular rock type by installing the in a core of the and 
compressing in the laboratory. 
• Gauge contact area with tbe borehole wall - the calibration and response of the 
gauges is highly sensitive to the match of gauge seating platens to the hole wan and 
the resulting contact area. 
• Orientation - the stress monitored by the gauge is sensitive to axis orientation. As 
demonstrated by Pikalnis, the stress monitored by the stress meter will vary 
significantly with even a few degrees ofrotation of the axis of the seating platen. 
For these reasons, the calibration (which was done without attempting to manipulate the 
estimated in situ stress magnitude) is considered to be very good and lends confidence to the 
interpretation that a N40W stress provides a reasonable and conservative maximum stress 
orientation and that the 1.5 maximum:minimum stress ratio is also reasonable. It does not make 
sense to attempt to make any more detailed assessment of these measurements at this time. 
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Figure 12 Prediction of induced stress change at East} West1 and Top stressmeter locations 
for two cases of the direction of cr 1: N40W and N15W. The approximate range of 
the predictions is given by the shaded boxes. 
4.2 COMPARISON OF MODEL TO OBSERVATIONS OF HOLE BREAKOUT AND 
DISCING 
4.2.1 Prediction ofFailed Regions 
The depth of failure given by the base case model can be summarized as follows: 
1) The failure depth in the pillar reaches a maximum of around 10 to 15' around the 
outer rim of the pillar and stabilizes after the "Phase I!" extraction when the pillar is 
fully created by mining (Figure 10). Failure is by extension along the outer edge, and 
shear in the interior confined zone at the rim. Failure in this model would typically 
mean formation of new fractures and shear on existing fractures. Drilling into this 
zone would potentially mean encountering poor core recovery and core loss. 
zones 
The interior of the pUlar 
and below the 5900 drift to a 
elastic and is 
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Further this failed zone can be determined exam the level of induced 
in the pillar. 13 shows the base case maximum principal strain induced in the pillar, 
contoured to a level of 0.05%, which is an approximate level for extensional cracking of concrete 
or rock. As seen, this zone of expected new fracturing is approximately the same depth as 
indicated by the yielded zone. Again , the meaning of this zone is that formation of newly-
developed fracturing or movement on existing fractures can be expected. 
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Figure 13 Base case strain Jevels induced in the pillar. The red region has strain levels 
exceeding 0.5%, which is the approximate level of extensional strain at which 
concrete and underground cave mine cracking are observed. This zone roughly 
follows the yield zone above and is the region where new fractures might be 
expected. 
4.2.1.1 Discing and Bre(l/cout 
In addition to the damage level observed in the stope backs and floors, damage within the 
pillar was observed from drilling of the east and west GH holes (Figure 14 and 15). 
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Figure 14 GH West borehole core. Note moderate to strong discing over entire length of 
the hole, with rubbiized and iost core beiow about 50' length. 
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Figure 15 GH East borehole core. Note moderate to strong discing over entire length of the 
hole, with the exception of the final 10' of hole which is in a mostly-undamaged 
condition. 
A summary of the hole observations is as follows: 
• Both holes show moderate to strong discing behavior over much of their length, 
although the east hole shows no discing for the bottom 1 O' or so of the hole. 
However, the end of the ho le is in the region between the 30 and 40 veins , which 
appears to be more silicified and stronger (Figure 16). 
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Figure 16 Plan view of the 5900 pillar and drift showing west and east observation holes. 
Note that the east observation hole is not centered in the pillar and passes out 
through the silicified zone between the 30 and 40 veins. 
• The bottom 5 to JO' of the west hole is strongly disced and rubblized. 
• Both holes remain open and passable to the video camera probe. Video shows that the 
west hole has breakouts at the top and bottom of the hole for the final half of the hole. 
The east hole has some breakouts in the hofe and joint offset from about 30 to 40' 
depth, but the remainder of the hole is circular and in good condition. 
The conclusion from these above points is that although the west hole shows greater 
damage in terms of discing and breakouts, both holes (with the exception of the end of the west 
hole) are open with only local evidence of intense hole failure or squeezing. 
A number of researchers have studied the stress state and rock that in 
discing of core. The most interesting work are laboratory simulations in which diamond drilling 
was perfotmed into a rock sample subjected to applied biaxial stresses (e.g., Lee and Haitnson, 
1993). These studies have resulted in estimates of the stress conditions that lead to discing and 
borehole breakout for numerous rock 
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of core stubs occurs when tbe stress the results 
extensional failure of the core stub. The thickness of the discs is indicative of the intensity of 
the stresses-the thinner the disc, the greater the principal stress difference. Figure 17 provides a 
plot of the relationship between the principal stresses that result in discing for granite. To 
understand the stress state in the stub, computer models were used to simulate the drilling 
process and estimate the stresses corresponding to tensile failure of the core stub. The plot shown 
in Figure 17 is an approximate relationship for granite and is based on a low tensile strength and 
brittle behavior. The quartzites and siderites at the Gold Hunter will undoubtedly be different, 
but this plot provides some basis for addressing the question of whether discing is expected in 
the pillar, given the stresses, or is there some other mechanism occurring? 
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Figure 17 Relationship of the principal stresses for which core discing is likely to occur (solid 
symbols). The stress crz is pa1·aI1el to the borehole while the other components are 
perpendicu1ar to the hole. The component Gm is the average of all three 
components. The black circles are derived from laboratory testing. 
The stresses for an E-W line through the center of the 30 vein (we did not account for the 
off-center East hole alignment), through the 5900 drift and to the E and W extremities of the 
pillar ,vere detem1ined and plotted in the form of the discing predictions (Figure 17) in Figure 
18. As seen in this plot, the stress conditions in the entire pillar are either in a possible discing 
condition or borderline condition (with the exception of the area immediately adjacent to the 
5900 drift). [t is therefore assumed that the character of the observed discing, which, \'\11th the 
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rock stress which fall 
discing limit. The bottom line is that the stress conditions in the pillar appear to be conducive to 
discing over most of its width and are not 
due to strength variability. 
related to extensive failure of the pillar, but 
4.2.J.3 B0rel1ole Breakout 
Spalling of the boreholes, particularly the 'vvest borehole, has been observed in the digital 
borehole video. The spalling has occurred at the top and bottom of the hole, which is consistent 
with the maximum stress being horizontal and oriented in a vein-perpendicular direction. The 
relationship of spalling in boreholes to stress magnitude and rock strength is not certain, and 
some researchers have concluded that there is no unique relationship between stress and 
breakout. However, Lee and Haimson (l 993) performed laboratory compression testing of large 
rock samples of granite and limestone with boreholes and defined a range of conditions under 
which breakout occuned. Figure 19 illustrates the relationship of the major and minor stresses in 
to the axis under was and 
limestone. The stress state predicted for the 5900 pillar base case along a horizontal line across 
the 5900 pillar in the 30 vein was determined. This line is at the center of the pillar elevation, 
through the 5900 drift. The normalized stresses (normalized by the UCS of both quartzite and 
siderite) are plotted (Figure 20) for positions along this line and given in the form of Figure 19. 
The range of breakout criteria derived from the laboratory for granite and limestone are shown 
on Figure 20. This plot indicates the following: 
1) The pillar stress state (N-S and vertical) perpendicular to the borehole is sufficient to 
result in spalling in quartizite in regions in the outer approximately Yi of the pillar. 
2) The pillar stress state is sufficient to result in spalling in virtually all of the pillar 
where siderite is present. 
This simple correlation indicates that borehole breakouts can occur in highly silicic rocks, 
but only in the outer approximately Vz of the pillar, whereas breakouts are possible anywhere in 
the piilar in siderite. This generally agrees with observations where spailing occurs in the 
rocks west 
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Figure 18 Stress conditions from base case model for a line from the west to east pillar 
boundaries plotted as given in Figure 16. Essentially all of the stress conditions 
in the pillar are conducive to potential discing. 
0.5 
0.0 
0.0 0.2 0.4 o.e OJI LO 
Figure 19 Relationship between the maximum and minimum stresses perpendicular to a 
hole required for breakout. Three rock units: granite and two limestones are 
shown. The stress component on each ax.is is normalized by the compressive 
strength of the rock. 
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Figure 20 Limits of approximate breakout regions from Figure 18 plotted for stresses 
along an E-W line through 30 vein, 5900 pillar. The line goes through the middle 
of the vein and the 5900 drift. The sti·ess states indicate potential for 
breakout in both quartzite and side1·ite, ho-wever, the potential for breakout in 
the weaker siderite zones is much incl·eased. 
4.2.1.4 Closure of Orebody Across 5900 Drift 
· The model was used to estimate the c!osme across the pillar at the 5900 drift. Figure 21 
shows the displacement of the hangingwall side of the pillar (in cm). The total closure 
(hangingwall + footwall displacement) at the location of the 5900 drift is about J .5". This can be 
compared to tape extensometer measurements made regularly and reported by T. Williams. The 
closure reported after completion of the Phase IIl mining is about 1.3", or roughly the same as 
predicted by the model. The deformation equates to a strain of about l.3"/120" (10' vein width), 
or about I%. The exact measurement and comparison is not particularly relevant-the important 
point is that the closures of the orebody are not large, and not sufficient to indicate complete 
crushing of the pillar. 
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Figm;e 21 N-S displacement contours (in cm) of the hangingwall of the pillar. 
Displacements are approximately 1 to 2 cm (0. 75"), or a total closure of 2 to 4 cm 
(1.5") at the 5900 drift location. Measurements using a tape extensometer 
indicate approximately 1.3" (reported by T. Williams). 
4.3 DISCUSSION 
below: 
The comparison of the model results to observation and measurement is summarized 
• 5900 Pillar Stresses - the modeled stresses compare quite well with the !RAD 
stressmeter readings. The stress predictions for the base case (N40W 0 1 orientation) 
and ratio of cri/Gv = 1.5, and for the alternative case of (N l SW c, 1 orientation) bound 
the West and East stressmeter response, This comparison is felt to be very good, 
considering the various inaccuracies inherent in the IRAD stressmeter gauge 
measurement. The N40W orientation was also compared to borehole breakouts at the 
Lucky Friday and other mines in the district. As noted earlier, the breakout directions 
in the Gold Hunter may vary due to dominance of the bedding anisotropy in causing 
failure of raisebore sidewalls, Since the Lucky Friday breakouts are in brittle rock, 
they should show the true maj or principal stress orientation, which agrees reasonably 
well v--' ith mode l-s tressmeter compar isons. Based on the agreement of the N40W 
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Da1nage Estin1ates = The base case that a thin 
(roughly 10 to 15' thick) zone of failure develops around the outer periphery of the 
pillar as a result of the mining. A smaller (about 5' +/-) yield zone develops around 
the 5900 drift. This depth of failure correlates reasonably well 'With the rubblized and 
unrecoverable core observed in the west observation borehole that was drilled in the 
30 vein. The East borehole passes outside the vein and thus correlation of failure is 
not certain. The modeling indicates that the interior of the pillar remains elastic and is 
not in a failed state. The model indicates that the 5900 drift should be stable for the 
given stress state, primarily since it is driven in the direction parallel to the maximum 
stress direction. 
• Core Discing and Borelwle Breakouts - Extensive core discing and breakouts 
(particularly in the west borehole) were observed in the observation boreholes. 
Comparison of stress state to discing or breakouts is an inexact science. we 
have used laboratory-based testing correlations of discing and breakouts to stresses to 
attempt to relate the modeled pillar stresses to observations. H was found that: 
o The predicted pillar stresses indicate that the magnitudes are sufficient to 
create discing throughout most of the pillar, particularly in the siderite-rich 
rocks. ln other words, the presence of discing at the outer regions of the pillar 
in any rock type, but particularly in the siderite, is not unusual or surprising. 
The fact that discing may occur is a natural result of the in situ stresses, but 
does not indicate that the central portions of the pillar have failed-it is 
simply highly-stressed. 
o The pillar stresses are also sufficient to cause borehole breakouts in the outer 
half of the pillar, particularly in the siderite-rich areas of the orebody. The 
extensive breakouts in the west half of the pillar may be indicative of the 
lower strength rocks encountered in the west side of the pillar. 
• Closure - the closure of the 30 vein at the 5900 drift correlates reasonably well with 
the model predictions. 
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The conclusion of the 
well with the IRAD stressmeter 
is that the stress state predicted correlates 
and that damage observed is as expected 
from the stress state. More importantly, the modeling indicates that the 5900 pillar is not 
currently in a failed state. Only the outer l O' to 15 1 of the pillar has yielded, while the interior is 
still in an elastic state. A question to be asked is whether or not this is unusual or expected, given 
the potentially-high induced stresses in the piilar. The answer is no-the 5900 pillar has a 
width:height ratio of approximately 8:1 to 10:l (100 ft diameter by 10' +/- width). Many 
empirical studies have been perfo1med in which the strength of pillars in room and pillar mines 
have been observed (Figure 22). Virtually all of the pillars in which failure has been observed 
occur for pillar width to height ratios of less than 2. This makes sense since no pillars are 
observed to fail for squat shapes characterized by w:h > -2.5. For example, strike or dip-
stabilizing pillars in South African gold mines with w:h ratios as high as 40 have been left in 
place. It is \-Veil known that these pillars remain elastic, although the foundations of these pillars 
may fail ln sheai·. Kaiser ar:id l<:iiil (2008) have *ow.n tbat pillars in relatively strong and brittle 
rocks with w:h ratios greater than about 2 to 2.5 have a confined inner core (Figure 22). The 
exterior rims of these pillars may fail by spalling, but the dilation and bulking of this exterior rim 
rapidly confines the inner core with the result that it remains elastic. Figure 23 shows a 
schematic of the mechanism of pi liar foundation failure due to punching and shear failure at the 
edges of the pillar where the shear stresses are highest. If poorly-oriented fault structures exist in 
these regions of high shear stress, slip and damaging seismic events are possible, even though the 
host rock might be somewhat ductile. Therefore, it is difficult to imagine the scenario that the 
5900 pillar would actually fail throughout. Thus, the pillar will likely remain stressed at or near 
its current level, with the potential for relatively low level seismicity occuning in the highly 
stressed areas along the boundary of the failed region along its periphery. This could result in 
shaking of the 5900 dritl, but support with dywidag bolts and screen will likely be sufficient to 
maintain loosened material. It is more likely that the foundation of the pillar in argillite along its 
boundaries will shear and yield, If fault structures are present, these could produce larger events. 
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Based on the calibrations prese11ted in this memo, it is felt that sufficient confidence in 
the model is available to move to the next level, which is simulation of future mining of Gold 
Hunter. 
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Figure 22 Empirical estimates of nornrnlized pillar strength as a function of pilla r width to 
height ratio. Empirical estimates underestimate the pillar strength at w:h ratios 
greater than about 2 due to a lack of data. Martin and Maybee (2000) show that 
pillars in brittle rocks ha1·den and behave elastically for w:h ratios greater than 
about 2 (the shaded band) (Kaiser and Kim (2008)). 
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Figure 23 Squat pillars with large ·w: h ratios remain elastic in their cores and can punch 
into wea ker foundation rocks, resulting in shear failure at the pillar edges. This 
failure ca n result in seismicity in the wall rocks. Also, the high shear stress 
regions (shown in red) can cause slip on poorly-oriented faults in the wall rock 
that crnss through this area. 
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nAE-MAIL 
Mr. Kyle E. Jackson 
Special Investigator 
U.S. Department of Labor 
Mine Safety & Health Administration 
6811 South 204th, Ste. 180 
Kent, WA 98032 
(303) 390-0008 
November 8, 2013 
Re: Hecla Limited/Lucky Friday Mine 
MSHA Special Investigation Case No. WE-MW 12-27 
Citation/Order Nos. 8605620, 8559614, 8559615, and 8565565 
JK File Nos. 70010/311, 70010/318, and 70010/325 
Dear Mr. Jackson: 
We submit this position statement on behalf of Hecla Limited - Lucky Friday Mine and 
its agents ("Hecla"), with respect to MSHA' s investigation under § 110( c) of the Federal Mine 
Safety and Health Act of 1977 (the "Mine Act"), arising from the issuance of the above-
referenced citations and orders. Citation No. 8605620 was issued to Hecla at the conclusion of 
MSHA's investigation of a rockburst that occurred at the mine on Nov. 16, 2011. This citation 
was issued on Dec. 6, 2011. Citation No. 8565565 and Order Nos. 8559614 and 8559615 were 
issued to Hecla following MSHA's investigation into the Dec. 14, 2011, rockburst. The citation 
was issued on Dec. 21, 2011, and the orders were issued on May 15, 2012. 
You requested interviews with the following Lucky Friday management personnel: John 
Jordan, former Vice President/General Manager ("Jordan"); Doug Bayer, Mine Superintendent 
("Bayer"); Scott Hogamier, Safety Foreman ("Hogamier"); and John Lund, Mine Foreman 
("Lund''). Each of these individuals has declined MSHA' s request for an interview, and this 
position statement is submitted on their behalf 
With regard to the allegations in the citations and orders, Hecla denies the fact of the 
and disagrees with as 
violations as an unwarrantable failure. Hecla 
{D0875439.1} 
Charleston, WY ,· Clarksburg, WV • Martinsburg.WV • Mo'lantown, 'NV • Wheeling, WV 
Denver, CC) • Evansville, IN• Lexington, KY • .a,mon, OH • Pittsburgh, PA • Washington, DC 
Mining 
to 
determine whether an agent of the operator committed a knowing violation of the standards, not 
to determine whether a violation occurred or whether such violation was an unwarrantable 
to comply. Notwithstanding, the facts discussed below are relevant to prove that there 
was no violation of the standards, let alone an unwarrantable failure to comply with the cited 
standards. Similarly, the ailegation of working in the face of an order issued under the Mine Act 
cannot be sustained. Consequently, there can be no knowing violation on behalf of any agent of 
Hecla based on the allegations in the citations and orders. 
I. CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS 
A. November 16, 2011, Rockburst 
Heda's Lucky Friday Mine experienced a rockburst on Nov. 16, 2011, resulting from a 
fault-slip event associated with closure of the mined-out zone off of the 5900 level. The burst 
was measured at 2.8 Richter, and its epicenter was between the 5700 sublevel and the 
intersection of the 5700 slot access with the 5700 14 stope. There was extensive damage to the 
footwall access ramp system all the way up to the 5550 level, and the 5900 I-Drift pillar 
(sometimes referred to as the "5900 Mainline Pillar") also sustained damage. The burst occurred 
following night shift blasting. 1 The damage to the 5900 pillar appeared to be the result of the 
seismic wave traveling down in the hard, silicified, footwall zone adjacent to the fill and 
impacting the stressed back of the 5900 I-Drift pillar. 
The seismic wave damage to the 5900 I-Drift pillar reduced the of this pillar as well 
as its height-to-width ratio. This increased the stress in this pillar and made it potentially more 
burst prone. The reduction in the size of the pillar, however, did not indicate to the rock 
mechanics engineer that the pillar was likely to fail completely. In addition, the rock above the 
pillar was intact and not de-stressed, and the load bearing capacity of the pillar was not affected. 
The decision was made to install a tunnel iiner through this pillar to provide additional resistance 
to possible seismic loading. 
Initially, Wilson Blake ("Blake"), a longtime rock mechanics consultant to the Lucky 
Friday Mine, believed that the burst was located in the 5900 pillar and that it was a foundation 
failure. This conclusion was based upon his initial inspection of the 5900 drift on Nov. 16 and 
was noted in Blake's Nov. 25 memo provided to MSHA. However, in mid-December, Blake 
toured the eastern footwall ramp development along with Lucky Friday engineers and a 
geologist, MSHA personnel, and others. After the opportunity to observe the footwall openings, 
it was clear to Blake that the Nov. 16 rockburst was not a pillar burst in the 5900 pillar as he had 
initially concluded. Rather, it was a fault-slip event at the ramp, from which the seismic wave 
then induced the damage at the 5900 I-Drift pillar. 
The vast majority of seismic events at the Friday Mine are blasting with 
the blast or within some time window thereafter). See Geotechnical Characteristics of the Lucky Friday Mine, 
December 2012, Section4.2.3; Rockburst Control Plan, Lucky Friday Unit, December 2012, Section 3.3. 
{D0875439.1} 
December 14, 2011, Rockburst 
Following the Nov. 16 fault-slip event, MSHA issued a § order the 
affected areas. The § 103(k) order's prohibition on access to the 5900 main haulage meant that 
access to all mining of the Gold Hunter deposit was effectively cut off and travel through the 
mine prohibited. This is because the 5900 main haulage was the central travelway to access 
production areas of the mine. In order to gain access through the 5900 main haulage, mine 
management submitted a number of rehabilitation plans to MSHA, which had to be approved 
and corresponding modifications to the§ 103(k) order issued before any action could be taken by 
the mine. 
The rehabbing of the back and walls of the 5900 main haulage area included the 
following initial support: installation of 20' cable bolts, installation of 6', 8', and 12' Dywidag 
bolts, installation of 4' and 6' split set bolts, installation of chain link mesh, and spraying the back 
and ribs with a minimum of 3" of shotcrete. In addition, a heavy segmented steel culvert, or 
tunnel liner, was ordered for placement through the pillar. Once the culvert was installed, then 
the rehab would be finished off by backfilling the area with Tekfoam.2 This ground support was 
designed to be capable of containing the effects of a 2.5 magnitude event at approximately seven 
meters distance. This proposed rehabilitation plan was accepted by MSHA. 
After the main haulage was rehabbed, and while the mine was waiting for the liner to 
arrive, MSHA approved the mine's proposed plan to allow travel through the main haulage and 
continue mining in other areas, including Stopes 10, 11, and 14. Mining began again on Dec. 6, 
2011, and advanced in those stopes between the Dec. 6 night shift and the rockburst on Dec. 14 
as follows:3 
• Stope 10 - 8' of advance and a 61 slab (this was a single-shift stope at the 
time) 
• Stope 11 - 96' on both east and west sides 
• Stope 14 - 32' on both east and west sides 
The tunnel liner components arrived at the mine on Dec. 12, and the representative from 
the tunnel liner manufacturer arrived the next day. Once the manufacturer's representative 
determined that all of the parts were on-site, he trained Lucky Friday personnel on the 
installation process, and the liner components were moved underground. On Dec. 14 day. shift, 
the miners started to install the tunnel liner. All production \Vork in the mine had ceased at the 
end of the prior shift. At approximately 7:40 p.m. that evening, a rockburst occurred in the 5900 
Tekfoam is a pumped, porous cement grout that will allow deformation of the tunnel to preserve the 
integrity of the steel culvert. 
3 The stopes that were mined during this time period are identified on the map attached as Exhibit A. Exhibit 
A is a long-section, or longitudinal, drawing of the 30 vein. As you requested, it shows all stopes being mined in 
December 2011. Please note, because the 520-10 mines on the intermediate veins (60, 80), you would not see 
that stope in this view as it is behind this view by 100' or so to the north. We have superimposed the 520-10 stope 
onto this section for your reference. 
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Lvv,uvu approximately meters from 5900 drift through the pillar. the 
liner installation had been completed, including the Tekfoam backfill, it is presumed 
liner may have deformed from the burst but would have remained serviceable. 
C. Heda's Position as to the Individual Citations/Orders and Responses to 
Specific Questions 
As part of this special investigation, you requested that mine management respond to 
questions presented by you. Those questions and the information provided by management in 
response are below. Hecla has sought to clarify certain questions and has made some 
assumptions in answering the questions below. If any of our clarifications or assumptions are 
incorrect, please advise us so that we may attempt to fully answer the question that you intended 
to ask. 
i. Citation No. 8605620 
This citation alleges a violation of 30 C.F.R. § 57.3360 which requires, in part, that when 
ground support is necessary, the support system shall be designed, installed, and maintained to 
control the ground in places where persons work or travel. The citation alleges that the ground 
control at the 5900 main haulage near the chevron was not properly designed or installed to 
maintain control of ground .. The citation references.the fall of material .from the back in the 5900 
main haulage after the Nov. 16 rockburst. It is Hecla's position that there is no violation of the 
standard. We note that this is the first time MSHA cited Hecla for damage to ground support 
caused by a rockburst at the Lucky Friday Mine. 
The ground support in the 5900 main haulage had been maintained since the main 
haulage was developed in 2005. The area was bolted with a combination of 4' and 61 split sets, 
12' Dywidag bolts, and 201 cable bolts, and chain link fencing was installed on the back and ribs. 
The ground support requirements for this area were established based on an analysis of ground 
conditions in the area by rock mechanic experts and the operator's experience mining in similar 
ground conditions. 
The area affected by the rockburst at the 5900 main haulage was designed with a 50' 
pillar of solid rock ail the way around the drift (I IT diameter). Stress models indicated that the 
pillar was large enough to remain stable, with lower level seismicity expected on the periphery of 
the pillar where it would yield. The history of prior rockbursts in the Gold Hunter deposit 
conformed to a pattern of lower level seismic events, and a burst of this magnitude (2.8 Richter) 
was not reasonably anticipated given the Gold Hunter's history of seismic events. The drift had 
been bolted substantially, as per the rock mechanic experts' recommendations. The ground 
support was designed to withstand damage cause by rockbursts of the anticipated magnitude. 
MSHA's on 
occurred along t.he same affected area near the chevron at 
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were three prior seismic events located along the back edges of the 5900 I-Drift pillar prior 
to November 2011. Two of the three events did not cause any observable damage to the pillar. 
The last burst, of magnitude 1.9 Richter, caused minor damage to the 5900 level drift along the 
pillar and to some sections of the back and Jeft rib of the chevron drift, just south of the 5900 
pillar. The damage consisted of minor spalling and minor dislodging of loose material, all of 
which was contained by the existing installed ground support, and no rehabilitation of the ground 
support was required. See Blake Affidavit, ,I12.4 This demonstrates that the installed ground 
support was more than adequate for containing the effects of bursts of the anticipated seismic 
magnitudes. 
a. How was the company monitoring the 5900 I-Drift pillar between 
April 5, 2010, to November 16, 2011? 
Mine management had been monitoring the 5900 I-Drift pillar for several years prior to 
2011. In March 2006, stress meters were installed in the pillar. NIOSH had previously installed 
other instrumentation in the pillar, and split sets, grouted rebar, and closure measurements were 
instrumented in approximately May 2005. Ted Williams ("Williams")5 would obtain the stress 
data and closure readings on a quarterly basis and provide the data to mine management. 
Williams' information was provided to MSHA at its request during the rockburst investigations. 
Blake also visited the mine regularly in his consulting capacity and would review the same data. 
As well, the pillar area was inspected by mine staff daily and by consultants. 
In Spring 2010, Hecla retained Itasca Consulting Group and Blake to review and evaluate 
the status of the 5900 I-Drift pillar. Itasca's modeling of the pillar, based on the available data, 
indicated that the pillar was likely failed only around the more highly-stressed outer periphery. 
All indications in April 2010 were that the entire pillar was unlikely to violently fail. Following 
April 2010, management continued to monitor the pillar's behavior through the data from the 
stress monitors. In addition, the.mine's microseismic monitoring network was active throughout 
that time and would have indicated whether any seismic or microseismic events indicating a 
build-up to failure registered in the area. Finally, there were visual examinations of the pillar 
during regular workplace examinations. There was no indication of "over-stressing" of the drift 
as indicated by excessive closure, bending of rock support, fracture development in the tunnel 
surface, rock spalling, etc. 
b. What was the company doing to ensure the 5900 I-Drift pillar was 
stable before November 16, 2011? 
4 An unsigned copy of the Blake Affidavit is attached to this position statement. A signed and notarized 
copy will be forwarded to you next week. 
5 Williams was an employee of the Bureau of Mines, Spokane Research Center, which came under NIOSH's · 
supervision, when the instrumentation was instalJed Williams :retrieved the data from the 
instrumentation and provided it to NIOSH and the Lucky Friday Mine. Following his retirement from the Bureau of 
Mines, Williams was hired as a consultant to the Lucky Friday Mine and continued gathering the data. 
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observations haulage, 
pillar was stable. There were no visual signs damage on the skin of the pillar indicating 
(e.g., rock bolt plates bending over or bagging of wire). Even though there had been some 
seismic activity in Gold Hunter deposit (which is expected throughout the Coeur d'Alene 
Mining District), there had not been any damage to the 5900 I-Drift pillar requiring any repairs 
to ground support · 
c. Why did the company continue to mine the 5300 to 5900 sill after 
recommendations that if they continue to mine these areas it might 
cause stability problems? 
We make the initial assumption that the phrase "stability problems" is referring to the 
behavior of the 5900 I-Drift pillar. It appears that MSHA is misinterpreting Blake's April 5, 
2010, Report and other statements and information received from mine management. We 
assume that this question arises from Blake's statement on page 2 of the April 5 Report, "I do 
have some doubts about the stability of the 5900 Drift Pillar." These concerns were directed at 
the long-term stability of the pillar, i.e., stability of the pillar for the life of the mine. The 
stability of the circular pillar surrounding the 5900 level access through the ore body was of 
concern to management, as is the stability of all pillars in the mine. Blake recommended that the 
mine continue to gather stress and closure data specific to the 5900 I-Drift pillar for purposes of 
ongoing evaluation and that modeling of the pillar be undertaken. See Blake Affidavit, ,rs. 
By way of background, Blake's April 5, 2010, Report was a review of Itasca's modeling 
and pillar evaluation that Lucky Friday management had requested in Spring 2010. As part of 
monitoring the 5900 I-Drift pillar, it was instrumented in 2005 and 2006 to determine the stresses 
in the pillar back and ribs as well as closure across and along the pillar. In 2010, Itasca reviewed 
the data and prepared a numerical stress analysis model to be used with some degree of 
confidence in examining the stability of the 5900 I-Drift pillar during various extraction 
scenanos. It was this numerical modeling that Blake reviewed in his April 5, 2010, Report. 
ii. Order No. 8559614 
This order alleges a violation of 30 C.F.R. § 57.3461(b)(l), which requires that rockburst 
plans shall include mining and operating procedures designed to reduce fhe occurrence of 
rockbursts. The order alleges 1hat the mining procedure in place at the time of1he Dec. 14, 2011, 
rockburst was not designed to reduce the occurrence of a rockburst. The order states, "The 
mining method in place was to mine the main sill pillar above the 5900 I-Drift pillar." Hecla 
maintains that no violation of the standard occurred and denies that its minirig procedures were 
not designed to reduce the occurrence of a rockburst MSHA alleges that the company was 
warned that rehabilitation should proceed with caution and that a better understanding of the 
cause of the Nov. 16 burst was needed in relation to mining into the sill pillar. The order further 
~, .. ~·,a.-" that aggravated were aware that mining 
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On Dec. the mine operator submitted a plan to MSHA regarding the repair work that 
was to take place the area affected by the rockburst and a mining plan that would allow mining 
above the sill pillar until the tunnel liner arrived. MSHA accepted this pian, and MSHA gave the 
mine permission to continue mining via a modification to the § 103(k) order, Order No. 
8605614-03.6 The rehabilitation of the 5900 main haulage was proceeding with caution and 
pursuant to the repair plan accepted by MSHA: the drift was repaired according to the plan, and 
workplace inspections were completed by every employee traveling through the affected area. In 
addition, stress gauges were installed in the 5900 I-Drift pillar and measurements were taken, 
which showed a normal stress build-up and the beginning of stabilization prior to the Dec. 14 
burst. The facts do not support a conclusion that the mine failed to proceed with caution. 
Further, the reference to the need for a better understanding of the cause of the Nov. 16 
rockburst as a basis for high negligence or aggravated conduct is misplaced. This statement was 
taken out of context from the Nov. 18, 2011, Blake Report. Blake was advising that a better 
understanding of the cause of the burst would be helpful in modeling the future mining of the 
main sill pillar to determine whether the previous modeling was still accurate as to the long-tem1 
mining of the sill pillar. It was not an advisory directed at the short-term future mining of the sill 
pillar. Blake Affidavit, if 11. The plan for mining the sill pillar had been prepared in consultation 
with rock mechanics and ihe mine's engineers; The main question regarding the mining of the 
sill pillar was related to how much of the sill pillar could be mined safely before the sill pillar's 
stability would become a concern. Based on the modeling of the sill pillar done in 2010, it was 
determined that the sill pillar could be mined until it reached a height of approximately 70', at 
which point a change in mining method would need to be considered. Following the Nov. 16 
rockburst, Blake was advising the mine that the 2010 modeling should be re-evaluated to 
determine whether it was still accurate in light of the additional known information. 
Finally, MSHA's stated basis for aggravated conduct is factually incorrect. Mining an 
additional ! O' off the top of the main sill pillar, which was approximately 141' - 200' in height in 
Dec. 2011, would have no effect on the 5900 I-Drift pillar. Mining in Stopes 11 and 14 above 
the sill pillar did not transfer stress to the 5900 I-Drift pillar nor did it cause the Dec. 14 
rockburst. Moreover, with regard to the 5900 I-Drift pillar, the consultants believed it was 
stable. The Lucky Friday Mine had never experienced a pillar burst in a pillar that was more 
than 30' in height; prior to Dec. 14, 2011, the 5900 I-Drift pillar exceeded 30' in size as it was 
11 7' in diameter. The modeling showed that most of the pillar was in an elastic and confined 
state; in other words, the entire pillar did not look capable of instantaneous failure. 
lv'ISHA erred in its numbering of the modifications to Order No. 8605614 and issued different 
modifications numbered-03. Unless otherwise noted in this position statement, references to Order No. 8605614-03 
refer to the modification issued on Dec. 6,201 L 
was on as were 
time. Stope 14 was at the 5550 sublevel and Cut #4 was being mined. While the west end 
Stope 14 was directly above the 5900 I-Drift pillar, Cut #4 was to the east of and 348' from 
the nearest point of the 5900 I-Drift pillar on Dec. 14. See Exhibit A. Mining in Stope 14 at this 
level did not transfer stress to, nor have any impact on, the 5900 I-Drift pillar because of the 
stope's distance from the pillar. See Blake Affidavit, ill 5. Stope 11 was offset from the 5900 I-
Drift pillar, and the mining done in Stope 11 · would have no effect on the pillar. See Blake 
Affidavit, if16. Further, continued mining of 2645' in Stope 11 and 748' in Stope 14 has been 
done in 2013, and there have not been any seismic events recorded in the 5900 I-Drift pillar 
during this time even though it is believed the pillar is still largely in an unfailed state. If · 
"mining into the main sill pillar could cause added stress to the 5900 I-Drift pillar," thereby 
constituting an inappropriate mining method and a violation of the standard, there would have 
been seismic events in the pillar during this past year. 7 The mining methods in use at the Lucky 
Friday Mine in the days leading up to Dec. 14 were designed to reduce the occurrence of 
rockbursts, and the mining methods used (i.e., mining the main sill pillar a significant distance 
above the 5900 I-Drift pillar) did not cause the Dec. 14 rockburst. 
a. Why did the company mine into the main sill pillar before 
December 14, 2011? 
Hecla assumes that this inquiry is specifically directed at the Dec. 6-14 mining of Stopes 
1 land 14 and that it arises from the allegation in the Order stating, "The company was warned 
that the rehabilitation should proceed with caution, and that a better understanding of the cause 
of the previous burst in relation to mining into the Sill Pillar, was needed." It is apparent that 
this allegation is based on language in Blake's Nov. 18, 2011, Report summarizing his Nov. 16 
mine visit. On page 2 of the report, Blake states, " ... [W]e cannot yet assume that the remaining 
pillar is completely destressed. Therefore during rehabilitation work we need to proceed with 
caution." Mine management complied with Blake's recommendation to proceed with caution on 
the rehabilitation of the 5900 main haulage, as evidenced by the installation of the stress 
monitors, identification of closure points and measurements, the installation of significant 
additional ground support, visual workplace examinations whenever anyone traveled through or 
worked in the area on 5900 that was damaged by the Nov. 16 burst, and the suspension of all 
Gold Hunter mining during the installation of the liner. 
In answer to your specific question, mining the sill pillar was part of the overall mine 
plan in mining the Gold Hunter deposit The area that is referred to as the main sill pillar is, in 
fact, a solid piece of un-mined rock, or ore body, that the veins go through.8 See Exhibit A. In 
7 It is noted that the 5900 mainline drift has been filled with backfill to prevent any additional seismicity 
from resulting in further damage. 
8 The un-mined area between levels 5500 (Stope 11), 5550 (Stope 14), and 5700 is solid rock and ranged 
from approximately 141'-200' in height when mining ceased in December 2011. Experience in the Coeur d'Alene 
Mining District shows that solid ore between two mining fronts does not behave like a "pillar" and exhibit sill pillar 
seismicity until its height has been reduced to less than 50' - 60'. See Rockburst Control Plan, Lucky Friday Unit, 
Section 3 .2.1 and Appendix A thereto. 
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'thick below Stope 14. addition, there was almost 200' of cemented paste between the 
sill pillar and the 5900 I-Drift pillar. The on-going mining in Stopes 11 and 14 was located a 
significant distance above the 5900 level, and this mining did not transfer significant stress down 
to the 5900 I-Drift pillar. See Blake Affidavit, ,Il5, 16. In other words, Stopes 11 and 14 were 
far enough away from the 5900 I-Drift pillar so as to be isolated from it from a stress standpoint. 
MSHA mistakenly believes that mining of Stopes 11 and 14 caused the Dec. 14 
rockburst. MSHA has stated that mining the main sill pillar above the 5900 I-Drift pillar is the 
"mining method" which it believes contributed to the second rockburst, and it is this "mining 
method" that MSHA relies on to allege a reckless disregard violation of§ 57.3461 in Order No. 
8559614. The fact that the sill pillar was mined Dec. 6-14 has absolutely no bearing on, nor did 
it cause, the rockburst in the 5900 I-Drift pillar on Dec. 14. One ofMSHA's stated concerns was 
that the mine was "triple-shifting" to catch up on ore production that was lost due to the first 
rockburst. According to the senior MSHA investigator, "the excavation in Stope 11 was 
accomplished in a week which ... is a very high rate of advancement." This statement is 
factually incorrect and demonstrates the senior investigator's fundamental misunderstanding of 
the mining methods at the Lucky Friday Mine. 
The rate of advance in Stope 11 (96' on both east and west sides) was the expected 
amount. The mine works two 10-hour production shifts. There is also a Monday Friday 
graveyard shift-for moving muck or doing projects. No-"triple-shifting" was done nor was any 
mining done on Sunday, Dec. 11. Sundays typically are non-production days. Pursuant to the 
modification to the § 103(k) order issued on Dec. 6, the Lucky Friday resumed mining 
operations that night shift. From night shift on Dec. 6 through day shift on Dec. 14, the mine 
advanced 96' both east and west in Stope 11. Each round advances eight feet, and miners 
typically blast a round each shift. During this time period, Stope 11 blasted 12 rounds on each 
side over 6.5 days of mining. Simple math makes it clear that no extraordinary mining efforts 
were done in order to "catch up on ore production": 12 rounds x 81 = 96' of advancement in 6.5 
days of mining. Furthermore, the mining of Stope 11 would have no effect on the 5900 I-Drift 
pillar because of the distance Stope 11 was from the pillar (approximately 539') and the fact that 
it was offset to the 5900 pillar. See Blake Affidavit, i116. 
b. Who directed the work force to mine the main sill pillar before 
December 14, 2011? 
Jordan and Bayer directed the work force to return to mining Stopes 11 and 14 after 
MSHA approved the mine's proposed plan to do so, set forth in the Nov. 29 rockburst repair plan 
submitted to MSHA. When management sought to resume production, it was understood that 
there would be no stress transferred to the 5900 I-Drift pillar given that the main sill was so large 
and Stopes 11 and 14 were far enough away from the 5900 I-Drift pillar. MSHA gave the mine 
operator permission to resume mining and did not express any concerns to mine management 
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de-stressed while rehabilitation work was being done? 
Hecla assumes you are referring to the 5900 I-Drift pillar when you ask about "ensur[ing] 
the pillar was cornpietely de-stressed while rehabilitation work was being done." However, the 
5900 I-Drift pillar was not completely de-stressed after the Nov. 16 rockburst, nor would 
someone knowledgeable about rock mechanics have expected it to have been, given its large 
width to height ratio. Management consulted with Blake regarding the rehabilitation plan, 
including what supplemental ground support would be installed and the precautionary measures 
that would be taken during the rehabilitation process. The rehabilitation work in the 5900 main 
haulage was undertaken only after plans were submitted to and accepted by MSHA. The specific 
safety procedures that were implemented included stress gauge monitoring, measuring of closure 
points, visual examinations of the 5900 main haulage by every miner working in the area or 
traveling through the area, and the on-going monitoring of seismic events in the Gold Hunter 
deposit. 
d. After the November 16) 2011, Rockburst what did the company do 
to better understand the cause of the burst? 
In order to better understand the cause of the burst, Hecla conducted an investigation and 
analysis of the availabJe~data; As part of this investigation, the mine operator brought in Blake 
and Mark Board ("Board"), both of whom were longtime rock mechanic consultants to Hecla. 
The investigation reviewed the seismic data and sought to determine the location of the burst and 
the mechanism of the burst. The conclusions reached regarding the Nov. 16, 2011, burst are 
described in Section I.A. above. 
We presume this question arises from two statements in the Nov. 18 Blake Report. On 
page 2, Blake stated, "We really need to better understand why this burst occurred, as it has 
significant implications with respect to mining the main sill - particularly along the more burst 
prone eastern portion of the sill." And, in the summary, Blake stated, "And, finally, we need to 
better understand the cause of this burst to be able to relate it to mining the main sill." These 
statements were not directed at immediate future mining of the main sill pillar; rather, they were 
directed at mining the sill pillar beyond the innnediate future. Blake was suggesting that a better 
understanding of the mechanism of the burst would be helpful in modeling the future mining of 
the main sill to determine if the previous modeling was still accurate. See Blake Affidavit, ifl l. 
e. Did the company recover the instrumentation box from the 5900 
pillar after the November 16, 2011 Rockburst? 
The instrumentation box, or data collector, was damaged by the rockburst and \vas not 
recovered. 
This order alleges a violation 30 § which requires, that persons 
experienced in examining and testing for loose ground shall be designated by the mine· operator 
to examine and, where applicable, test ground conditions in areas where work is to be performed. 
The order aileges that the mine operator failed to adequately examine the 5900 I-Drift pillar 
while additional ground support was installed. It is Hecla's position that the 5900 I-Drift pillar 
was repeatedly and adequately examined during the period of time that the rehabilitation of the 
main haulage was performed, including while the tunnel liner was being installed. 
MSHA refers to the stress monitors that were installed in the I-Drift pillar after the Nov. 
16 rockburst and alleges that "the East Low gauge never read stress levels" and management 
recorded inaccurate readings. MSHA further alleges an unwarrantable failure based on 
management's knowledge that "the East Low stress gauge was defective and assigned miners to 
work in an area without knowing if the East wall was building stress." These allegations are not 
supported by the facts. 
The order suggests that the mine operator was recording inaccurate readings from one of 
the three stress gauges that were installed in the burst area, in that the gauge was reading 
negative. MSHA's statement that the East Low gauge "never read stress levels" is erroneous. 
The readings from the three gauges are attached as Exhibit B. The exhibit demonstrates that all 
three stress gauges were working and the East Low gauge was reading negative stress after it was 
installed. This does not mean that the gauge is malfunctioning. It means that the gauge is not 
seeing a recordable stress build-up. Geokon Inc., the manufacturer of the stress meters, 
confirmed to Hecla that, if the gauge is giving readings, it is functioning. See Exhibit C. It was 
not unprecedented to have a stress gauge in the 5900 I-Drift pillar read in negative numbers. For 
example, in March of 2006 when Ted Williams from NIOSH installed six gauges in the pillar, 
three of the gauges read almost zero stress and the other three dipped into negative numbers. It 
took until July of 2006 before the gauges started to climb as they were starting to see a positive 
indication of compressive stress. Those gauges continued to work properly until the Nov. 16 
rockburst 
a. Who took the readings of the three stress monitors that were 
installed in the I-Drift pillar after the November 16, 2011 
rockburst? 
Various people would obtain the data from the stress gauges, depending on who was 
underground at the time the data was collected; typically, it was Geoff Parker or the surveyors. 
Once the data from the stress gauges was obtained by connecting the handheld portable reader 
unit to the gauges, the data was then taken to the surface and the data was downloaded into a 
computer. The data as delivered by the stress gauges does not provide information in any 
meaningful form. After the data is dovmloaded to the computer, an engineer would load the data 
into a spread sheet and process it. The engineer uses a formula to translate the stress gauge data 
into a psi reading, ivhich is then compared to prior readings to determine whether the stress is 
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How often were the readings taken and for how long? 
The :frequency and duration of the stress gauge readings is set forth in Exhibit B. The 
time stated on the graph and chart is the time the data was read by the handheld reader, not the 
time that the engineer translated the data into the psi readings. After the temperature stabilized, 
the first data to be translated into a psi reading was retrieved at 4:30 p.m. on Dec. 2 and the last 
data was retrieved at 6:30 a.m. on Dec. 14. During that time period, the data from the stress 
gauges was read by the handheld device twice each day shift. The data from the stress monitors 
was obtained generally toward the beginning and end of the day shift, but not at any specific 
time. 
c. Who reviewed the readings from the stress monitors that were 
installed in the I-Drift pillar after the November 16, 2011 
rock burst? 
Engineering would review the readings in order to process the data and convert the data 
to psi readings. Jordan and Bayer also reviewed the data in its converted form. 
d. How were these readings used to ensure the stabilization of the I-
Drift pillar? 
Technically speaking, the readings were not used to "ensure the stabilization of the I-
Drift Pillar." Stress data from a pillar will not tell you whether a pillar is stabilized; stress data 
will tell you whether additional stress is being put on the pillar. For example, a sudden jump in 
psi or a steady increase of psi over a number of days will indicate that stress is building in the 
pillar. The increase in psi from Dec. 2-14 that was showing on the West and Back gauges was 
not interpreted to be out of the ordinary. This data was compared to prior stress data obtained 
from the gauges installed in 2006, and the data showed the pillar was behaving in a very similar 
manner. Mine management understood this similarity in readings to mean that the 5900 I-Drift 
pillar was not behaving any differently from how it behaved in the past. 
e. In the Lucky Friday Mine Rockburst Repair report by Doug Bayer 
on December 6, 2011 it states that " ... any closure measurements 
that indicate closure above the normal error factor ... " What is the 
error factor? What is considered above the normal error factor? 
Closure measurements are taken by placing the theodolite on a tri-pod and shooting the 
laser at the measurement points. The measurement points are determined by the location of short 
wedge-anchored bolts (Hilty bolts) installed in the rock wall, which present a target the of a 
quarter. Then, a "bulls-eye" is painted on the target for the surveyor to 
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slight variation in measurement is 
normal error factor that Bayer refers to in his Dec. 6, 2011, report. There is no precise 
numerical amount attached to the error factor. Bayer believed that movement from reading to 
reading above about one-tenth inch would indicate that closure was occurring the 5900 main 
haulage. To put this into perspective, the mine has seen ciosures of one inch per week in some 
stopes at times. Here, the closure measurements remained steady, indicating that closure, which· 
is an indication of stress increase, was not occurring. The closure measurements are attached as 
Exhibit D. 
f. In the same December 6, 2011 rockburst report it states "December 
6 show no movement or closure .... " and " .... The stress gauge 
readings show that the small expected increase stress over time has 
slowed down." What readings were being used to come to this 
conclusion? 
The closure measurements discussed above were relied on to conclude that no movement 
or closure was occurring. The measurements did not change. See Exhibit D. The stress gauge 
readings are contained in Exhibit B. As discussed elsewhere, the data from the stress gauges 
indicated that, in terms of measuring stress, the pillar was behaving as it had in the past. 
g. Was the East Low stress monitor in the I-Drift pillar used in these 
readings? 
Yes. See Exhibit B. 
iv. Citation No. 8565565 
This citation alleges that the mine operator worked in the face of Order No. 8605614, 
issued under § 103(k) of the Mine Act Specifically, the citation alleges that "subsequent action 
number 8605614-03 states that the mine operator will conduct two daily surveys at the start and 
end of the first shift to determine weather (sic) movement is occurring to indicate if stress levels 
are increasing." The issuing inspector appears to have mistakenly combined the required closure 
surveys (i.e., measuring of closure points to determine whether movement is occurring at the 
survey stations) with the stress gauge readings, which are calculated based on information 
provided by the data from the stress gauges. Stress readings and closure readings are two 
distinctly different things. The specific language of Order No. 8606514-03 requires "the mine 
will conduct two daily surveys at the start and end of the 1st shift to determine whether movement 
is occurring at the survey stations of the 5900 main haulage near the chevron." ( emphasis added) 
In order to determine whether movement was occurring, closure readings were taken by 
measuring specified points on bolts with a theodolite. And, pursuaTJ.t to Order No. 8606514-03, 
these closure surveys were to be taken twice per day until such time as the culvert arrived from 
{D0&75439.l} 
This citation further alleges that the mine operator failed to take the last reading on Dec. 
just prior to another rockburst and "if this reading was taken it may have indicated high 
levels, which have removed miners from the 2nd rockburst." As discussed above, in response to 
question (a) regarding Order No. 8559615, the process of reading the stress gauge data is not 
instantaneous. Even if the mine had gathered the data from the stress gauges later in the day on 
Dec. 14, 2011, despite not being required to do so by Order No. 8606514-03, the conversion of 
the data to psi would not have occurred until the morning of Dec. 15, long after the burst 
occurred. Thus, MSHA's allegation in the citation that the stress gauge readings may have 
indicated high levels and resulted in the removal of miners is utterly baseless. 
a. Why wasn't the last reading read on the stress monitors on I-Drift 
pillar before the December 14, 2011 rockburst? 
We assume that the "last reading" you are referring to is the "end of first shift" reading 
on Dec. 14 that was not taken. The mine operator did not take closure measurements or obtain 
the data from the stress gauges via the handheld reader on the evening of Dec. 14 because the 
tunnel liner was being installed. According to Order No. 8605614-03, once the tunnel liner was 
ready to be installed, aff other work in-the area affected by the §" 103(k) order was required to 
stop. A representative from the tunnel liner manufacturer arrived at the mine site on Dec. 13, 
confirmed that all necessary parts had arrived and trained Lucky Friday employees on the 
installation process. The liner parts and tools were transported underground later that day and all 
production operations ceased after that night shift ended. Beginning with day shift on Dec. 14, 
the only work performed in the Gold Hunter deposit was the installation of the tunnel liner and 
the continuation of repairs of the 54 Ramp rockburst damage. Mine management understood 
from MSHA that the installation of the tunnel liner took priority in terms of completing the 
repair work. The only "survey" required by Order No. 8605614-03 to be taken was the survey 
"to deteTIPine whether movement is occurring." However, by the end of first shift on Dec. 14, 
closure measurements could not be taken because some of the closure points were covered by the 
liner, making it physically impossible to take any measurements. The stress data was not 
obtained for two reasons: 1) the on-going installation of the tunnel liner took precedence over 
other work in the 5900 main haulage; and 2) Order No. 8605614-03 did not require that it be 
done. The data from the stress gauges could have been read by the handheld device because the 
wires for the stress gauges had been extended to a location beyond the start of the liner for future 
use. 
The statement in the citation that "The Mine Superintendent stated that the readings could 
not be taken because steel liner was installed over the gauges a.11d the gauges could not be read" 
steel 
liner started, the 
prevented measurements of the closure points from being taken. 
Wny the stress monitors hooked up the I-Drift pillar? 
The new stress monitors were hooked up in the 5900 I-Drift pillar on Dec. 1, 2011. The 
monitors remained hooked up until the rockburst on the evening of Dec. 14. 
c. How long were the stress monitors not hooked up in the I-Drift 
pillar? 
Stress gauges were installed in the 5900 main haulage near the I-Drift pillar in 2006. 
Individual gauges were replaced over the years as needed. The stress gauges in the 5900 main 
haulage stopped functioning after the Nov. 16 rockburst. Three new gauges were installed on 
Dec. 1, 2011, after MSHA gave the mine permission to install them. Three additional gauges 
had been ordered for installation. Once the gauges were installed, the gauges had to reach the 
same temperature as the rock surrounding it in order to get accurate readings and provide 
meaningful data. Temperature stabilization was achieved on Dec. and readings were recorded 
and analyzed going forward. 
II. KNOWING VIOLATIONS UNDER THE MINE ACT 
Under § 110( c) of the Mine Act, individual corporate agents can be held personally liable 
if they "knowingly authorized, ordered or carried out [a] violation" of a mandatory standard. 
The term "knowingly" has been defined to include both actual knowledge and constructive 
knowledge. See Freeman United Coal Mining Co. v. FMSHRC, 108 F.3d 358, 364 (D.C. Cir. 
1997). To establish liability under § 110( c ), the agency must prove that the individual knew or 
had reason to know of the violative condition. Target Industries, Inc., 23 FMSHRC 945, 963 
(Rev. Comm. 2001). According to the Review Commission, "an individual acts knowingly 
where he is 'in a position to protect employee safety and health [ and] fails to act on the basis of 
information that gives him knowledge or reason to know of the existence of a violative 
condition. m REB Enterprises, Inc., Harold Miller and Richard Beny, 20 FMSHRC 203, 211 
(Rev. Comm. 1998), citing Kenny Richardson, 3 FMSHRC 8, 16 (Rev. Comm. 1981). There is 
no evidence here that establishes the requisite knowledge, either constructive or actual, of the 
alleged violations on the part of any agent of Hecla. As such, a knowing violation cannot be 
substantiated for any of the alleged violations at issue. 
You requested information regarding four individuals in order to determine whether each 
was an agent under the Mine Act. Their specifics follow. With regard to the hiring or 
You have been advised that Bayer has retained separate counsel with to his representation in this 
rnvi~st11?;amm as to Citation No. 8565565. have to contact his counsel. 
~ re~ 
In November 2011, John Jordan was the President General Manager 
Friday Mine. is currently the Vice President of Technical Services, providing specific 
engineering support to various Hecla Limited operating sites and directing the work of three 
employees. As the VP/General Manager at Lucky Friday Mine, Jordan had overall responsibility 
for the mine site and provided guidance to the senior staff. At that time, he had approximately 
10 individuals who reported directly to him. Jordan assigned and directed the work of others. 
Jordan reports to Larry Radford, VP Operations, and did so in November 2011. Jordan has 42 
years of mining experience. 
Doug Bayer is the Mine Superintendent and has held that position since January 201 L 
Bayer has 21 years of mining experience. Typically, he works straight days, Monday through 
Friday, from 4:30 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. Bayer reports to the General Manager of the Lucky Friday, 
who is Ed Sutich. In November 2011, Jordan was the General Manager, as noted above. Bayer 
is responsible for the day-to-day operations of the mine and maintenance operations, and he 
supervises approximately 10 people, including the mine foreman, electrical foreman, mobile 
maintenance foreman, and shift bosses. Bayer has the authority to assign and direct the work of 
others; he does not schedule maintenance or order parts and equipment. 
John Lund is the Mine Foreman and has held that position since early 2011. He reports 
directly to Bayer. He works straight days, Tuesday through Friday, typically from 4:00 a.m. to 
·--4:00 p:m. Lund; alongwith Bayer, -supervises the shift bosses, who irrtum direct the work of thef 
miners cin a day-to-day basis. Lund assigns and directs the work of the shift bosses. He does not 
schedule maintenance or order parts. Lund has approximately 32 years of mining experience. 
Scott Hogamier is a Safety Foreman and held the same position in November 201 L 
Hogarnier presently reports to Jerry Murphy, Sr. Health and Safety Manager. In November 
2011, he reported to the General Manager. Hogamier is responsible for safety at the mill, 
industrial hygiene, MSHA and corporate reporting, and is the nrine rescue coordinator. In 
November 2011, he covered safety in the mine and the mill. Ho gamier will purchase equipment 
as needed in the context of safety operations and mine rescue. Hogarnier occasionally supervises 
individuals on light duty working in the safety department, otherwise he does not direct or assign 
the work of others. Hogarnier has more than 17 years of mining experience. His schedule is 
Monday through Thursday from 6:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m., except as needed to participate in MSHA 
inspections or other safety-related operations. 
In relation to each citation and order discussed separately above, none of the enforcement 
actions alleges aggravated conduct with regard to any specific individual, except for Citation No. 
8565565 which refers to the Mine Superintendent ·(Bayer). There is no evidence here that 
establishes the requisite aggravated conduct by management and management's knowledge, 
either constructive or actual, of the alleged violations on the part of Mr. Jordan, Wu. Bayer, Mr. 
Lund, or Mr. Hogarnier, or other agent the compac'1y. such, cannot 
substantiated here. 
{D0875439. l} 
Based on foregoing, it is clear that no agent of Hecla engaged in a knowing violation 
any MSHA standards or the Mine Act with regard to the above-referenced citations and 
orders, nor did any agent engage in aggravated conduct constituting more than ordinary 
negligence. Consequently, there is no basis for individual liability under§ llO(c) of the Mine 
Act arising from the allegations in Citation Nos. 8565565 and 8605620 and Order Nos. 8559614 
and 8559615. 
Hecla reserves the right to offer any additional defenses it may have in any hearing on the 
above-referenced citations and orders and to challenge the timeliness of this investigation. If you 
require additional documents and/or information, please contact the undersigned directly. 
Sincerely, 
KLJ/jlk 
·Enclosures 
cc: Mr. John Jordan (via E-mail, w/encl.) 
Mr. Doug Bayer (via E-mail, w/encl.) 
Mr. Scott Hogamier (via E-mail, w/encl.) 
Mr. John Lund (via E-mail, w/encl.) 
Mike Clary, Esq. (via E-mail, w/encl.) 
{D0875439.1} 
Exhibit 33 
I 
7. Detailed description of 
the incident 
At loch additional pages ijnccc:;rnrv. 
( -- Injury Detail 
~mediate corrective 
l actions taken 
~--
9. Initial Risk Rating 
10. Supervisor Analysis 
11. investigation 
required? 
"··--------··---~ 
A+ 
f l,i ... -} dtt1'-fµ~j 
4f fk 
Cr ?or/,p" 
LJf-c.1c_ l,r'L 
EXMIBlt·· 
OCC.u /cd 
of fk_ 
+LsL 5 I CJ ZJ "5 ul l·cJ,< I 
t,1 ,, d ') ,·c, h 1 
I 
Body Part affacled : 0 Lall side D 
Brief description oj what actions /Jave 
f},;rr/t'etd,..d off a//cc)~c:J a/cA) 
--·-·-------------·-------! 
Ste Ri1k Mn-tcgrmerH 
wmd,ud Jar Jul! dt!.criplors 
Muhlple ht:llltlrs/ 
<$SM dam:i:sr:/ mart! 
thil!l l WC'!li: down 
f;ultty/pwn 
dil>bl!lty/ $S00k · $SM "'~~~.!~Ol:i,~r~~ l 
darnaa;i:o/ 1 d~y.t wk 
down 
_ Supar,isor Name: Ho (,,,.,,~-:;- Pc),//. · --=~=---·--·--
WJ~ there a violation of a safeJ:L!.ule, M5HA or comp.iny7 ~ 
Y,{!:!) 
Friday Mine INCiDENT INVESTI ION 
2. Information 
Gathering 
3. Draw conclusions/ 
determine root 
causes 
on a separate document detall !he Incident Attach rnmploted document to this report. 
Use the following headings when preparing your report: 
o Background: List the series of events that preceded the Incident, 
o Incident: Describe tile de!olls of the incid1Y1t. 
o tnvest!gatlo n/Flndlngs: Root couse, What can we learn from 1/Jis lncldem? 
• When completlng tha lnddent description, fully describe what happen including what lead up to the incident 
occurring. The description should be complete enough to allow for a recreation of the Incident ff required. 
Ensure that medical c,Htl is given if necessary. Make sure to ask questlon of person directly involved as soon ~s 
possible. 
• Secure the scene and make sure witnesses ace avatlable if needed. Nolify MSHA within 15 minutes If the 
accident/incident meets the criteria. 
Inspect the scene of the lncfdent and m;ke a methodical si;arch of the area. Look ;it everything. 
Use a team aJ)proach. Include specialist If necessary. Team members may Include: person Involved. crew 
members, safely, maintenance, engineering, etc. 
• Take good notes. Take pictures If you have a camera. 
Interview one witness at a time. Have witnessc~ write out the facts in detail or ask them to tell you what the 
facts are. listen and ask questlons but don't interject your Ideas. Ask them what they think the solutions ~re. 
Gather as much documentation as possibh!: Umecards, equfpment cards, work p{ace impaction cards, 
opcr;,tor manuals, task training records, accident history, discipline records, etc. 
Look for direct ann lndirPrtJ;auu.:,i,n:.,_•----------._,.. ..... 
• Ask the ti~ uw·s and NH" /What who whv, when, whoro Dnd hm..:.1..J 
Don't stop at the Hrst easy answer, make sure the corrective actions really address all lh!, root causes and 
contributing factors not Just the simple one or easy ones to Implement or write down I 
Consider both the long term anu the short term. "Quick fixes (short term) nre things like incre.ised vigilance, 
temporary barricades, etc. Preventative Uong term) actions eliminate the cause of the root cau,e and 
generally take longer (engineering design, capital approval, etc). 
Look for actions that. eliminate the root cJuse In procllcal way. That ls long las!ing ~nd requires minimal 
maintenance (mechanical and behavioralj. Are readily implemented and are difficult to circumvent. 
Identify actions step, that will spell who will do it, what will be d0r1e, when will it be done and what follow up 
ls required to insure the right things were done. 
.. 
Use the hierarchy of control to Implement effective control measures: 1) Elimination 2) Substitution 3} En ine!!ring jSe arationl 4) Adminis!ratlve 5) PPE 
Supervisor Signature 
Involved Person 
Signature 
Superintendent 
Signature 
General Manager 
Signature 
Target Date Completion Date 
Name Signatu~~ ------+-D_a_t __ e __ +-C_o_rn_m_e_n_ts __ 
---------+--------+------------- ----· -· 
-----.--- D "--··~ --··-!-·--·--·-----------+-------+----------- --·---
H /":Jo/ 11 
Completed Ind den I investln;:;Uon lndudlng corrective actions mu.st be entered into lntel!ex within 10 ,fays. 
assistance with completing this Investigation report. 
the health ;:ind safety dcp~rtml!nt for 
Hard copy of report ta be sent to Health and Salety Manager 
birect Causes 
---:fl/,.-;!r·;,: /qa ,2,.,,,,/ ,.,.,,,// -f,, jf<c __ {DC.k. bc.d~i°·!L._ 
-.-·--··------------------
Conclusion 
: 
.£ac.k·fu.,d:'51:i".1c.." c; ::l w,'f/ l1"'i1..f?er.1 wJ1tf.,.o,,} ,J)cJr:/d.1," .... ~,,;5, . .,,·r}S 
o"'.,,. :f';.cu2/,,w:e::r, 4:c::C: : .,., q: s~ .?"4,,.-r:: du:,~ .bl.;,.;,.sbc, . .r,. ...f::IL_,·~/J_· --
a,d ;'c ~a,;,, 1 (.1...r. I ~+ ,r..-,,~
7 
"l!,1)--"f?":r: lK1s~. ~40.Ai~ "fa ... .,d,_ 
e-o h~1ac::r:L ,..,,,,,2.,, ·bo>;.5 ol t:1.., ,.,_,il,../c.,._:J '°z<G r /.i r""' .42.J..,_<-+~-.,......_ _ _____ _ 
W;\Pub!ic\REPORTS\Porms\Accident injury report.doc 
Exhibit 34 
Good 
2011 
amount of 
Stope 10 12 feet of advance, and a 6 foot slab 
Stope 11 - 96 feet, both east and west sides· 
Stepe 14- 38 feet, both east and west sides 
Please let me know if you have any questions. 
Mike 
14 November 
¥t1 
PP 
Exhibit 35 
Hecla Limited 
6500 Mineral Drive 
Box C-8000 
Coeur Idaho 
Baker 
President and CEO 
John Jordan 
Vice President Hecla Limited/ 
General Manager Lucky Friday Unit 
Geology Summary of the Lucky Friday and Gold HUI1ter veins and Surrounding Rock 
Lucky Friday: The Lucky Friday ore body is a steeply dipping, tabular, fracture-filled vein containing 
argentiferous galena, tetrahedrite and minor sphalerite. The vein is about 1500 feet along strike, with an 
average width of 6 feet. Vein dip is variable and ranges from 75° to vertical. Gangue :minerals include 
quattz; wall rock and siderite. The surrounding wall rock is vitreous and sericitic quartzite and siltite-
argillite of the pre-Cambrian Revert formation. No production activities are currently planned in the Lucky 
Friday vein, and no mining operations have been conducted in this vein system since August 2004. 
Gold Hunter: The Gold Hunter vein system is developed with primary levels at the 4050, 4900, and 
5900 levels, with sub-levels on 50-foot vertical intervals above and below the primary levels. The Gold 
Hunter system is comprised of numerous veins within a zone approximately 50 to 200 feet wide; with the 
horizontal strike of economic ore shoots ranging from 100 to 2,200 feet in length. Mining is mainly 
concentrated on the "30 Vein" which dips steeply to the south and is conformable to bedding. Vein width 
supports mechanized mining operations on this vein and mining widths range from a min.i.rnum of 5-feet to 
areas that can locally exceed 20 feet for short lengths. The ore minerals of the 30 Vein are predominately 
argentiferou.s galena, sphalerite and tefra1iedrite within a siderite, quartz and barite gangue. The remaining 
activity takes place on other veins, commonly referred to as "intermediate veins", in the Gold Hunter 
system. These are not as consistently economically mineralized along strike, with ore shoots varying from 
50 to 200 feet in length, and ranging from 3 to 1 O+ feet in width. As with the 30 vein, these veins are 
conformable to bedding. All veins in the Gold Hunter system above 5900 are hosted in the pre-Cambrian 
Wallace formation which consists of thinly bedded argUlites and fine grained carbonates. Below the 5900 
level, there is increasing evidence that the vein system transitions into St Regis stratigraphy, consisting of 
thinly bedded argillites interbedded and interlaminated with quartzites. 
Descrigtion of Mining Methods 
Two mining methods are currently being employed at the Luch.-y Friday Unit. 
···--1.· Mechanized Underhand Stoping,---· · 
This method accounts for approximately 93% of the production in the Gold Hunter area. This undercut and 
fill method utilizes rubber-tired diesel powered equipment to extract the ore. Production proceeds along the 
vein from the top down with each successive cut taken beneath cemented backfill. Normal ground support 
consists of a combination of friction rock-bolts, mats, and wire mesh. Grouted rock-bolts and timber 
support is used on an "as-needed" basis. Bolts are installed with conventional percussion drills. Scaling is 
done when and where needed. The normal mining sequence is as follows: 
1. A p1imary development heading is driven parallel, or sub-parallel to the strike of the ore-body. 
2. An access slot is driven perpendicular from the development heading to the vein. This initial 
access is driven at a+ 15% to +20% grade. 
3. The vein is drifted until the end of the or the is and then filled 
with cemented back.fill. 
4. The next successive cut is reached by benching the access slot. This process typically continues 
for 5 cuts, after which the orebody is accessed from the next lower primary development sub-level. 
another successive cut taken on 
combination of friction rock-bolts, mats, and mesh, as with. underhand mechanized mining. Grouted 
rock-bolts and timber support is used on an "as-needed" basis. Bolts are installed with conventional 
percussion drills. Scaling is done when and where needed. The normal mining sequence is as follows: 
a) A primary development heading is driven parallel, or sub-parallel to the strike of the ore-body. 
b) An access slot is driven perpendicular from the development heading to the vein. This initial 
access is driven at a -15% to -20% grade. 
c) The vein is drifted along untilthe end of the vein, or tbe adjacent stope is reached, and then filled 
with cemented backfill, or a combination of development rock (gob) capped with cemented 
backfill. 
d) The next successive cut is reached by breasting down the access slot and ramping up to reach the 
next cut height. Thls process typically continues for 5 cuts, after which the orebody is accessed 
from the next higher primary development sub-Ievel. 
Description of Mine Openings 
Ore bodies are accessed through two vertical shafts. The Silver Shaft is the primary escapeway, fresh air 
intake, and production shaft. It is an 18-foot diameter, concret.;-lined, circular shaft that provides access to 
the 2800, 4050, and the 4900 through 6100 levels. The #2 Shaft is the secondary escapeway and exhaust 
shaft. rt is a 23 ft x 11 ft rectangular timbered shaft with. four compartments that provides access to all 
levels down to the 5100 level. Tracked levels are a nominal 9-foot x 9-foot in cross-section. Ramps, sub-
levels, drifts, crosscuts, and laterals in areas currently under development are typically 12 ft wide x 12 ft 
high-older parts ofthem..ine have 10 ft wide x 10 ft openings in some areas. Access to the mechanized 
overhand and underhand stopes is typically through 10 ftx 10 ft access slots. 
Ground Support Systems 
Depending on local ground conditions and geoiogic structure, once an opening is blasted and scaled, ground 
support is installed in accordance with company ground support standards. Extra ground support is added 
on an "as needed" basis, as determined by mining crews and supervisors in the course of daily inspections. 
Development headings are normally supported with some combination of grouted bolts, friction rock 
stabilizers, fencing, mats and/or shotcrete. Stopes are normally supported with some combination of 
grouted bolts, friction rock stabilizers, fencing, mats and/or timber. 
Seismic Monitoring Methods 
Both the Lucky Friday and Gold Hunter areas are monitored for seisniicity by a microseismic system. 
· - ··· ·--··Activity-is-monitored-via a-surface·seismograph.in,combination with an. underground system array, 
consisting of 16 transducers (accelerometers), which are installed throughout the mine workings. 
Two signal types are utilized to gather information on seismic activity at the Lucky Friday Unit. 
1. A Geotech fnstruments S-13 seismometer Qug) is located at the surface level by the old #1 Shaft 
hoist room and supplies signal data to a continuous recording drum helicorder (also supplied by 
Geotech Instruments). The analog seismographic chart records time and amplitude of underground 
events. 
2. Data acquired at the underground transducers is transmitted to the surface through a SO-pair signal 
cable iocated in the Silver Shaft to a central surface iocation. for data-processing an.d storage. 
Signals are monitored Yi.a an MP-250 microprocessor which was fabricated to our specifications 
Electro-Lab of Spokane, WashingtoD.. This data is then fed through a continuous data logger 
(NetDAS digital interlink) supplied by DAQ Systems, which is interfaced to two computer seismic 
programs for processing. 
Information through these systems, can be manually reviewed to for daily of 
seismic information to the appropriate operational personnel. 
A monitoring program is being conducted on the 5900 level where the main access from the Silver Shaft 
intersects the Gold Hunter 30 Vein. This program was begun with the Spokane branch ofNIOSH and has 
since been taken over by the company. The object ofthls monitoring is to identify the change in load on the 
walls of the 30 vein as a pillar is created by mining around it. This information has been used to model the 
pillar between. the 5900 and 4900 levels. Most of the instrumentation is in the 30 vein, but a rock strain 
strip, an instrumented rebar bolt, and an instrumented split set bolt were installed about 70 ft south of the 
vein. The zero location data is used to determine the overall response of the rock mass to mining for 
comparison with the pillar response. Observation boreholes are periodically monitored using a borehole 
camera to compare the model predictions and actual behavior. A monitoring program is also being 
conducted in 1 I and 14 stopes at the 5700 subleveL where there are closure stations and stress meters in 
both stopes. Measurements will be taken and analyzed as the pillar between the finished overhand cuts and 
the advancing underhand cuts gets smaller. The information will be used to monitor ground conditions and 
pillar stresses. 
Corrective Measures 
Depending on the level of seismic or microseismic activity, the geologic structure of an area, and the 
configuration of the stopes and relevant development access areas, seismically active areas may: 
L Be de-stressed by drilling and blasting, or other methods; 
2. Have excavation or production rates slowed down; 
3.-Have crews removed from areas for temporary periods; 
4. Be suspended from production for indefinite periods. 
Reporting ofRockbursts (as governed by 30 CFRPart 50. l and 50.2) 
Reporting is done as required by company officials to MSHA officials in the Kent field office, Western 
District. Rockbursts with the following characteristics should be reported as per the following guidelines: 
o When a rockburst causes extensive failnre of the ground support system, such as the grotl!ld falling 
out past the anchorage zone in maintained work places; or 
.. When a rockburst impairs ventilation or impedes passage; or 
" \Vhen rockburst damage causes a miner(s) to be ,vithdrawn from a workplace during shift for more 
than one hour. 
Non-damaging microseismic activity will not be reported to MSHA when, as a precautionary measure, the 
in.iner(s) is withdrawn from a workplace or not scheduled in a work place. 
L:\MINE PLANNING\Seismic\R.OCICBURST PLAN 04011 Ldocx: 
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FROM: 
SUBJECT: 4, 2010 Mine Visit 
On Tuesday May 4, 2010 I visited the Gold Hunter to inspect the damage and geological 
conditions associated with the 2.5 Ml rockburst that occurred April 22, 2010 in the 
footwall of the 5700 14 E stope. Other stopes as well as development headings for #4 
Shaft were also visited. In addition, the micro- and macro-seismic systems were 
discussed, and the 3D model of Gold Hunter mining showing the burst location and the 
north dipping structures was viewed. 
This summary report presents my observations and thoughts regarding this mine visit. 
April 22, 2010 2.5 Ml Rockburst 
At 7:51 pm a 2.5 Ml burst occurred out in the footwall of the 5700 14 W stope ( see 
Figure 1). One of the crew was working at the face when the burst hit. There was 
shockwave damage back from the face along the north rib in the crown over a distance of 
some 7 5 ft. Most of the damage was contained by the bolts and screen along the n9rth 
rib, but it was estimated that there was some 8 t of shakedown from the back along the 
damaged zone. The ventilation bag was knocked down along a portion of the damaged 
zone. This is the largest burst to date in the Gold Hunter associated with day to day 
mining. The stope would have been severely damaged had this burst not occurred some 
150 ft out in the footwalL 
This burst and the previous bursts, also shown on Figure 1, appear to have been located 
on either of two well defined, north dipping faults mapped along the 54 ramp from the 
5750 sublevel up to the 5600 sublevel. The elevation of all three bursts appeared to be at 
about stope elevation, although the stope damage associated with the 2.5 burst was from 
shock loading from above stope elevation. The occurrence of these fault-slip type bursts 
out in the footwall on north dipping structures does not fit the normal pattern of bursting 
associated with an advancing mining front. However, if the north dipping structures 
intersect the vein to the east, then a fault slip type event could occur since these structures 
are undamped along the mined out zone. Since we have good data on these bursts, I 
recommend that we have Itasca do a back analysis of the 2.5 burst to better define the 
burst mechanism. 
The location of this burst by the microseismic system, JProcess, was poor. The reason 
for this poor location is not yet known, but it does point out the to Gold 
Hunter geophone array by at least 4 additional geophones. Good source locations for this 
burst were obtained by post processing of the original seismic and microseismic data. 
MineSeis system is now very close to being completely operationaL 
! /: 
Figure 1 - 5700 14 W Stope Showing Burst Locations (MineSeis/JProcess - circle, 
Block- 1.5 Burst 10/18/09 -Yellow, Block 2.5 Burst 2/22/10-Red, 
Burst damage - l. 0 Burst 4/06/09 - White) 
i• 
2 
or 
Ground conditions and ground control looked good in 6100 15 stope. The 40 vein was 
being advanced on both sides, and the overlying fill really looked good. The same 
observations apply for 6050 12 E/W stope. Both sides of 5700 11 stope looked good as 
well. Stress fractures above the back along the west end of the vein were not nearly as 
prominent as observed along the east end of the vein. 
A number of access and service openings for #4 shaft infrastructure were briefly visited. 
While ground conditions are variable depending on location, and the orientation of the 
bedding, the ground support being installed appeared to be very adequate. 
Microseismic/Seismic Instrumentation 
The poor JProcess source location for the 2.5 burst was a surprise since we have routinely 
been getting good source locations for seismic activity outside of blasting times. As 
__ Q}entioned previously, we need to install at least 4 more geophone_s in the Gold Hunter to 
improve both coverage and source location accuracy. The arrival times for geophone #9 
have been erratic for some time. This geophone was visited and there did not appear to 
be any problems associated with its location or mounting. This geophone was installed in 
1996, hence, the problem may be internal. I recommend that we replace it with a new or 
other working geophone and have the old geophone checked out. 
The MineSeis system is very close to being fully functional. Because most of its 
geophones are within the Gold Hunter, seismic events occurring during blasting are 
presently non-locatable. While we used to be able to locate bursts during blasting with 
the old Macro system, we had more geophones located outside the zone being monitored. 
The time window with the old Macro was only 3 seconds, and now we have a 10 second 
time window. It appears that we have distortion of all signals during blasting. What is 
causing this distortion has not yet been established. While it may be a frequency 
response mismatch problem between the geophones and the MineSeis analog to digital 
input device, it could also be a frequency problem within the AID device itself. I 
recommend that we get Corky up to s01i out this and other signal quality problems. He 
should bring his signal generating equipment and an oscilloscope so he can carry out this 
task In the past Corky made up a calibration signal device for USBM to use on the old 
Macro systems which also must have been thrown out with the other Macro components. 
Summary 
The 2.5 Ml burst on 4/22/10 was significant because of its magnitude and its location. 
Most of the past bursts in the Gold Hunter have been in the Ml 1.5 range, have been 
located within some 50 ft of the 30 vein, and have caused little or no stope damage. This 
burst would have caused serious damage had it been closer to the stope. We need to 
understand the cause and mechanism for this burst since its magnitude and location are 
anomalous. 
Mining and ground control in the stopes and development openings visited looked very 
good, as did the backfill in the underhand stopes. While this is the norm for Gold Hunter 
mining, we have had both backfill and ground control problems in a few stopes during 
the past couple of years. 
The MineSeis system is very close to being completely operational, and did provide a 
good solution for the 2.5 burst. JProcess continues to function well, but did not give a 
good solution for thi_s_ J::?urst. It is ~lear tha_:!: the Gold Hunter geophone array needs to be 
expanded. The signal frequency problems in the MineSeis system need to be addressed 
and solved. 
The mine 3D model clearly showed the relationship between the north dipping faults and 
the 2.5 burst. This model has become very useful in viewing the relationship between 
mining and seismic activity in the Gold Hunter. 
We need to instrument the bottom of the sill pillar when overhand mining above the 5900 
level is halted. The instrumentation in the 5900 drift pillar is still providing useful data 
despite instrument failures. It is not clear to me that a complete overhaul of this 
instrumentation is necessary at the present time. 
4 
Exhibit 37 
SUBJECT: November 2010 Mine 
On Tuesday November 23,2010, I visited the Gold Hunter to inspect access and mining 
openings that might have been damaged from the 2.2 Ml rockburst at 15:01, and the 2.3 
Ml rockburst at 15:33 on November 16th. I also reviewed the blasting prior to the 
bursting, as well as checking the source locations for the bursts that were obtained from 
both Jprocess and Mineseis. In addition, I reviewed the instrumentation data from the 
5700 11 and 14 stopes, as well as the 5900 pillar. 
This summary report presents my observations and thoughts regarding this mine visit. 
November 16th Rockbursts 
At 15:01:52 on November 16, 2001, blasting was initiated in the 5500 14W stope. At 
about 15:01:57 a 2.2 Ml burst occurred during the blasting. Jprocess located an event at 
15:01:56, 17351,24458,-2170, which was presumed to be the burst, but the arrival data 
indicate that thi_s was tQe last blast be_fore th_e burst. Mineseis repo1ied that the 15:01 
burst was located at 17841,24409,-2123, and a block location using the Mineseis arrivals 
located the burst at l 7965,25028,-2074. These locations suggested that the 15:01 burst 
occurred in the hanging wall of the 5500 14W stope. Upon obtaining the seismic 
waveforms and more information from Doug Dodge, it became evident that the Mineseis 
location was not for the 15: 01 burst but a blast just before the burst. Hence, we do not 
have a seismic location for the 15:01 burst, but presume it was triggered by the blasting 
in 5500 14W. On the Lucky Friday side it was not uncommon for a burst to be 
associated with an earlier blast, but that does not seem to be the case for this burst. 
At 1533:59 on November 16th a 2.3 burst occurred and was located by Jprocess at 
18028, 24640,-2155 and by Mineseis at 18121,24493,-2104. The Block locations for the 
Jprocess and Mineseis arrivals are 17935,24560,-2185 and 18107,24529,-2108. The 
errors for all the solutions were in the 100 ft range, likely caused by differences in 
seismic velocities along bedding and perpendicular to bedding. The Jprocess location 
better fits the damage observed along the F3 fault as it crosses the 54-5600 ramp, and the 
54-5650 ramp. 
. ,. 
The 2.3 burst at 15:33 was obviously located in the clamped zone under the advancing 
underhand longwall mining front. It was initially presurned that the 2.2 burst at 15:01 
was in the hanging wall of 14 stope, and maybe affected stress Since we 
now don't really have a location for the first burst, it is not clear what relationship it may 
have had with respect to the second burst. It seems unlikely that they both would have 
on the same structure. The waveforms recorded at seismic sensor 
the on the ramp was widespread minor '-'""'"'"''-'-F,"' 
screen in the back, some wall squeeze and bagging of screen, loosening or opening 
along the faults and favorably oriented bedding planes, cracking of the shotcreted 
bulkhead at the old orepass/vent raise, and some minor squeeze along the left rib of the 
up-ramp. Only very minor movement or damage was noted along the slot access to the 
old stope. 
On the 54-5600 sublevel there was a small fall of ground along the fault, some open 
cracks in the floor of the adjacent muckbay, and minor damage just above the floor along 
one of the ribs of the daybox cutout. The fall of ground, due to shakedown and/or minor 
movement, resulted in the split sets in the immediate back being ejected from back and 
left hanging in the ripped and separated chain link mesh. There did not appear to be any 
Dywidag bolts in the back in the damaged zone, based on the photos, however, there 
could have been bolts on the ground covered by the pile of muck. There was less 
widespread damage on this sublevel. It is clear that the back support along the wider 
intersection, with a cross-fault, could not contain the burst damage. This will be 
discussed later. 
There was no cl_arp.ag_e _apparently r~ported in either the 5500 14 E/W stopes or the 11 
stopes. An inspection of the 5700 14E/W open stopes did not really reveal any 
significant new damage since my November 8 mine visit, however, there appeared to be 
more minor shakedown/spalling along both ends of the stope. At the intersection some of 
the ends of the cable bolts were starting to umavel, and maybe there was more bagging of 
the screen. It was not apparent that any new closure had occurred. An inspection of 
5700 11 E/W stopes revealed only minor additional spalling affects since my November 
8 stope visit. There were less changes noted along the 11 stopes than the 14 stopes. 
For two large bursts, apparently both associated with the 5500 14 E/W underhand stopes, 
there was only a modest amount of damage on two sublevels, and no stope damage. The 
second burst was located on the F3 north dipping fault in the footwall, while the source 
location of the first burst is unknown. The observed damage fits the location of the first 
burst. 
Had there been better back support at this wider intersection along the 54-5600 sublevel, 
there likely would have been no displaced rock. For a 20 ft wide intersection the worst 
case scenario would be a 10 ft wedge type failure. The 6 ft Dywidag bolts on 5 ft rows 
across the back are not sufficient to prevent this type failure or contain shock loading 
affects from a burst. th.is case 8 ft Dywidag bolts would be sufficient. For wider 
intersections longer bolts or some form of cables would be required. 
had any 
stress gage data was more erratic 
14 C and 11 D gages showed stress increases of some 500 psi 
the previous readings two weeks Previous increases two week monitoring 
periods for these gages were as much as some 300 psi, hence, the stress jumps for these 
gages is not really that anomalous. · In addition, the closure changes at these locations 
were in the O. 0 l range, which don't appear to support any large stress increase due to the 
bursting. 
There were no changes reported for the just completed 5900 pillar instrumentation 
readings. I would have to conclude that the bursts had little affect on the instruments on 
the 5700 and 5900 levels, indicating that fault plane movement did not intersect the 
mined out area below the 5700 level. 
Summary 
The source location for the 2.2 Ml burst at 15:01 on November 16, 2010 could not be 
determined from either the micro-or macro-seismic systems. The 2.3 Ml burst at 15:33 
was located on the F3 north dipping fault that intersected the 5600 54-ramp. While these 
bur§ts appeared !_o_be tr:iggere_q_ by the 15- :Q 1: 52 blasting in t4e 5500 14 W stope, there 
was no reported damage in either of the 5 500 14 or 11 stopes. lack of stope damage 
suggests that any stope intersection with the F3 fault was at some distance above the 
stope level. The relationship between the first and second burst is unknown, and we have 
never before seen two bursts occur on the same fault during any burst sequence. 
The numerical model result showed that the high stress wrapping around the advancing 
underhand longwall face should provide clamping for any fault-slip events on structures 
dipping down from either the footwall or hanging wall. It was presumed that the 
previous fault slip events associated with overhand mining would not accompany the 
underhand mining. We need to have Itasca review these recent bursts. 
The ground support at the intersection of the F3 fault and the 54-5600 sublevel was 
insufficient to contain the burst damage. There did not appear to be Dywidag bolts in the 
back at the burst location. It is likely that rows of 8 ft Dywidag bolts along the 20 ft wide 
intersections on the sublevel would have been sufficient to contain shock loading damage 
from bursting. Longer reinforcement would be needed at wider intersections. 
The installed instrumentation on the 5700 and 5900 levels did not reflect bursts occurring 
below the 5700 level. 
Minseis array needs to be modified to respond to bursts occurring 
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Geotechnical 
Mine is based on the 
at the mine: 
"' ,A,n understanding of the geology, in situ stress state and 
the host rock mass and orebody 
basic information 
characteristics of 
• An understanding of the seismic source mechanisms that have occurred and their 
relationship to the geology, mining geometry and blasting 
• An understanding of the relationship of seismicity to location and extent of observed 
damage in stopes and access drifts and to the ground support methods and practices 
used 
This information is used to develop a plan for mitigation of seismic risk based on the following 
proactive measures, shown schematically in Figure 1: 
• Use of seismic monitoring methods to track microseismic and seismic event locations 
and time-history response, and to verify currently active regions and possible source 
mechanisms. 
• Exclusion of personnel from potential seismic areas for a sufficient time after central 
mine blasting. 
• Use of mining methods, procedures, an·d geometrie·s to minimize risk of large seismic 
events, and adherence to design and mining execution procedures that involve 
engineering, geology, safety, mine management, and the workforce in the process. 
• Use of ground support in potential seismic areas that has energy absorption capacity 
sufficient to maintain stable openings. 
• Dissemination of current and timely information to mine management, safety personnel 
and the workforce regarding seismicity and solicitation of observations and comment on 
seismic planning and risk. 
This document provides background 1mormat1on on the mine and mming methods used, the 
geology, in situ stress state, geotechnical characteristics of the orebody and host rock, and the 
observed seismicity and source mechanisms and their relation to geology and mining. The 
companion Rockburst Control Plan, which fulfills MSHA requirements set forth in 
30CFR57.3461(2), presents the seismic mitigation plan that addresses the above proactive 
measures. 
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Source r.~echanisms and Proactive Measures to 
Damage Potential Mitigate Seismic Risk Background Data 
•••1221ca__. ...... ~ ..... ~--
Background Information 
• Geology 
• in swstress 
• Geoteclmicel ch1m:1cterislics 
• Mining methods end geometries 
• Seismic history 
Seismic Source 
Mechanisms- Location, 
Timlng and Frequency and 
Relation to Mining 
Geometry and Blasting 
Seismic Damage 
Mechanism and Locations 
Exclusion of Personnel at 
nmes of Higher Seismic 
Risk in the Mining Cycle 
Seismic Monitoring to Track 
Location, Frequency and 
Magnitude of Current 
Activity 
Mining Methods, 
Geometriesand Procedures 
to l.'llnimize Seismic Rlsk 
Ground Support to 
-==:--,- _Dlssip;ite_S.ei.srnic...Enoo.n-' 
Dissemination of 
lnformation on Current 
Seismic Risk and 
Solicitation of Observations 
from Mining Crev;s 
Figure 1. Schematic illustration of contents of Geotechnica/ Characteristics document and Rockburst 
Control Plan. 
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Hu M 
in 
mine Silver 1995 
economic mineralization in the projection of the Gold Hunter orebody with depth in 
the lower Wallace Formation. A decision to begin production was made in 1997. Since late 
2001, all production from the Lucky Friday operation (combined Lucky Friday mine and Gold 
Hunter veins) has been from the Gold Hunter. Access to the Gold Hunter is gained from two 
levels off the Silver shaft (4900 and 5900) which is located approximately one mile south-
southeast of the Gold Hunter. Construction of the #4 shaft is currently underway at the Gold 
Hunter. The No. 4 shaft is a winze with top landing at the 4900 level and planned final depth of 
over 9000' from ground surface. 
2.2 Current Mine Configuration of the Gold Hunter Unit 
A 30 view of the Gold Hunter mining area or deposit, 30 Vein stopes is shown in Figure 2. The 
deposit is accessed from the Silver Shaft, which is the main producton hoist. Connections to 
the Silver Shaft are made at the 4900 level (- 1600' elevation below sea level), and 5900 levels. 
Mining currently extends from approximately the 4000 level to below the 6100 level. The 
current operations at Gold Hunter occur in two primary mining fronts on the 30 Vein - the 11 
and 14 underhand stopes extending downward from the 5300 level, and the 12, 15 and 16 
underhand stopes extending down from the 5900 level (Figure 2). The 11 and 14 stopes are 
serviced from the 590-51 and .c54 ramps, respectively, and the- 12, 15 and 16 stopes from the 
590-52, -55 and -56 ramps. A developing sill pillar occurs between the 5300, 11 (west) and 14 
(east) underhand stopes. The sill pillar is approximately 200' in height on the 11 stope side and 
130' in height on the 14 stope side at the time of this writing. A 60' high pillar was left beneath 
the 5900 15 stope following the groundfall in April, 2011, and a new cut was established below 
the pillar. The previous overhand stopes mined up from the 5900 level were stopped in 2010 
and are filled. The three underhand stopes mining downward from the 5900 level create a 
roughly longwall front with the stopes at approximately 6150 level at the time of this writing. 
Development in the 590-55 ramp extends to 6500 level while the 590-52 and -56 ramps extend 
to points just below the current stope elevations. 
Additional scattered mining was conducted on various intermediate veins in the footwall of the 
30 Vein. Most of this mining occurred above 4900 level. The 1 O stope is currently mining 
several Intermediate Veins (the 60, 80 and 90 Veins - a series of orebodies that occur in the 
footwall of and parallel to the 30 Vein) just above the 5300 level. 
2.3 Mining Methods 
The Gold Hunter uses the cut and fill mining method to extract the narrow, near-vertical veins. 
Two variants of this method are used - overhand and underhand mining. In both approaches, 
cross-cuts are driven from each footwall spiral ramp to the center of the stope. From a given 
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access the next and so on. This process continues 
all five cuts are completed and a new series of crosscuts is established from the next ramp 
In overhand stopes, the back and walls are typically bolted and screene'ct with 4' or 6' 
bolts and chain link. Breast-down faces progress- in both directions from the crosscut to 
the ends of the stope (approximately 500') where the stope cuts eventually connect to the 
adjacent stope or stop on an economic boundary. 
In underhand mining the process essentially works in reverse, with crosscuts driven from the 
ramp to the orebody in a downward progression. Each stope cut is driven by breasting up 
beneath a sandfill/mat construction poured in the cut above. The fill mat consists of an 18" 
buffer of broken rock left on the stope floor followed by placement of vertically-oriented, 6' 
Dywidag bolts on 4' centers into the broken rock floor. This is followed by a nominal 8' high 
paste fill pour at 10% cement content. Figure 4 shows laboratory uniaxial compressive strength 
data for Gold Hunter paste fill as a function of set time. The plot shows the historical database 
and the results of recent (2011) laboratory testing, indicating that 28 day strength of the fill is 
substantial, ranging from about 400 to 650 psi. This paste forms a strong back when exposed 
below. When breasting beneath the fill mat, the 18" of broken muck falls into the stope with the 
blast, leaving a cemented fill back with Dywidags protruding a few inches into the stope. The 
Dywidags are then plated over chain link mesh for the final back support. If required, split bolts 
can be driven into the back for additional support. Stope/cross-cut intersections are additionally 
supported with timber-planks (with Dywidags installed through them)-laid on the broken muck 
floor and hitched with wire rope to wall bolts to improve ground control at wider spans and to 
provide a solid beam for posting if required. Fill fences are constructed in the slot and the slot 
pasted. 
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East 
'1900 level 
West 
West 
590-52 Ramp 
6500 level 
590-55 Ramp 
Figure 2. Views of the Gold Hunter mine from the footwa/1 (toward the south) showing development 
and from the hangingwa/1 (toward the north}. 
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Figure 3. Overhand and underhand crosscut access from ramp to stopes. 
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Figure 4. Historical (blue and green) and recent (red) 10% cement paste fill uniaxial 
compressive strength behavior as a function of set time, Gold Hunter Mine. 
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2.4 Summary of Geology 
2.3.1 Lithology 
The Gold Hunter deposit is hosted entirely in the Wallace formation. It is believed that 
minerali zation at the 4050, 4900 , and the new 5900 leve ls is located in lower W allace . 
Lithologies consist of thin-bedded argillites, argillite alternating with silt caps and local siltites . 
The argil!ites vary from green to gray with local purple hematitic argil!ites more distal to the 
mineral zone. Also distal to the mineral zone is an increasing carbonate component consisting 
of dolomitic argillites and siltites, which are more typical of the Wallace formation. The 
bedding/cleavage has spacing ranging from a few inches to feet. The cleavage is often coated . 
with talcy , slickensided material and can be high ly irregular in shape (Figure 5). The 
bedding/cleavage thus provides a significant anisotropy in the mechanical response of the 
material when stressed. Drifts driven perpendicular to bedding tend to be quite stable , whereas 
drifts driven parallel to bedding typically show buckling or high deflection of the wall beds. 
Figure 5. Photograph of thinly-bedded argilfite core showing slickensided cleavage 
surfaces. 
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Geotechnical 
N80-85W dipping 80S. 
fault lies to the south at N80W dipping 85S. These faults are about 
feet around the mine and define the trend of the Star-Gold Hunter mineral belt 
Post Mineral faulting 
The Master fault is the most prominent structural feature within the Gold Hunter vein system. 
The fault is near vertical and follows the trace of the 30 vein for at least 1500 feet along strike, 
forming the hangingwall contact. Protomylonitic fabrics are evident within a few millimeters of 
the principal slip plane, which is locally highly polished and displays offsets, slickensides, and 
other kinematic indicators suggesting dextral slip. 
The mineralization in the Gold Hunter deposit is offset by at least two periods of post-mineral 
faulting. One period is dominated by both high and low angle reverse faulting which trends 
N30-70W and dips south, suggesting compression from the south west. These faults do not 
appear to be associated with seismicity. The other period of faulting trends N75-88E and dips 
40-60° to the north, also showing reverse displacement. The combined geometry suggests 
compression from the northwest which, as described later, is the current estimated maximum in 
situ compression direction. These structures, designated as the "F" faults are observed in 
interlevel ramps and crosscuts, particularly on the east end of the mine. The continuity of these 
structures through the orebody is unknown due to limited access to the hangingwall, but appear 
to be cut off at the hangingwall contact. The faults are generally narrow and tight with rough 
surfaces, both locally and macroscopically. Their continuity is currently not well known, but they 
have been mapped over 1 O's to 1 OO's of feet in multiple locations. These faults are of particular 
interest since they are related to seismic events monitored from about 5300 level downward. 
Post-mineral offsets on both of these sets of structures vary from 1 to 15 feet which complicates 
production efforts. These structures are currently being mapped in detail in ramp and slot 
exposures, and 30 surfaces are being fit to these exposures in an attempt to understand the 
topography and continuity of the surfaces. 
Folding 
The Wallace formation is folded to +/- 90° upright with stratigraphy striking N80-85W and 
dipping 80-90° S. The Gold Hunter appears to be on the upright south limb of a faulted N80-
85W-trending antiform. Up-section is to the south with locally-overturned bedding. To the west, 
stratigraphy turns northerly toward the Mill Creek syncline. To the east and slightly north is the 
trend of the Deadman syncline, which does not influence the rocks in the mine area. 
Wal/rock Fabrics 
The rocks around the Gold Hunter veins have a metamorphic shear lineation that trends N83W 
and rakes between 74° and 82° down to the west. This parallels the mineral rake and is 
believed to be axial plane cleavage reactivated during mineralization. This fabric can be 
observed at the surface in the discovery pit and seen underground as fillings of sericite on 
cleavage and bedding surfaces (Figure 5). 
Page 10 
Geotechnical Characteristics the Lucky Friday Mine, Hecla Mining Company Rev. O 
economic when compared to adjacent veins. The 30 Vein averages greater than 
4 feet in width as a composite of closely spaced veins and veinlets. It strikes N83 W and dips 
south. The economic vein length is 1,500 feet at the 4900 level and has increased to 
over 2,000 feet at the 5900 level elevation. The 30 Vein has yielded more than 90 percent of 
total mine production since 1997 and produced 11456 1 036 tons at 16.0 
1.7% Zn through August2005. 
Ag, 8.9% Pb and 
The other veins have shorter strike lengths and generally narrower widths; these are known 
collectively as the Intermediate veins and are subparallel to the 30 Vein, with most lying in its 
footwall. The Intermediate veins occur from 20' to more than 100' from the 30 Vein and some 
have continuity nearly as great, but their ore is typically of lower value. The distribution of silver, 
lead and zinc varies widely for each vein. The most prominent Intermediate veins include the 
40, 60, 80, 90 and 110 (progressively from the footwall contact of the 30 Vein). These veins 
have been mined with scattered stopes, primarily above 4900 level. 
The Gold Hunter veins consist of gangue and sulfide mineralization. The typical vein has quartz 
and siderite components with lesser amounts of pyrite and barite. Ore minerals include 
argentiferous galena, sphalerite, and local tetrahedrite. There are also minor amounts of 
sulfosalts including pyrargrite, bournonite, and boulangerite. 
All of the principal veins locally display fabrics that document multiple episodes of faulting and 
mineralization. Gangue mineral textures are often cataclastic for siderite and local quartz. 
Sulfide-textures vary from locally coarse crystalline-galena to fine grained steel galena. Gold 
Hunter sphalerite varies from locally coarse crystalline to fine-grained, and is generally lower in 
iron content when compared to sphalerite from the Lucky Friday veins. Discrete veins 
composed of fine-grained matrix-supported galena breccia are common, and are the dominant 
ore type of 30 Vein production. 
3.0 Geotechnical Characteristics 
3.1 In Situ Stress State 
The in situ stress state in the Coeur d'Alene district was reported by Whyatt et al. (1995a and b) 
as shown in Tables 1 and 2. These estimates are based on stress measurements at the 4250 
and 5300 levels of the Lucky Friday Mine and the 7300 level of the Star mine. The 
measurements indicate a CT1 direction of about N40W and a ratio of cr1/crv of approximately 
1.3 to >2. The maximum stress direction is reinforced by numerous observations of breakouts in 
boreholes, shafts, and raises, as summarized for the Lucky Friday in Figure 6 , and similar 
breakouts across the Coeur d'Alene district indicate consistent direction of the major stress. 
The horizontal to vertical stress ratio appears to vary between the Lucky Friday and nearby Star 
Mines, with the Lucky Friday measurements showing significantly higher horizontal 
components. It is felt that the Lucky Friday measurements represent a conservative upper 
Page 11 
of 
Geotechnical Characteristics of the Rev. 0 
' Mine In Situ Stress Estimate 
(Whyatt et 1995a) 
Bearing 
er ns: 57 2.5 
C,"" . 49 2.2 
0. 35 1.6 
T ns/e11 -15 -0_6 
T ns1'v 2 0.1 
Tet11.'il -10 -0.4 
01 70 3.1 N40' W 13' 
C,o 42 1.8 S41' W 33' 
1Magnitude is a function of overburden depth. 
'Principal stresses from measurement at 4250 level (-885 elevation) 
TABLE 2 
Star Mine In Situ Stress Estimate· 
. - - --··-· 
(Whyatt et al., 1995b) 
Strer.s component Magnitude Beanng ?lunge 
54 7,800 N3.:J Vi/ 10' 
42 6,000 M74' E 66 
34 4,9DD S 48' w 22 
NOTc.-Empry cells in columns intentionally left blank. 
'Principal stresses from measurement at 7300 level (-885 elevation) 
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Notes 
A!imak raise: 
3980 .. N40' W 
4020. N65' W 
4100 N75' W 
Silver shall loading pocket 
4900 N45' W Subunit E, hard. 
5100 . N45' W Subunit G, hard. 
5500 . N45' W Subunit G. hard. 
Ore passes: .. 
5100-97 N55' W 
5100-107 N45' W 
5160-107 N40' W 
5210-107 N35' W 
5300-107 N55' W 
Service raise. 5480 N 35'-45' W 
Blastholes. service raise, 5400 N74' W Diameter= 14 cm (5.5 inJ 
Grouse vein raise. Star Mine N 30' -40' W 
Figure 6. Summary of borehole breakout directions at the Lucky Friday and Star Mines 
supporting a NW orientation of the major principal stress direction. 
3.2 Rock Quality and Material Properties 
The rock mass quality and material properties of the deeper (around 5900 level) Gold Hunter 
vein and wall rock materials were determined from geotechnical logging and laboratory testing 
of exploration boreholes drilled from the footwall ramp across the orebody and into the 
hangingwall at about the 6100 level. The results of the lab testing and rough estimates of the 
rock mass quality and rock mass material properties are given here. 
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3.2.1 Exploration Geotechnical Borehole 
A horizontal, 225' long exploration diamond drill hole GH61-40 was driven from the footwall 
ramp through the footwall waste, the 30-40 Vein package, and into the hang ingwall at a 
distance of approxim ately 20' beneath the 6150-15 stope (Figure 7). Th is hole was drilled 
primarily for determ ining the quality of the rock units in the 5300-5900 pillar area as well as the 
stopes below 5900 level, and to sample the hangingwall, footwall , and vein rocks for material 
properties testing . 
The core log indicates generally 100% core recovery, but moderate ROD in the footwall rocks , 
whereas the ROD in the vein package is ofte n over 80%. The wall rocks grade from silty 
argillites to stronger siltites that are sometimes cut by low-angle fault planes. The wall rocks 
exhibit anisotropy via cleavage that is oriented parallel to the orebody. The 30/40 vein package 
consists of ore minerals (sphalerite and galena with some pyrite ) in a matrix of siderite, quartzite 
and siltite gangue. Figures 8 and 9 show examples of the wall and ore rock core recovered 
from the exploration hole. No discing was observed in the core, supporting the argument that 
horizontal to ve rtical stress ratio is likely not at the high end of the Lucky Friday measured in situ 
stress range . 
·------~- -
,._......._.t,:.\1 UDR 
View Looking East 
Figure 7. Section view showing the location of geotechnical drill hole GH61-40 drilled 
beneath th e 615-15 stope. 
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Figure 8. Typical footwalf rock conditions consisting of silty argillite and siltite 
lithology. 
Ronne! E. Barrette, eta! vs Helca Mining Co., eta! Docket No. 43639 
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Figure 9. Core through 30/40 vein package (approximately 160 to 187 ft hole depth) 
consisting of ore minerals spha/erite and galena with gangue minerals siderite, 
quartzite and siltite. 
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conducted. tests were 
conducted on wall rock and 25 on rocks from the vein Three sets of triaxial tests were 
conducted on footwall rocks (a set consisting of confining pressures of 500, 1000, 2000 and 
3000 psi - 3.5, 7, 14 and 20 MPa), one on vein package rocks and one on hangingwal! rocks. 
The results are summarized in Tables 3 and 4. 
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GH61-40-U-03 (El:61-40 61.lO 2S.O! L'19 4-61 3.94 
GH5l-40-U..06 utl6i-40 73.00 73..W 21.79 1.99 4.01 1SS.9 36,185 
G!:i61-40-U.05 GH6120 75AO 75.SO 19.70 l.99 3.83 178.6 12,510 134 0.29 
utl51-40-U-04 GH6120 7620 76.60 24.16 1.99 !S52 53,850 l7j0S 0.13 
GH6I-40-U..07 GE:61-40 79.50 79.S5 20.5+ l.99 3.S9 1833 30,355 9,721 LS7 0.10 
GE:61-40-U.08 GH6l-!O 90.SO 9120 2j.99 L99 4.52 200.5 37,215 12,011 4.66 0.18 
GH61-40-U-09 GH61-40 9120 91.60 25 !5 1.99. &.2~ 206.S 33,520 .10,Sl5 3.77 022 
GH6l-40-U-10 GH61-40 92.70 93.10 21..!6 L"9 43& 1703 20,S05 6,699 3A1 0.14 
GH6l-40-U-ll GH6J...!O 95.!0 95.80 25.S4 1.99 4.64 193.S 19,920 6,421 2.6S 020 
GH61-40-U-12 GH61-40 97.10 97.50 24.55 1.99 ~34 196.9 35,~0 11,552 i.00 021 
GB:61-4()..U.13 GHo!-40 103.00 103.40 2322 1.99 42s 191.0 32S70 10,606 336 0.47 
GH6l.40-U-!5 GH61..l0 !0530 105.70 21. 77 l.99 4.49 176.7 48,290 15,597 3.63 030 
GH6l-40-U-l4 GH6!-40 105.00 106.4-0 24.30 l.99 455 185.4 77,405 2,,900 3.91 0.34 
GH6l-40-U-17 GH6l40 107.IO 10750 2124 l.99 4.62 167.i 97,565 31,464 5.71 0.13 
GH6l-40-U-16 G.'i6l-40 !OS.50 !OS.90 22.,7 l.99 4.62 172.0 113,i>!O 36,703 453 OA,3 
GE:61-40-U-19 GE:61-40 117.SO llS.20 25.52 1.99 453 195.6 3S,l>l0 12~30 l.SS 0.15 
GH6!-40-U-t& GB.6120 11s.40 ns.so 2212 1.99 4.U rns.s 79,3S5 15~,;.;9 t.47 o.os 
GH61-40-U.20 GH61-40 126.50 125.90 ll.!7 1.99 453 170.4 70,020 22,569 737 0.12 
GB.61-4-0-U-21 GH61-40 12i.40 127.SO 2533 1.99 4.46 197.L 37,500 12,075 6.05 0.19 
GH6l-40-U-22 GH6!-40 131.10 131.50 26.03 U9 4.is 202.1 36,495 11,746 5.06 0.19 
GH61-40-U-24 GH61-40 135 . .!0 135.80 22.1& 1.99 450 1713 53,210 170 111 4.64 0.06 
GP.51-40-U-23 GH61...!0 136.10 136.50 2431 L.99 4.4.! 1903 39)55 12,660 i.08 O.OS 
GH61-4()..U.27 GH61-40 137.00 137.40 27.S5 1.99 4./sl 2103 36,505 11,7~3 6.96 033 
GH61-40-U-26 GH61.i0 138.00 !3S.40 26.S2 L"9 4.51 206.5 33,500 10,776 7.57 022 
GH61-40-U-25 GH6l-40 138.40 138.80 2825 1.99 -i.47 219.i 63,165 20,329 8.03 030 
GH61-40-U-2S GH61.i0 Ut.60 142.00 25.90 1.99 457 196.6 11,930 3,S32 3.56 0.25 
GH61-40-U-29 GH6PO 1-14.SO 14520 26.71 L"9 4.5S 202.9 31,750 10224 2.S5 0.31 
GH61-40-U-30 GH6!.i0 149.70 150.JO 26.5S L99 4.55 2031 44,765 !J.,J.07 5.65 030 
GH61-40-U-32 GE:5120 15L60 !5l00 28.78 l.99 J..63 116.0 75,70a 24,351 7.15 OJ.2 
GH61-40-U-31 GH61-40 152,00 152.40 26.9S t.99 4.51 207.9 44,165 14,193 6.28 0.4 
~61::,r:J;.u~,.;:51=40---,1:n1:rtFSo..........:is:s~:99--~---71-:1---::iT,19s·,s~·o:u---o:tu"-
GH6t-40-U-33 GE:6140 153.65 154.05 26.10 1.99 4j5 198.i 56,725 18,219 5.15 0.16 
GH6l-40-U-36 GE:61...!0 157..iO 15i.S0 3054 1.99 4.57 131.6 63,085 20263 6.39 0.41 
GH6i-40-U-3:i GH61-40 157.SO 15S20 2821 1.99 4.47 21S.S 62,920 20220 6.13 0.4S 
GH6l-40-U-37 GH61.40 15950 159.90 42.50 1.99 333.0 44,5-!0 14,356 6.70 OAS 
1,GB:61-40:U.38 :aHoi'.40 - ·161.3( ~ 161.70 1750 1.99 210:J 32,450 10,m 6.56 0.39 
t: GH61:,io.u-40 .. GH61-40 162.SO 163.20 305s L99 4.51 .235.2 19,m 6,246 299 f mI61-40-1J.39 . GH61-40 16320 163.60 3139 L99 -!.69 239.6 , 34,010 10,935 5.30 r gH6I-40-U4} GH61-40 165.00 + 165.40 ,, 3230 1.99 4.57. . 24U 2,,030 8,678 7-49 
[}lHl51~tr4f "'GH61-40 'fo~.30 i66.70 30Ai 1.99 4Ai 236.6 39,850. 12,812 6,82 
fGH61'40-U-43 . GH61-40 · , 166.70 fri1.io . 3157 1.99 ~.46 245.7 63,675 20,442 S.34 
f,,GH6l40-lt:42 GH61'40 .. 157-10<._!6130 30.99. 1.99 4.59 2345 54,405 17,475 JJU 
~ GH61-4o.:.J-46 GH61:.W :l73_so ·, 17420. 3151 1.99 -1.49 2-BJ 72,940 · 23,+04 SJ6 
f C!Ff6140-:U::i5 . ;GH61'.40i '.115jj ·• • 175.65 3l14 .. · · 1.99 • 455 244.9 50,0S5 16,063 7.61 
f'.(!Fl:61~~2 GH61-40 ·. /hsiii :rn,.60 : 33.81. . L99. 4.40 2665 76,543 24,605. S.90 • 
I' GP,:6140.U-'47 • GH61-40 JJ:ric( lTl.60 30.75 :1.99. 4.63 230.1 51,900 16,628 5.70 
:c GH61-40-U-4S GE:61-40 .. , in.so ns20. 33.90 · l.99 4.62 isB 68,215 21,m &3S 
1;;GH6!..W:tf4~. GH61-40 · · iso:oo· : 1So.+o 2s.i, 1:99 45i 21n 67,no 21.104 7.45 
: .GH51-4D-U-51 · urlol-40 is2.oo' 1S2.40 26.68 1.99 455 203.0 50,06:i 16,048 6.97, i 9ff61-4()..U~50 GH61;40 .', 18250 '. .182.90 31.59 1.99 451 · 242.7 58,570 .. 1S,S03 J.90 
i ·mi:61:MJ::U-52 GH61-40 : 18320' .1S3,60 .. 19.50 1.99 453 125,5 60.,300 19.,3-19 7.69 
f GH61-40.U-53 GH61-40 193.80· 19i20 22.75. L09 4.58 172.0 20,210 6,47S 3.91 
f GH6!-40.:U.54 · GE:61-40 19650 195.90 n ?.j. 1.99 .U i 185.0 89,695 2S, 781 7 .87 
[ GH61-40-U-55 GH61-40 20120 .101.60 22.6-l. 1.99 4.40 178.4 5S,S55 18,875 -t51 
C GH61~V.:56 GF.61-40 . 203.20 . 203.60 15.05 1.99 455 190.9 57,m lS,526 5.45 
i GH61-40-U'58< GH6l-40 204.50' .. 20t90 13.26 .· 1.99 .4.56 48,130 15,436 536 
,:GH6i....W:U..57 GH6l-40 ;105,00 . 20UO n ,5 1.99 4.4S 48,785 15,646 . 527 
GH6l-40 20620 206.60 23.9& 1.99. -!.46 37,665 12,086 6.02 
023 
039 
6.43 
038 
0.40 
0.2~ 
0.35 
0.49 
0.43 
OAS 
0.46 
0.46 
0.10 
{).23 
0.15 
0.33 
631 0.31 
rock tests in green, vein in red and HW in blue 
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Triaxial Test 
Anal llg 
ID Length Load Pressnr Modnlns 
e 
GH61-l-O 
GH6UO-T-02 GH61-t0 76.60 17.00 24.23 4A7 1SSJ 71,985 2,000 23~133 327 
GH.61-40-T-03 GH61-40 &130 8L70 23.10 L99 4.40 1S25 11,395 1,000 3,669 L07 
GB:61-40-T-04 GH61-t0 94.SO 9520 22..53 L99 450 1741 19,135 500 6,I6S 1.51 
GH61-40-T-05 GH61-W 10020 100.60 24.73 1-99 4.67 1845 83,435 500 26.,920 3.00 
GH61-40-T-06 GH61-40 110.80 11120 21.67 · 1.99 4.15 190.0 86,S35 1,000 27,961 3.00 
GH61-40-T-07 GH61-l-O 123.60 124.00 2324 1.99 4.42 182.9 83,560 2,000 26,907 3.48 
GE:61-40-T..08 GH61-40 134.10 134..50 ?'"' •.t 
~-'"'!" 1.99 4.4-S 184.4 111,115 3,000 35,779 4.09 
GH6UO-T-09 GH61-40 137.50 137.90 27.62 1.99 4.60 20S.6 50,160 500 16,135 3.78 
GH6140-T-10 GE:61-tO 1+2.SO 14320 r ,, L.)_-r-.) 1..99 4-A-7 181.8 101,725 1,000 32,690 3.9S 
GH61-40-T-11 GH6l-40 152.!W 153.00 29A-5 1..99 4.40 232-4 96,810 2,000 31,095 5-13 
GH51-40-T-12 GH6i-40 t55.50 155.90 2933 1.99 4AO 2312 148,695 3,000 47,784 5..51 
GH61-40-T-13 Glifil-40 159.10 159..50 37.&l 1.99 4.59 2865 68,465 3,000 22,068 5.27 
GBoUO-T-14 GH.61-40 164..50 164..90 34.47 1.99 4j7 162.l 108,355 .2,000 34,811 5.47 
GH6UO..T-15 GF..61-40 169..50 169.90 24.60 1.99 4j3 188.l &4_T)j 1,000 26,998 4.51 
GH61-40-T-16 GH61-W 1i5.80 17620 33.Sl L99 4.42 265.5 82,910 500 26,644 4..56 
GH61-40..T-17 GE:61-40 179.40 179.80 31.75 1..99 4.49 2432 82,035 3,000 26,310 4.64 
GH6140-T-18 GH6UO 192.50 192.90 23.05 1.99 -U9 174.1 35,390 2,0!}0 11,367 3..51 
GH61-40-T-19 GH6I-40 200.30 200.70 23.71/ L99 437 1SS.9 S5,S90 1,0(10 27,55D 329 
+FW rock tests in green, vein package in red and HW in blue 
Histogram plots of the UCS testing results for the footwall and vein package rocks are given in 
-Figi:fre 10. The mean UCS for the-FWfocks is 15~307 psi+/- 6,960 psi'(106 MPa +/- 48 MPa) 
and 15,660 psi +/- 5,800 psi (108 MPa +/- 40 MPa) for the vein package rocks. Although the 
mean UCS is roughly the same, the UCS of the FW rocks is more-or-less normally distributed, 
whereas the vein package rocks have a bimodal or skewed distribution toward somewhat higher 
strengths. All of the rock units taken together show a roughly-normal distribution with mean of 
about 15,660 psi (108 MPa). It is noted that the sampling for the laboratory testing was taken 
from intact cores or rock which may contain internal cleavage planes. Thus, the results for the 
wall rocks reflect failure along cleavage surfaces as well as intact rock fracture. 
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Figure 10. Histograms of UCS data for at/ FW rocks (top), vein package rocks (center) 
and all the data (bottom). 
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Mass Estimate 
, the beds are confined, dilation is controlled. The wall rocks behave in 
a stable fashion and can be characterized as having fair to good in which the bedding 
only a small role in control of rock mass response. When drifting parallel to bedding, the 
bedding controls the rock mass response, expressed as dilation of the beds and buckling Rock 
mass characterization schemes such as the Hoek and Brown 1 GS! approach do not lend 
themselves to conditions in which the bedding lamination controls the rock properties. 
Therefore, in this case, estimates are only given for the vein package and for wall rock in which 
the bedding is in a confined state. 
Due to the limited triaxial database, it is clear that some of the tests were conducted on rock 
samples in which failure occurred on cleavage planes. This data was excluded from the triaxial 
data when developing curve fits. To estimate the rock mass properties, the laboratory data is 
first used to determine a failure criterion for the intact rock (lab-scale) material. Then, the rock 
quality data from underground is used to estimate the in situ or rock mass failure criteria. It is 
assumed here that the orebody material has a rock quality (GSI) of approximately 60, or a fair 
quality rock, which is derived from rock core and agrees reasonably with observations made in 
the stopes and bedding-perpendicular drifts from the lower levels of the mine. It is noted that 
the rock mass quality can vary significantly depending on depth and orientation. 
The Rocscience freeware program Roclab was used to fit the failure envelopes to the laboratory 
data. Figure 11 shows the data and curve fits for the confined waif rock arid vein package 
materials. A summary of the Hoek-Brown intact and rock mass properties are given in Table 5. 
Table 5 
Rock Properties Estimate for Confined Wall Rock and Vein Package 
H-B Property Wall Confined Bedding Vein Package 
UCS (O"c; • MPa) 106 109 
Assumed Rock Quality (GSI) 60 60 
HB Intact Rock Parameter (m;) 25 27 
HB Rock Mass Parameter (mb) 5.9 6.6 
HB Rock Mass Parameter (s) 0.01174 0.01174 
Rock Mass Modulus (E,m- MPa) 6240 
Rock Mass TensileStrength {O'trm • 0.21 0.19 
MPa) 
1 For example: Hoek, E., 1998, "Rock engineering: course notes," University of Toronto, Department of Civil 
Engineering. 
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Figure 11. Laboratory UCS and triaxiaf data and best-fit Hoek-Brown failure envelopes. 
The Hoek-Brown parameters crci (the UCS - the vertical axis intercept) and the 
mi parameter (the curvature of the envelope) are derived from these curves. 
3.2.4 Material Models For Representation of Wall and Vein Package Rocks 
For assessment of mining-induced stress conditions and rock mass yieldingmateriai models 
must be assumed for the rock mass in addition to the rock mass properties. The ubiquitous 
cleavage and bedding surfaces in the silty argillite and siltite wall rocks results in a directional 
behavior of the rock mass. The anisotropy direction is oriented parallel to the strike and dip of 
the orebody. This type of behavior is best represented by a laminated material model such as a 
ubiquitous joint model in which the intact rock properties represent the solid beds of argillite and 
siltite, and the bedding surfaces are represented by weakness planes characterized by 
cohesion and friction. In this case, the altered bedding surfaces have !ow (20-30°) friction angle 
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n the vein material, which is characterized by ore minerals, siderite, and quartzite, the rock is 
expected to behave in a brittle fashion characterized by peak and residual strengths as 
illustrated in Figure 13. This type of behavior is typically referred to as "strain-softening" (peak-
residual strength), in which peak failure strength is governed by the Hoek-Brown failure 
envelope (Figure 11) assumes a "Damage Factor" of zero while the residual strength is 
estimated based on a damage factor of 1 (Hoek, et al., 2002)2 . 
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Figure 12. Shear strength of weak faults and discontinuities (Wyllie and Mah, 2004)3. 
Bedding and fault range assumed for Gold Hunter shown. 
2Hoek E, Carranza-Torres CT, Corkum 8. Hoek-Brown failure criterion-2002 edition. In: Proceedings of the 5th North 
American Rock Mechanics Symp., Toronto, Canada, 2002: 1: 267-73. 
Wyllie, D. and C. Mah (2004). Rock Slope Engineering, 4th Edition, CRC Press. 
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R,;sidual Stre~gth 
.,.._..,.. 
c;.. Strain 
Figure 13. The wall and vein package rocks are assumed to be brittle "strain-softening" 
materials. 
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Hu 
and Gold areas are monitored 
underground, mine-wide microseismic systems - the Electrolab MP-250 source location 
and the state-of-the-art ESG full-waveform digitizing system. The MP250 system has been in 
operation in various forms, first at the Lucky Friday then Gold Hunter operations, for over 30 
years. The ESG system was installed in late 2011 Activity is also monitored via a surface 
seismograph in combination with the underground systems. The MP-250. system currently 
consists of 16 uniaxial geophones (accelerometers), which are installed throughout the mine 
workings. The ESG system installation began in 2011, but was suspended during the mine 
shutdown prior to full commissioning. The installation was resumed in 2012 and will be 
functional prior to re-start of the mine in early 2013. The system ultimately consist of 21 uniaxial 
and 5 triaxial accelerometers located in development near the stopes from 4050 to 6150 levels. 
Finally, a triaxial accelerometer is to be installed near the ground surface at the #1 shaft collar 
for strong ground motion detection and digital recording. The strong motion sensor is placed 
sufficiently far from the active mining to eliminate potential "swamping" of the sensors during 
large events or blasting. A description of the instrumentation is given below. 
1. Surface Seismograph - A Geotech Instruments S-13 seismometer Uug) is located at 
the surface level by the old #1 Shaft hoist room supplying signal data to a continuous 
recording drum helicorder (also supplied by Geotech Instruments). The analog 
seismographic chart records time and amplitude of underground events. The amplitude 
of events large enough to be seen on the strip chart is recorded in millimeters of offset. 
2. Electro/ab MP-250 System - Data acquired at the underground transducers is 
transmitted to the surface through a 50-pair signal cable located in the Silver Shaft to a 
central surface location for data-processing and storage. Signals are monitored via an 
MP-250 microprocessor which was fabricated to Hecla specifications by Electro-Lab of 
Spokane, Washington. This data is then fed through a continuous data logger (NetDAS 
digital interlink) supplied by DAQ Systems, which is interfaced with two computer 
seismic programs for processing: 
a. JProcess is a microseismic analyzing program that provides time and an 
estimate of location for events. 
b. MineSeis is a macroseismic analyzing program that provides time and an 
estimate of location for events. MineSeis also utilizes signals from the S-13 jug to 
produce a digital signature and amplitude of underground events. 
3. ESG Seismic System - the ESG Paladin System, developed by ESG of Kingston, 
Ontario consists of a series data acquisition units (Paladin units) that digitize analog 
waveforms from uniaxial and triaxial geophones and sends the digitized data to the 
ground surface via a fiber optic cable run in the Silver Shaft. From here, the data is 
delivered to a computer on the ground surface where P-wave and S-wave arrival picks 
are made automatically and source locations determined. The system is also capable of 
performing numerous seismological calculations on the waveforms, including local 
Richter magnitude estimate and other information such as shear and compression wave 
energy, source radius, stress drop, fault plane solutions, etc. The lowest-magnitude 
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Paladin units can be accessed via the internet for 
data or troubleshooting of the system. Assistance in data interpretation is also available 
from ESG seismologists who can access the data on-line. The system will be ful!y 
functional the time of mine restart in early 2013. 
Information processed through these systems is manually reviewed every morning to provide 
daily seismic information to the appropriate operational personnel. The data is also regularly 
examined for interpretations in trends in the data which can be used as a basis for estimation of 
general level of seismic activity. 
4.2 Seismic History 
The database of microseismic and seismic events for the Gold Hunter operation extends from 
1999 to the current day. Some seismicity accompanied the opening of the 4900 level of the 
mine, but only a few events of magnitude greater than approximately 1.5 ML occurred until the 
latter half of 2009, when a greater number of >-1.5 ML events occurred. Figure 14 shows a 
histogram of the larger events (ML>-0.7 reported by the seismological station at Montana 
Technological University in Butte, Montana) at the Gold Hunter from 1999 to the current time. 
The largest events (>2 ML) have occurred for the most part since 2009, associated primarily 
with the 5900 Mainline pillar and suspected movement on flat-dipping footwall faults adjacent to 
the reducing 5300 sill pillar on the east end of the mine (14 stope). The largest recorded event 
(with the exception of two large, non-locatable events in 2004 that occurred far from the 
workings and caused no damage) was the 2.8 ML event in November, 2011. These events 
resulted in minor damage (displaced rock) with the exception of the November, 2011, 2.8 ML 
event (damage to a ramp intersection below 550-14 stope) and the December, 2011, 2.4 ML 
event (damage to the 5900 Mainline pillar and drift). 
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Figure 14. Histogram of larger magnitude events at the Gold Hunter, 1999 to 2012. 
4.2. 1 Location of Events 
Plots of the location of all monitored events from 1999 to 2012 are shown in longitudinal and 
cross-sectional views in Figures 15 and 16. In these figures, the size and color of the events 
are scaled by the millimeters of offset they generated on the surface seismograph station - a 
rough magnitude scale (an offset of 70mm is approximately equivalent to a 1 ML event). In 
general, based on Richter magnitudes supplied l?Y the seis_mo!ogical observatory at Montana 
Technological University in Butte, events colored in red on this plot have Richter magnitudes of 
roughly 2 or larger, with the largest event having a magnitude of 2.8 ML. This event, located in 
the 14 stope footwall along the F3 or F4 fault, occurred in November, 2011. The stoped areas 
are shown in brown solid while the ramp development is shown in transparent violet. The large 
events are clustered at or below the 5300 pillar, and primarily in the east end of the mine in the 
footwall (north) of the orebody. There appear to be two prominent clusters of the larger events 
- adjacent to and in the footwall of the 5300 pillar and below the 14 underhand stope, and those 
in and around the 5900 circular Mainline pillar on 5900 level. The source location accuracy of 
these events is not well knovm, so relying heavily on the specific location is not possible, 
although the general locations of the larger events are consistent with observed damage. The 
occurrence of larger events has increased since the second half of 2009, and has been related 
to the stress concentrations of the 5300 sill activating the F3 and F4 fault structures beneath the 
14 stope and the stress concentrations in the 5300 Mainline pillar. 
4.2.2 Mechanism of Seismicity 
There appear to be two basic seismic source mechanisms operating at the Gold Hunter: pillar-
type/strain bursting, and slip along geologic structure. Pillar-type rockbursts occur when brittle 
rock in pillars or exposed faces is stressed beyond its strength limits, typically near a free face. 
The host rock mass at the Gold Hunter is composed of thinly-bedded argillites and more thickly-
bedded siltites or quartzites. These rocks typically fail via anisotropic plastic yielding due to 
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events involve unstable slip on geologic structures such as faults and bedding 
At the Gold Hunter, observations of movement on north-dipping fault structures at the 
east end of the orebody below 5300 level appear to be associated with some of the larger 
events. These structures can be seen in intersections in the 54 ramp between 5300 and 5900 
levels and in 52 ramp below the 5900 level. Three specific structures (F3, F4 and F4 Splay) 
with dip from about 40 to 60° to the north have been mapped within the 54 ramp (Figure 17). 
North-dipping structures (possibly the same structures as observed in the ramp) have been 
mapped in the 14 stope, and terminate on the Master Fault, which makes up the hangingwall of 
the 30 Vein. The continuous length of these structures is not known, but is likely on the order of 
several hundred feet in dip-length. Offset (less than 1 ") along the F3 fault was observed in the 
54 ramp below 5700 elevation after the Nov., 2011 2.8 ML event. The mechanism for unstable 
movement on these structures is likely the result of: a) stress state on the fault structure that 
allows slip to occur, and, b) closure of the stope which drives fault movement. The increase in 
occurrence of large footwall events near the 14 stope since late 2009 likely is at least partially 
the result of concentrating stresses in the adjacent 5300 sill pillar. 
4.2.3 Time of Day of Events and Relation to Blasting 
The timing of seismic events with respect to blasting is of critical importance in planning a 
mTfigation · strategy for the mine since blasting tends to trigger a large portion of the seismicity. 
Figure 18 shows a plot of the number of microseismic and seismic events from 2006 to 2011 as 
a function of time of day, while Figure 19 shows a close-up view of blasting events and the 
periods immediately thereafter. Blasting for most of the stope faces occurred at the end of shift 
- 00:30 to 00:45 from 1-1-07 to 12-20-10 and from 01:00 to 0:1:15 from 12-21:10 to 12:31-11 
(Night Shift) and 15:00 to 15:15 (Day Shift). Additionally, blasting during shift was allowed on 
isolated stope faces. Typically, mid-shift blasting would occur at 11:00-11:15 on day shift and 
20:30-20:45 (1-1-07 to 12-20-10) and 21:00-21:15 (12-21-10 to 12-31-11) on night shift. This 
plot shows that a background level of about 1-2% of all events may occur per hour randomly 
throughout the day. Approximately 65% of all recorded events (regardless of size) occur with 
blasting, and that the blasting-related events decay to the background rate within about ;h to 1 
hour of the blasting window. From 2006 to 2011, 17 events occurred in which some level of 
damage was reported. Level of damage ranged from minor flyrock to the extensive damage 
from events in Nov. - Dec. 2011. Of these damaging events, 11, or 65% occurred with or 
shortly after blasting. In summary, this data provides the basis for use of a central blasting 
system in which blasting occurs at the end of shift after workers have vacated the stoping areas, 
and excluding entry for approximately 1 hour thereafter. 
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Figure 15. Longitudinal {viewing footwal/) view of the Gold Hunter showing location of microseismic 
and seismic events, 1999-2011. The scale is in mm of offset on the mine seismograph, 
which is a rough magnitude scale. Events are identified as possible fault-slip vs 5900 pillar 
origin. 
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Figure 16. Cross section view, looking west, of the Gold Hunter showing location of microseismic and 
seismic events, 1999-2011 . The scale is in mm of offset on the mine seismograph, which is 
a rough magnitude scale. Events are identified as possible fault-slip vs 5900 pillar origin. 
Page 30 
Ronnel E. Barrette, etal vs Helca Mining Co., eta l Docket No. 43639 660 of 1172 
661 of 1172 
Geotechnical Characteristics of the Lucky Friday Mine, Hecla Mining Company Rev. 0 
3DEC DP4.10 
1!12001 1t:11Q CMsutmo GrwJ>, 1~. 
S1ep0 
12117f.1012 5:04:32 PM 
UDScalar 
Scale: 0.061269 
Mark Type: pyramid 
I O.OIIllE-!{]0 2.SOJOE-tDl 5.0IIllE4{)1 7. SOC()E i{J1 L: 1.D000Ei{J2 
r/ 1 2500E 4{)2 
~: 1.500JE-l{J2 
~ 17500Ei{J2 
!;i) 2 0000Ei{J2 
, .. 2.2SOOE-+02 
r0 2. 5000Ei{J2 
2.7500Ei{J2 
300JOE-tD2 
3.2500E+02 
i,. 3.50JOE-tD2 3.7500E-tD2 4.000JE-tD2 4.2100E-l{J2 
A.'7eS 
Itasca Consulting Group, Inc 
Minneapolis, Minne sol a USA 
Figure 17. View of 1999-2006 events, scaled by mm of offset on seismograph, with F3 and F4 faults 
superimposed on mining geometry. View is from footwall looking west down the strike of 
the F3 and F4 faults. 
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Figure 18. Plot of the number of events (seismic and microseismic) as a function of the time of day of 
occurrence, 2006 to 2011, Gold Hunter operation. 
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IN TIIB DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JtJDICIAL DISTRlCT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
FRANNIE ANDERTON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RAYMOND CAMPBELL, 
Defendant. 
CASE NO. CV-2013-2722 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
AND DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION 
FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
This case arises out of a mining accident which occurred at the Lucky Friday Mine on 
April 15, 2011. The basic facts are as follows: 
Larry "Pete" and Mike Marek (hereinafter "Pete'' and "Mike") were brothers and were 
both employed as 111.iners for Hecla at the Lucky Friday Mine. Shift Boss Dale Stepro was Pete 
and Mike's direct supervisor. At the time of the incident Phillip S. Baker, was Hecla's CEO, 
President, and a Member of the Board of Directors; John Jordan was Heda's General Manager; 
Doug Bayer was Heda's Mine Supervisor; Ron Krusemark1 was Hecla's Chief Engineer; Scott 
Hogamier was Hecla's Safety Coordinator; Cindy Moore was a Chief Engineer for Hecla; and, 
as noted above, Dale Stepro was a Shift Boss for Hecla. 
On April 15, 2011, Pete and Mike were working at the Lucky Friday Mine at 6150-
1 Krusemark was dismissed from this case by stipulation on March l l., 2015. 
.MEMORANDUM DECISJON AND ORDER GRANTING DEPENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
n;.,,-t-at"!af\, .. ~~= SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
O'CLOCK.l!..M 
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was 
enaicted by MSHA. 
Upon arriving at the 6150-15-3 stope, Pete and Mike set about watering down the muck 
in the stope to cool the area; Pete watered the muck in the 6150-15-3 west stope and Mike 
watered the muck in the 6150-15-3 east stope. At approximately 5:30 p.m. on April 15, 2011, 
Mike observed Pete ro!Hng up the hose he had been using to water the muck in the 6150-15-3 
west stope when the stope allegedly failed causing a massive amount of ground to collapse onto 
Pete. Plaintiffs allege that the failure of the stope was caused by Defendants' decision to 
undercut the waste pillar; the cave-in was approximately 90 feet long, 20 feet wide, and 30 feet 
high. Mike was not able to rescue Pete; a search for Pete's body took place over the next 9 days. 
Pete ts body was found on April 24, 2011; his cause of death was determined t9 be blunt force 
+ -- - -- - - -- - - • -- -
trauma. 
Plaintiffs and Defendants have each filed Motions for Summary Judgment. By way of 
their Partial Motion for Summary Judgment1 Plaintiffs seek dismissal of Defendants' Sixth, 
Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Defenses on the grounds that there are no genuine issues of 
material fact and that Plaintiffs are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Defendants concede 
that their seventh, eighth, and tenth defenses should be dismissed. Defendants oppose Pla.intiffsl 
Motion for Summary Judgment and seek Surrunary Judgment that Plaintiffs' exclusive remedy is 
found in Idaho's Worker's Compensation Law; Defendants also seek Summary Judgment on the 
claims of intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. 
It is undisputed by the parties that M.l.ke and .Pete were not assigned to work in the 6 IS0-15-3 stope; rather they 
were assigned to work In the spray chamber in the 6150 slot and chose to water down the muck in the 6150-15-3 
stope. 
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SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD 
Summary judgment is appropriate •1if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, 
together 'With the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." IRCP 56(c). "Once the 
movant has established a pri.ma facie case that, on the basis of uncontroverted facts, the movant 
is entitled to judgment, the opposing party must set forth specific facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue for trial and cannot merely rest on the pleadings." Mc Vicker v. City of Lewiston, 
134 Idaho 34, 37 (2000), citing IRCP 56(e); Theriault v. A.H Robins Co. Inv., 108 Idaho 303, 
306 (1985). 
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in tbis rule, an 
adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of that party's pleadings, 
but the p~y's response!! by_affidavits or as o~~~seprovided in this rule,must s~t forth 
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If the party does not so 
respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the party. 
IRCP 56(e). 
"In order to survive a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party must 'make a 
showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case on which 
that party will bear the burden of proof at trial."' Jones v. Starnes, 150 Idaho 257 ,_, 245 P .3d 
1009, 1012 (2011), (quotingBadell v. Beeks, 115 Idaho 101, 102; 765 P.2d 126, 127 (1988)). 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTlON FOR SUM:MARY 
JUDGMENT 
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set 
"Generally, 
arising 
P.2d 117i, 1 
compensation provides the 
and the course of employment." Kearney v. Denker, 114 Idaho 
(Idaho, i 988); see also §§ 72-201, 72-209, and 72-211; Dominguez ex 
Hamp v. Evergreen Res., Inc., 142 Idaho 7, 11, 121 P.3d 938,942 (Idaho, 2005). 
LC. § 72-209 provides that: 
(1) Subject to the provisions of section 72-223, [Idaho Code] the liability of the 
employer under this law shall be exclusive and in place of all other liability of the 
employer to the employee, his spouse, dependents, heirs, legal representatives or 
assigns, 
(3) The exemption from liability given an employer by this section shall also 
extend to the employer's surety and to all officers, agents, servants and employees 
of the employer or surety,provided that such exemptions from liability shallnot 
apply tn any case where ihe injury or death is proximately caused by the w{/ful or 
unprovoked physical aggression of the employer, its officers, agents, servants or 
employees, the loss of such exemption applying only to the aggressor and shall 
not be imputable to the employer unless provoked or authorized by the employer, 
or the employer was a party thereto. 
(Emphasis added) 
In other words. "[f]or those injuries covered by worker's compensation, an employer is 
generally liable to its employees only under the worker's compensation system and is immune 
other civil causes of action." Dominguez, 142 Idaho at 11, 121 P.3d at 942. Nevertheless, 
LC. § 72-209(3) provides an exception from the exclusivity rule "where the injury or death is 
proximately caused by the wilful o:r unprovoked physical aggression of the employer; its officers, 
agents. servants or employees." In Kearney the Supreme Court of Idaho sought to explain the 
§ that the Court stated that: 
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the case at bar, Plaintiffs argue that the burden to prove exclusivity is on Defendants 
and that Defendants' reckless conduct precludes exclusivity. The Court finds, however, that 
pursuant to the Court's language in Kearny/ the exclusivity of relief under Idaho Worker's 
Compensation is a rebuttable presumption of sorts, and therefore, the burden is on Plaintiffs to 
prove that their claims fall within the exception to exclusivity. 
Plaintiffs rely heavily upon Dominguez for the assertion that egregious conduct comes 
within the umbrella of the exception provided by LC.§ 72-209(3). The Court, however, finds 
Dominguez to be readily distinguishable from the case at bar. In Dominguez, the Plaintiff 
suffered severe injµri~s after being directed by his employer to was sludge containitig cyanide 
from a steel tank. 142 Idaho at 9-10, 121 P.3d at 940-41. The plaintiff's employer allegedly 
knew it was hazardous to enter the steel tank, did not obtain a con.fined space entry permit, did 
not provide proper training~ did not provide appropriate safety equipment, did not provide an 
attendant to stand by, and was not cooperative with the rescue and medical workers thereby 
hampering the plaintiff's rescue and treatment ld In that case, the Plaintiff was permitted to 
collect worker's compensation benefits and to bring a cause of action against his employer 
outside of the worker;s compensation system because he alleged «a willful unprovoked physical 
aggression by his employer, and therefore his claim [fell] into a statutory exception to the 
exclusive remedy rule." Id. at 12, 121 P.3d at 943. 
3 
"To prove aggression there must be evidence of some offensive action or hostile attack. It is not sufficient to prove 
that the alleged aggressor committed negligent acts that made it substantially certain that injury would occur." 
Kearney, I 14 Idaho at 757, 760 P .2d at 1173 (Emphasis added) 
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case 
or impeded rescue efforts. 
Furthermore, Court finds that the procedural posture of Dominguez is distinguishable 
from the case at bar. In Dominguez, the employer was denied summary judgment; subsequently, 
employer's counsel withdrew. Following the withdrawal of its counsel, the employer failed to 
timely respond and thus, default judgment was entered. Id at 10, 121 P.3d at 941. The employer 
did not move the trial court to set aside the default) but rather sought to appeal the default and the 
denial of its motion for summary judgment, directly to the Supreme Court. Id. The Supreme 
Court noted that no direct appeal can be taken from default, and that "[ u ]pon default by the 
defendant, the allegations contained in the complaint are taken as true, and the plaintiff is 
relieve~ ()f any obligation to introduce_ evidence in support of those allegations. Dominguez,_ 
Idaho at 13-14) 121 P.3d at 944-45. Therefore, because of the employer,s default, the plaintiff's 
allegations of willful or unprovoked physical aggression by the employer were accepted as true. 
The Court is cognizant of the Supreme Coure s statement in Dominguez that: 
Contrary to the Employer1s assertions, injury in the course of employment and 
injury as the result of an intentional act are not mutually exclusive. As a matter of 
common sense, an employee can be harmed while working, whether that harm is 
the result of negligence or design. Even if an employer commits an intentional tort 
against an employee, it does not follow that the tort necessarily arose outside of 
the employment context. or that the employee was acting outside the course of his 
employment at the time of irJury. 
An injury can be "accidental'' from the perspective of an employee while at the 
same time being intentional on the part of the employer. The worker1s 
compensation law defines an "injury" as "a personal injury caused by an accident 
arising out of and in the course of any employment covered by the worker's 
compensation law." I.C. § 72-102(17)(a). In turn, an "accident" is defined as "an 
unexpected, undesigned, and unlooked for mishap~ or untoward event, connected 
v.ith die industry in which it occurs, and which can be reasonably located as to 
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was an to it can 
reasonably located as to time and place. It is no contradiction for Dominguez's 
to maintain he suffered an accident covered by worker1s compensation and at the 
same time argue he was harmed by the Employer's intentional acts. 
1 Idaho at 11, 121 P.3d at 942 (emphasis provided). 
Plaintiffs also rely upon In re Elias, 302 B.R. 900 (Bankr. D. Idaho2003) (subsequently 
affd sub nom. Elias,.,. Dominguez, 191 F. App'x 567 (9th Cir. 2006)), a bankruptcy case arising 
out of Dominguez. In Elias, the United States Bankruptcy Court recognized the rule set forth in 
Kearney, and asserted that "[e]ffectively, to recover outside the Worker's Compensation system, 
a claimant must prove that the employer committed an intentional act of aggression against the 
claimant which caused an injury. In re Elias, 302 B.R. at 912. The Bankruptcy Court restated the 
Dominguez Court's 'judgment as preclusively establish(ing] that the allegations of the complaint 
are true, and that Defendant acted with a subjective intent to harm Plaintiff: or that he believed 
that harm was substantially certain to occur/' Id at 913. In the case at bar; there are no 
allegations that Defendants acted with any subjective intent to harm Pete and/or Mike Marek, nor 
are there any allegations that Defendants believed that harm was substantially certain to occur. 
The Court finds that the facts in the case at bar are most analogous to Kearney. In that 
case the employee was injured while she was working for the employer when her right foot was 
partially severed by a lawn mower she was operating. Kearney, 114 Idaho at 756, 760 P.2d at 
1172. In that case7 the employer assembled the lawn mower without installing the included safety 
devices or a grass deflector that would have covered a.n area exposing the blade of the mower. Id. 
Instead; the employer prepared the mower so that a grass catcher could be 
attached th.at would cover this opening while the lawn mower was being operated. 
The employer left it to the discretion of the person operating the lawn mower 
whether the grass catcher was used or not. At the time the employee was injured 
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injury the employee slipped hillsides when the grass was wet the time 
while going downhill with the mower causing her 
rotary blade. 
contact with the 
In Kearney, the employee argued that Idaho worker's compensation law does not prevent 
an employee from recovering damages in a civil action against an employer for injury caused to 
an employee by an intentional tort of the employer while the employee is in the course of 
employment, and that the rule should be extended to include negligent acts committed by the 
employer where there is a substantial certainty that injury to the employee v.ri.11 occur. Id at 757, 
760 P.2d at 1173. Ultimately, however, the trial court in Kearney granted summary judgment 
because there was no evidence presented that the employer wilfully or without provocation 
physically and offensively or hostilely attacked the employee. Id. -The Supreme Court upheld 
summary judgment and stated that 1'[i]n the absence of [that] evidence there was no genuine 
issue of material fact, and the trial court was justified in granting summary judgment against the 
employee." /dat 757-58~ 760 P.2d at 1173~74. Like Kearny, in the case at bar, there are no 
allegations and no evidence has been presented that Defendants willfully or without provocation 
physically and offensively or hostilely attacked either Pete or Mike Marek. 
The case at bar is also akin to DeMoss v. City of Coeur D'Alene, 118 Idaho 176i 795 P.2d 
875 (1990). In that case, the plaintiffs filed suit seeking recovery for mental anguish resulting 
from exposure to asbestos. The trial court granted summary judgment in fuvor of the City and 
concluded that worker's compensation exclusivity barred tort recovery and the Supreme Court of 
affirmed. DeMoss 118 Idaho at P.2d at 876-77. In Delvf.oss .. the Supreme Court 
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war1tect to cause manner. 
shows further that John Austin, the city welder, told defendant Eastwood that he 
thought the material might be asbestos. The record does not show that Eastwood 
or any of the defendants actually knew that it was asbestos until the test results 
from the laboratory were received. These test results were received after the 
appellants' first exposure to the asbestos had occurred. More-0ver, while the 
protective clothing provided the workers prior to the second round of removal 
may indeed have been inadequate, that does not rise to the level of "unprovoked 
physical aggression." To reiterate what we said in Kearney v. Denker, ''It is not 
sufficient to prove that the alleged aggressor committed negligent acts that made 
it substantially certain that injury would occur." 114 Idaho at 757, 760 P.2d at 
1173. The plaintiffs have not proved any "willful or unprovoked physical 
aggression" as required in I.C. § 72-209(3), and thus the plaintiffs' state tort 
claims were preempted by the Worker's Compensation Act. J.C. §§ 72-201 et seq. 
Id at 179, 795 P.2d at 87&. 
Similarly, in the case at bar, there is no evidence that Defendants harbored any ill will 
toward Pete or Mike or that Defendants wanted Pete or Mike to be injured in any manner, in the 
castf at bar there are some -a11egations that Defendants-were warned about potential hazards of the 
situation, and there is no evidence that Defendants actually knew the conditions were hazardous 
until after the April 15, 2011 incident. DeMoss is distinguishable from the case at bar in at least 
one way: in Delllfoss the plaintiffs were directed into the hazardous environment whereas in the 
case at bar, Pete and Mike were not directed into the 6150~ 15-3 stope on April 15, 2011. This 
distinguishing factor works in favor of Defendants in the case at bar. 
Plaintiffs assert that Defendants' actions constituted willful or unprovoked physical 
aggression against Mike and Pete. According to Plaintiffs, Defendants' alleged willful and 
unprovoked acts of physical aggression include failing to have engineer review and approval for 
the pillar removal, foiling to heed warnings regarding the removal of the pillar, and failing to 
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the Court that Defendants acted intentionally with any intent to injury Pete and Mike, that 
Defendants knew a collapse was substantially likely to occur. or that Pete and Mike were ordered 
work in an unsafe environment. 
The Court finds that while there may be some disputed facts in the case at bar, such as 
whether Defendants received warnings that the mining practices were dangerous and whether it 
was necessary for the chief engineer to approve the mining plan,, those disputed facts are not 
material to the Court's determination of whether the exclusive remedy for Plaintiffs' claims is 
IdahoJs Worker Compensation. Furthermore, even if Defendants did know that the environment 
was potentially hazardous, Kearney and DeMoss demonstrate that knowledge of the dangerous 
condtlion alone that made it su~s_tantially certain that injury would occur does not create an 
exception to exclusivity. The relevant inquiry to the Court's determination of exclusivity is 
whether Mike's injury and Pete's death were proximately caused by wilful or unprovoked 
physical aggression. As noted abovei the Court finds that the burden is on Plaintiffs to establish 
that this case falls outside of the exclusivity exception. The Court finds. from a review of the 
record, that Plaintiffs have failed to put forth any evidence that Defendants harbored any ill will 
toward Mike and/or Pete, nor have Plaintiffs put forth any evidence the Defendants wanted to 
cause injury or death to Plaintiffs. Therefore, the Court finds that there are no genuine issues of 
material fact on the issue of whether Idaho Workeris Compensation provides Plaintiffs their 
exclusive remedy. 
4 The Court notes, that although not verified and thus not matters, Court may consider in on the motion 
for summary judgment, severa[ of the causes of action alleged ln the Complaint (i.e. negligence, negligence per se, 
and negligent infliction of emotional distress) are inconsistent with Plaintiff's argument that this is not a case of 
mere .reckless conduct 
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the that Plaintiffs;, exclusive remedy is Idaho Worker's Compensation. 
Whether Defendants Phillip Baker, Jr., John Jordan, Doug Bayer, Ron 
Krusemark5, Scott Hogamier, Cindy Moore, and Dale Stepro, were fellow servants 
of Plaintiffs' Pete and Mike Marek and are therefore immune from suit under LC.§ 
44-1401 et seq. and I.C. § 72-101, et seq.? 
The Court notes that according to the plain language of 1.C. § 72-209, the exception from 
liability provided by Idaho Worker's Compensation exclusivity also extends to officer, agents, 
servants; or employees of the employer. Therefore, the Court fmds that Defendants Phillip 
Baker, Jr., John Jordan, Doug Bayer, Ron Krusemark, Scott Hogamier, Cindy Moore, and Dale 
Stepro, were fellow servants of Pete and Mike, and are therefore immune from liability under 
LC.§ 72~209, and for the reasons stated above, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on 
this issue. 
3. Other Arguments Raised by the Parties 
The Court having found that Idaho Worker's Comp is the exclusive remedy for Plaintiff's 
injuries, the Court need not reach the remaining issues raised by the parties. 
ORDER: 
Based upon the foregoing, IT IS HERBY ORDERED, that: 
L The Court finds that pursuant to LC.§ 72-209 and Kearney, Plaintiffs have the 
burden to establish that this case falls outside of the exclusivity exception. 
2. The Court fmds that Plaintiffs have failed to put forth any evidence that Defendants 
harbored any ill will toward Mike and/or Pete, or any evidence the Defendants 
wanted to cause injury or death to Plaintiffs. Therefore, the Court finds that while 
there may be some disputed fact; none of those disputed facts are material to the issue 
of whether Idaho Worker's Compensation provides Plaintiffs their exclusive remedy. 
Krusemark was dismissed from this case by stipulation on March 11, 2015. 
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Defendants, Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden to establish that this case falls 
outside of the exclusivity exception. Because Plaintiffs have failed to establish that 
this case falls outside the exclusivity exception, the Court finds that Defendants are 
entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. 
4. Based upon the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiffs' exclusive remedy is Idaho 
Worker's Compensation. 
5. The Court finds that pursuant to LC. § 72-209 the exclusivity ofidaho Worker's 
Compensation as the only remedy available to Plaintiffs extends to those claims 
brought against defendants/co-employees Phillip Baker, Jr., John Jordan, Doug 
Bayer, Scott Hogamier, Cindy Moore, and Dale Stepro. 
6. Pursuant to these findings, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is 
GRANTED, Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED and Plaintiffs' 
claims are DISMISSED. 
7. Defendants' shall prepare and submit a judgment conforming to I.R.C.P. 54. 
DATED: The _l_['day of April, 2015. A~ IL .. ~ 
~.Simpson  
District Judge# 101 
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) 
JAMES W. first duly 
1. I am over the age of eighteen ( 18) and competent to testify to the matters stated 
herein. 
2. I have personal knowledge of the facts contained herein and make this affidavit 
based upon my own personal knowledge. 
3. I currently am and at all relevant times mentioned herein was a resident of the 
State of Tennessee. 
4. I currently am and at all relevant times mentioned herein was employed with as 
Emeritus Profossol' of Engineering at the University of Maryland and a Doctotate degree 
in Mechanics from the Illinois Institute of Technology. I have been a mechanical engineer since 
1 . See my curriculum vitae, listing of prior testimony and listing of publications, attached 
hereto as Exhibit "1". 
5. I have reviewed the following documents and records in preparing my opinions in 
this matter: United States Department of Labor, Mine Safety and Health Administration {MSHA} 
Reports of Investigations regarding fatalities and injuries of miners at the Lucky Friday Mine on 
April 15, November 17, and December 14, 2011; Citations and Orders issued by MSHA related to 
prior fatalities and injuries of miners at the Lucky Friday Mine; Orders Nos. 8559614 and 8559615 
issued by MSHA on May 1 2012 regarding the rock burst that caused injury to Ronnell E. Barrett 
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on 
dated 
April .9, 2015 and Wilson B.lake Affidavit dated November 8, 2013; Correspondence from Hecla 
Mining Company to the Mine Safety and Health Administration regarding stress monitors; 
Complaint; MSHA Citations and Orders issued to Hecla regarding safety violations related to ground 
control and support on December 16, 18, and 19, 2011 with inspector notes and documents; Exhibits 
1 through 58 of deposition exhibits for Hecla employees; MSHA Order No. 8565565 issued to Hecla 
on December 21, 2011 for continuing to work while still under a previous order; Defendant' 
Discovery Responses and Exhibits; Depositions of Doug Bayer, John Jordan, Terry Devoe, and 
Ronald Ki·usmark in Secretary of Labor, Mine Safety and Health Administration v. Hecla Limited; 
Deposition transcript for John Jordan dated April 6, 201 · Deposition transcript for Doug Bayer 
dated April 6, 2015; MSHA Order 8605614 issued to Hecla to conduct readings of stress monitors at 
the 5900 I-Drift Pillar; December 27, 2011 Memorandum from Wilson Blake and Mark Board, 
Consultants to Hecla managers John Jordan, Doug Bayer, John Lund, Karl Ha1imann, Eric Carlson, 
and Zach Thomas; "Recent Bursting in Gold Hunter and Its Implications"; Report by Itasca 
Consulting Group, regarding stability of the 5900 I-Drift Pillar in the Lucky Friday Mine; 
Memorandum from Blake Wilson to Mark Board, Itasca Consulting Group, dated November 1 7, 
. 2011 regarding the stability of the 5900 Pillar in the Lucky Friday Mine; MSHA repo1is, citations, 
orders related to the 
1 . 
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was to caused a 
Eight miners were installing a steel tunnel liner in this drift at the of the rock burst. Seven 
these miners were injured by the falling rock during this event and taken to area hospitals. 
The injured miners included: Jason Chambers, Ronnel E Barrett, Greg Hammerberg, Erick J. 
Tester, Matthew Williams, Geoff Parker, and Wallace Lambott. 
7. The Helca Mining Company, a Delaware Corporation, operates the Lucky Friday 
Mine. This is one of the deepest mines in the United States with mining operations being 
conducted at depths exceeding 6,000 ft. In 1998 White and Whyatt, from the Spokane Research 
laboratory of the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, wrote "The Coeur 
d'Alene Mining District in northern Idaho the second largestsilver-mining district in the world· 
as well as a leading U.S. producer oflead and zinc. At recent mining depths of nearly 2,000 m, 
Hecla Mining Co.'s Lucky Friday Mine has been one of the most active mines in North America 
tenns of seismic energy per tonne of ore mined. 
8. The mining area is accessed by an 18 ft diameter concrete lined shaft constructed 
in 1983 and known as the Silver Shaft. Ore is removed from a relatively narrow vein (6 to 10 ft 
wide) that is nearly vertical. The vein is accessed by tunnels leading from the Silver Shaft to the 
various levels where the ore is being mined. At the time of the accident ore was being mined at 
the 5500 and 6100 levels while miners were working to install a steel tunnel liner in the 5900 
drift. The mining method was to drill holes into the ore, fill these holes with an explosive and 
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cross mme 1s 
Attachment particular interest is the donut like pillar located near the 
center of mined out . The 5900 level drift (tunnel) passes through this pillar. The 
location the mining activity at the time of the accident, 550-11 cut 
cut #5, 620-15 cut #4 and 61 16 cut #5 is shown in the drawing. 
14 cut#4, 610-12 
10. As ore is removed from the vein, the walls on the sides of the mined out area tend 
to close, due to the weight of the overburden and horizontal forces that develop at depth. The 
donut like pillar at the 5900 level resists the closure and in doing so significant compressive 
stresses develop within the pillar. These compressive stresses increase as the ore is removed and 
the mined out atea: increases in size. When the compressive stresses the pillar exceed the 
compressive strength of the rock the pillar fails. The failure releases the strain energy stored in 
the pillar causing a rock burst with stress waves that propagate away from fracture 
causing severe vibrations that register as earthquakes with magnitudes ranging from 1 to 3 or 
more on the Richter scale. 
11. Wilson Blake Ph.Dan experienced Geologist and Mining Engineer has served as a 
consultant to Hecla Mining Corp. for many years. From May 10, 2010 to December 27, 2011 he 
submitted five memos to various managers of the Lucky Friday Mine pertaining to rock bursts in 
the Gold Hunter region of the mine near the 5900 level pillar. The first memo written on May 
10, 2010 refers to 2.5 Ml rock burst that occurred on April 2010 footwall of the 5700 
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below: may not be complete, as it was compiled based on memos 
by Dr. Wilson Blake. I have not had the oppottunity to review the complete log of the 
seismic events at the mine that were recorded by their system of geo transducers. 
Seismic Events in the Gold Hunter 
region 
Date 
4/6/2009 
10/18/2009 
2/22/2010 
4/22/2010 
11/16/2010 
11/16/2010 
12/9/2010 
8/2/2011 
11/16/2011 
12/14/2011 
Magnitude 
1 
1 
2.5 
2.2 
2.3 
1.9 
1.9 
2.8 or 3.0+ 
2.2 
Dr Blake's second memo, written on November 30, 2010, pertains two rock 
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1 1 were 
associated It is 
(seismic events) are often triggered by blasting the stopes. 
13. While these reports of rock bursts refer to events occurring prior to the 
November/December 2011 period, these memos clearly indicate the high probability of rock 
bursts in the Lucky Friday/Gold Hunter mine, and the fact that blasting induces rock bursts. 
14. The third memo written on November 18, 2011 pertains to the 2.8 rock burst that 
occurred on November 16, 2011. See Blake Repo1t, dated November 18, 2011, attached as 
Exhibit "8" to the Rossman Affidavit. In the summary section of this memo, he stated "The 2.8 
inthe 5900 pillat not expected:and did nofappear to be pillarburst. Because 
the upper ribs and back appeared to be solid, we can't assume that the remaining pillar is 
destressed, hence the rehabilitation needs to proceed with caution." also stated that, "we need 
to better understand the cause of this burst to be able to relate it to mining the main sill." 
15. His fourth memo, written a week later on November 25, 2011, also pertains to the 
2.8 Ml rock burst that occurred on November 16, 2011. See November 25, 2011 Blake Memo, 
attached as Exhibit "6" to the Rossman Affidavit. Blake made an initial visit to the 5900 pillar 
immediately following the rock burst on November 16 and a subsequent visit on November 23. 
The November 25th memo describes his observations and opinion for the cause of the 5900 pillar 
burst, as well as the present stability of the 5900 pillar. important 
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underhand stope was blasted. However, magnitude was in 
the 3.0 range as measuted by the seismic sensors of the USGS National 
Earthquake Center located at Montana Tech in Butte, MT. Butte, MT is 
about 250 miles from Mullin, ID; hence it appears that the seismic event 
on November 16, 2011 was much stronger than the 2.8 reported by Dr. 
Blake. 
2. model studies by Itasca indicated that small rock bursts around 
the edges of the pillar could be expected with magnitudes up to 2.0, and 
with magnitudes as ftigh as 1 fact, did occur1. The model 
results also indicated that pillar was safe unless its height to width ratio 
changed and the pillar lost confinement. 
3. The model assumed a 10: 1 width to height ratio for the pillar and 
predicted that a foundation failure would occur in the outer walls, rather 
than in the core of the pillar. Moreover, the model results did not include 
any geologic structures intersecting the pillar. 
1 The 3.0+ magnitude earthquake generated by the seismic event on November 16, 2011 was an order of 
made in 
the mine should have ale1ied management that the status of the 5900 pillar had changed. 
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is actually 3 a 10 ft. vein 
thickness. The 5900 pillar is borderline stable based on mining.history 
at Lucky Friday/Gold Hunter. 
5. The in situ stress in the 5900 pillar area before mining was some 
1.2 psi/ ft of depth for the vertical stress, and 1.5 times this value for the 
horizontal stress. The actual vertical distance to surface above the Gold 
Hunter is in the 7,000 ft range, hence the vertical stress would be 8,400 
psi, and the maximum horizontal stress, N40°W direction, is 12,600 psi. 
-From the stress ga:ges it is known that the sttesses the 
pillar from mining off of the 5900 level, taking into account the ore and 
waste rock modulus values, was also some 12,600 psi. Hence, the stress 
in the pillar was very near the unconfined compressive strength of the 
pillar, and any further loss of confinement could lead to a pillar 
failure. 
7. The fact that the displaced rock from the back and walls of the 
pillar was comprised of very large slabs, with no dust, indicated that the 
2.8 burst was not a classic pillar rock burst. In addition, the domed cavity 
formed above the burst zone was not fractured and appeared to stili be 
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memo on 1 to 
on December 2011. Memorandum from Wilson Blake and Mark dated 
December 27, 2011, attached as Exhibit "18" to the Rossman Affidavit. He observed that the 
event appears to have occmred directly in the 5900 pillar, in the immediate east rib of the 5900 
drift. Damage was finely-fragmented and crushed rock and bolts and cables appearing to be 
broken in tension at the drift east shoulder and rib. This appears to be a typical strain burst 
mechanism resulting from the solid pillar in the wall of the 5900 drift reaching its peak strength. 
attributes the cause of this rock burst to the damage produced during the November 16 event, 
which ejected rock from the 5900 drift, expanded the drift reduced the width to height ratio 
----·of the-pillar (to around·3: 1 t and increased the minih1f induted stfess tlie pillar. noted that 
the pillar failure was centered in the strong, non-failed core of the pillar ofreduced w/h ratio. 
1 7. Dr. Wilson Blake warned the management team at Helca Mining Corp. of the 
danger of rock bursts at the 5900 drift and pillar. 
18. He cautioned Hecla management that the stress in the pillar was very near the 
unconfined compressive strength of the pillar, and any further loss of confinement could 
lead to a pillar failure. 
19. He also informed management that the damage due to the rock burst of November 
16, 2011 changed the geometry of the 5900 pillar. The new width to height ratio of the 5900 
pillar ( a doughnut shape) is actually 3 .5, assuming a l Oft. vein thiclmess. Previously the width 
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rehabilitation needs to proceed with caution. 
21. It is important to note that these warnings about the pillar's borderline stability and 
additional loss of confinement could lead to pillar failure were made on November 28th more 
than two weeks before the accident on December 14, 2011. 
22. The managers at Helca decided to rehabilitate the 5900 Drift. On November 29, 
2011 Doug Bayer issued a memo2 describing the rehabilitation plan for the 5900 drift. See Bayer 
Update, dated November 29, 2011, attached as Exhibit "10" to the Rossman Affidavit. The rock 
burst on November 16th had caused approximately 12 feet of its back to fail and damaged both 
23. The repair of the area was plam1ed for two stages. The first stage was to bolt and 
shotcrete the area. The second stage was to install a steel tunnel liner through the vein area of 
the drift and fill the void above and around the liner with Tech.foam (a compressible concrete 
foam). The initial stage of repair, completed by November 29, 2011 involved installation of 
dywidags, cable bolts, wire fencing and splits sets. The entire area was shotcreted to a depth of2 
to 3 inches. 
24. The secondary, long-term repair involved a steel tunnel liner that was to be 
installed through about 35 ft of the 5900 drift. The rock burst of December 14, 2011 occurred 
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to burst wrote "that although the pillar is still and is 
still carrying some load and stress, it is believed the majority of the stress was dissipated 
with the large rock burst and it will take months or years for the pillar to gain more stress 
that could cause any major rock bursts. In addition, the pillar is now smaller in size so it 
cannot carry the same load that caused this rock burst". This statement is not consistent 
with Dr. Blake's conclusion in his November 25 memorandum that "the pillar was borderline 
stable" and that "the stress in the pillar was very near the unconfined compressive strength 
of the pillar and that any further loss of confinement could lead to pillar failure". 
26. After completion of the first stage or rehabilitation, Mr. Bayer considered the rock 
burst area to be stable-and wrote thatmanagement of the mine would like to resume production-
prior to completing the installation of the tunnel liner. Requesting the resumption of 
production was a serious error as they were authorizing blasting that was known to trigger 
rock bursts. On December 6, 2011 MHSA authorized travel by trucks through the 5900 drift 
and mining was initiated. 
27. The decision to initiate mining was willful and exceedingly dangerous because it 
involved blasting at three different levels not far removed from the perimeter of the 5900 pillar. 
It was well known that blasting triggered rock bursts. 
28. Personnel at the mine employ stress meters to monitor the stresses that develop 
2 The rehabilitation memo was four days after Dr. Blake had i.,· ulS that the pillar was 
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by stress meters (2 back 2 East and West 
The stress meters the back were to be installed 10 ft above the drift and the stress 
meters in the ribs were to be placed at a depth of 20 ft. Personnel were able to install 3 of the 6 
meters which were in inventory; however 3 of the other meters were on order and were required 
by MSHA to be installed immediately upon receipt by Hecla. In addition to the stress meters, 
closure points were re-established, and closure was measured east-west across the drift and 
north-south across the vein. 
29. During the period of the repair from December 2 to the 14111 two of the stress 
meters installed in the 5900 pillar showed that the stresses in the pillar were continuing to 
at the rate of about 1,000 psi pei· week. Helca managers ignored the increasing stress 
level in spite of the advice from Blake that the pillar was borderline stable and that the 
stresses were very near the unconfined compressive strength of the pillar. 
30. Mr. Ted Williams, for several years, was responsible for measuring the stresses in 
the 5900 drift in the Gold Hunter pillar. He collected data from functioning stress gages at the 
site and installed new stress gages when replacements became necessary. An illustration of the 6 
bore holes used for mounting the stress gages in the 5900 drift is presented in Fig. 1. 
31. The data collected from the stress gages over the period from May 23, 2006 to 
April 27, 2011 is presented in Fig. 2. The data collected in earlier years (2006 to 2009) was 
stable. and that the stress in the pillar was very near the strength of the pillar. 
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installation. at 
measurements the stresses. 
32. The measurements are increasing steadily with time and indicate very high stress 
The West-Hi gage registered 22,500 psi before malfunctioning and the West-Lo gage is 
indicating a stress of 20,300 psi. These values are almost twice the estimate of the unconfined 
strength of the rock in the pillar. Wilson Blake, a consultant to Hecla, has stated, the maximum 
horizontal stress is 12,600 psi which is near the unconfined compressive strength of the pillar. 
He also stated that the pillar after the 3.0 (USGS) magnitude burst on November 16, 2011 
would fail with any further loss of confinement. Note the gaps in the data are due to either 
failure or failure of the data Iogget;-
Wilson Blake Memo ofNovember 
Zach Thomas. 
, John Lund. Karl Eric Carlson and 
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Fig. 1 Location of the stress gages in the 5900 drift (2006 to April 20 11). Note the direction 
of the stresses is parallel to the drift. 
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on November 16, 20 I 
area and to restore the 5900 drift so it could be used for haulage. Part of the repair plan4 
involved the measurement of stresses at six sites in the 5900 pillar. Because.the gages originally 
installed in the pillar were destroyed in the rock burst new bore holes and gages were required. 
Because only three gages were available at the time they were installed at the locations shown in 
Fig. 3. Additional gages were to be installed immediately after their delivery. 
34. Three stress gages were installed on December 1, 2011. Readings from the tlu·ee 
from December 2nd to the 14th are shown in Fig. 4. It is evident from these results that the 
stresses recorded by the Top and the West gages are increasing with time and the stresses in the 
pillar continue to increase;- However,. the results from the East decteased initially and then 
held essentially constant for the remaining interval. This behavior was not anticipated as all 
three gages were expected to indicate either increasing load or constant load. I believe the East 
stress gage was not properly installed. The fact that the gage is providing readings indicates that 
the gage is functioning and has not failed. The installation was a failure. 
35. The stress gages respond to 
very small changes in the diameter of the 
borehole and Geokon is specific in its 
4 See document titled 
2011 
5900 
AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES W. DALLY, PH.D. IN SUPf 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT- 16 
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00 
I did not find evidence that they used a 
borescope to confirm that the walls of the boreholes were sufficiently smooth for a successful 
installation. 
Fig. 3 Location of the three stress gages installed in the 5900 pillar following the rock burst 
ofNovember 16, 2011. 
-2:C.C• J-----------------------------
Fig. 4 Stress measurements from the three gages installed in the 5900 pillar following the 
rock burst 1 11. readings are 12 day 
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2 
of 1,000 on the 
a 12 Although stress gages were not place November 16 to 
1, 2011, it is reasonable to assume at least another 1,000 psi of stress was imposed oh 
the 5900 pillar during this 14 day period. 
37. Helca was able to monitor the stresses in the 5900 pillar at two locations. These 
stress meters showed that the stresses in the pillar were increasing; however, management at 
continued with the repairs in the 5900 drift in spite of the warningss from Wilson Blake 
that the pillar was "borderline stable based on mining history at Lucky Friday/Gold Hunter." 
38. Two of the stress gages showed increasing stress levels, which should have 
managers at tlieLucky Fdday Mine that .... -on the 5900 pillar was increasing 
and that Blake had previously warned them that the pillar had little or no margin of safety. 
39. Mark Board working for Itasca Denver, performed a numerical analysis of the 
5900 pillar in the Hunter Gold region of the Lucky Friday Mine. The purpose of this study was 
to provide a numerical model to match the pillar observations and thereby develop an 
understanding of the current pillar behavior. The issues raised pertaining to the 5900 pillar are: 
1. Is the pillar currently in a failed or unfailed state? 
5 See page 2 of Blake's memo ofNovember 2011 to John Doug , John Karl 
Carlson and Zach Thomas. 
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3. Given high stress values monitored, why is the not 
showing more damage? 
4. Is the discing and hole breakout observed what might be expected 
given the monitored stresses? 
Why is the response of the pillar apparently different on the two 
sides of the 5900 drift? 
40. A summary of the numerical results indicated: 
1. A reasonable agreement of the numerical model to predict stress 
chan:ges:was-achieved;- aftefl;onsidehngth.e uncertainty of the stress mefer · 
measurements. 
2. The reason for the variation in measured stress on the east and west 
side of the 5900 drift was not determined. However, the results were 
within the typical uncertainty of the output from the stress meters. The 
most significant unce1tainty in the stress measurements is the calibration 
factor used in for converting the vibrational frequency of the sensor's wire 
to stress change. This calibration factor is dependent on the modulus of the 
rock in which the gage is installed. The high variability of the rock 
modulus (vitreous 
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uncertainties involve installation orientations and hole roundness ( contact 
seating area). Becaus.e of these uncertainties, the correspondence of the 
numerical and experimental data is considered to be very good. 
3. The numerical analysis predicts that the outer boundaries of the 
pillar (about 10' to 15' thick) will fail in brittle tensile and shearing 
modes. This failure relieves the stresses from the pillar boundaries and 
transfers them into the confined core of the pillar. These stresses are 
sufficient to produce discing and borehole breakouts, particularly in the 
weaker siderite zones·. -The· observation holes show discing 
whose intensity appears to vary by rock type, but discing occurs 
tlu·oughout most of the holes away from the 5900 drift. Breakouts occur in 
both holes, and are strongest in the west borehole, although both holes are 
open and passable to the camera. The bottom 10' of the west borehole is 
rubblized and core lost, which corresponds to the depth of extensive 
failure predicted by the numerical analysis. The bottom 1 O' of the east 
borehole, conversely, shows little non-failed core in what appears to be 
strong silicic material. The east hole actually is drilled in the stronger 
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5900 is relatively small; about 1 drift radius in the and sidewalls 
of the drift. The model indicates that the drift should be stable under the 
current stress conditions, largely because it is driven parallel to the major 
principal stress that flows vein-perpendicular. 
5. The strength properties taken for the stronger silicic rocks result in 
approximately the c01Tect zone of brittle fracturing in the back and floor 
observed in the overhand and underhand stopes (about 3 to 5' of back 
fracturing). 
The results indicate a closure of the orebody (hanging wall to 
footwall) at the 5900 drift of about 1.5 in." is similar to that measured by 
the tape extensometer. This is not a very sensitive calibration measure, but 
the modeling appears to have used about the conect applied N-S stress and 
elastic modulus of the rock. 
41. The numerical results were considered to be in reasonable agreement with the 
measurements and observations of failure zones considering the uncertainties in the rock 
properties and measurements. The important question pertains to the stability of the 5900 pillar, 
and how might it be expected to respond in the future? 
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4 3. It is important to note that the Itasca report is dated March 2010 and does not 
account for the effects of continued mining of the 30 vein. See Calibration of 5900 Pillar 
Numerical Model, attached as Exhibit "31" to the Rossman Affidavit. Mark Board expects that 
the stress changes in the pillar should stabilize. It is also expected that the pillar should have an 
elastic core, because it has a width to height ratio of about 8 to 10 to 16. Experience and research 
studies have shown that pillars with width to height ratios (W /H) in brittle rocks are elastic for 
W /H greater than about 3. With squat pillars, the rock cannot displace under the action of 
compressive stress, the interior of the pillar is confined; thus, permitting large stresses to build 
-·-·· without yielding; Itis wellknown that the rock strength:.fricreases dramatically with confining 
pressure. These squat highly stressed pillars can fail and in doing so produce small seismic 
events in the highly-stressed regions around the periphery. However, they are unlikely to fail by 
crushing. Time-dependent yielding in the pillar's periphery can cause small seismic events as the 
pillar slowly adjusts to the stress redistribution. 
44. The stability discussion in the paragraph above may have been valid in March of 
2010. However, the rock burst ofNovember 16, 2011 markedly changed the geometry of the 
pillar. 
45. Blake in his November 25, 2011 memorandum observed that Itasca's numerical 
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a magnitude The model results indicated that the only way the pillar could fail 
was if the height to width ratio changed and the pillar lost confinement, in which case a 
foundation failure might occur. The model assumed a 10 to 1 width to height ratio. The 
foundation failure would occur at the walls, rather than in the core of the pillar. And further, the 
model results did not include any geologic structures intersecting the pillar. 
46. Blake then adds that with the observed stress deterioration along the inner and 
outer edges of the pillar, likely in the 10 ft range, the width to height ratio of the in place 
doughnut shaped pillar is actually 3 .5, assuming a 10 ft. vein thickness. This pillar is borderline 
stable based on mining history at Lucky Friday/Gold Hunter. 
Finally Blake indicatesthat the stf'ess ih the pillar is at the unconfined stre1igth of 
the rock. He states that ''the in situ stress in the 5900 pillar area before mining was some 1.2 psi/ 
ft of depth for the vertical stress, and 1.5 times this value for the horizontal stress. The actual 
vertical distance to surface above the Gold Hunter is in the 7,000 ft range, hence the vertical 
stress would be 8,400 psi, and the maximum horizontal stress, N40°W direction, is 12,600 psi. 
From the stress gages we know that the stress increase in the pillar from mining off of the 5900 
level, taking into account the ore and waste rock modulus values, was also some 12,600 psi. 
Hence, the stress in the pillar was very near the unconfined compressive strength of the 
6 The IO to 1 W /H ratio does not account for the fact that the 5900 pillar has a drift through its center that 
the W /H ratio. the effect drift in memo 
2011. 
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events at Friday Mine are by blasting occurring with the 
blast or within some time window thereafter)". See Geotechnical Characteristics of the Lucky 
Friday Mine, December 2012, Section 4.2.3; Rock burst Control Plan, Lucky Friday Unit, 
December 2012, Section 3.3. See Jackson Kelly PLLC letter, dated November 8, 2013, attached 
as Exhibit "32" to the Rossman Affidavit. 
49. The Lucky Friday Incident Report for the November 16, 2011 rock burst identifies 
the trigger of the seismic event as blasting together with ground movement causing a build-up of 
pressure in the rock. See Incident Report, attached as Exhibit "33" to the Rossman Affidavit. 
states that rock· bursts can will happen our-
employees are in a safe place during blasting will aid in our goal of sending everyone home safe 
and sound. Continued monitoring of the working conditions is a must. 
50. Dr. Blake in his memo of November 18, 2011 identifies the trigger of the seismic 
event ofN ovember 16, 2011 as the firing oflast hole of the round from the overlying 5500 level 
underhand stope. See id, Exhibit "8". 
51. Dr. Blake in his memo ofNovember 30, 2010 identifies the trigger for the seismic 
event of November 16, 2010 as the blasting on the 5500 14W cut. See id., Exhibit "37". 
52. Blasting can induce rock bursts or rock falls in tvvo different ways. First the 
detonation of an explosive, which is coupled to rock a hole, 
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2011. The stress waves from slip on November 16, 
2011 was sufficiently intense to cause a 3 .O+ earthquake as registered on the seismograph 200 
away at Montana Tech. 
53. The second mechanism for blasting to cause seismic events is by local rock 
bursting. The ore body is confined, except at a bench face where mining is occurring. Confined 
rock bodies can support much higher stresses than unconfined rock specimens. 
54. \Vhen a miner blasts away the bench face to loosen the ore, he exposes a new 
which has not be stress relieved. This new surface has suddenly lost its confinement and 
cannot support thestresses thatexist there,. A small and local rock-btii:st occurs thatejects rock 
into the muck pile and relieves the stresses for a depth of a few feet into the bench face. The 
detrimental effect is again the stress wave generated by the small local rock burst that may 
interact with a near-by fault causing a fault slip that in tum generates a much more significant 
stress wave capable of damaging structures in the mine. 
55. There is clear evidence that blasting triggers seismic events with rock bursts or 
rock falls. When Helca managers resumed mining on December 6, 2011, they authorized 
blasting in the stopes above and below the 5900 pillar. The daily shift reports show blasting 
occurring daily on multiple levels. Blasting was occurring at 520-10, 550-11, 555-14, 610-12, 
61 1 615-16, 620-1 and 650-55 levels above and below the 5900 pillar from December 6 to 
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ore was an to 
dated 1 2012~ 20 attached 
as Exhibit "34"to the Rossman Affidavit. The report states that the amount of footage mined in 
the 10, 11, and 14 stopes between November 17, 2011 and December 13, 2011 was: 
Stope 10 -12 feet of advance, and a 6 foot slab 
Stope 11 - 96 feet, both east and west sides 
Stope 14 - 38 feet, both east and west sides 
57. Note that this listing of advances is not consistent with the daily shift reports 
which indicated drilling and blasting on stopes 10, 11, 12, 1 1 16 and See id., Exhibit 
· "16"- to the Rossm·an Affidavit. The and16 the 6f00 to 6200 
located below the 5900 pillar, and the stopes 10, 11 and 14 are located above the 5900 pillar. 
58. Mining above and below the pillar had two detrimental effects. First blasting at 
many sites (I estimate 10 to 12 sites) for 8 days with 3 shifts per day provided more than 100 
opportunities to trigger a seismic event that would result in failure of the 5900 pillar. Second 
removal of ore from above and below the 5900 pillar increased the mined out area and thereby 
increased the pressure of the side wall on the pillar and elevated the compressive stresses. The 
stress gages confirmed the increased pressure on the 5900 pillar. 
59. Helca's Management at the highest levels were aware of the occurrence of rock 
bursts in Friday Mine and they developed a three Burst Plan dated 
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directed to various managers m charge of operations at the mine. My report provides 
considerable detail on the content of Dr. Blake's findings. Of particular importance are his two 
memos describing the major rock burst that occurred on November 16, 2011. In his memo of 
November 25, 2011, Blake makes several statements which clearly represent warnings to the 
managers. 
1. The occurrence of the 2.8 (USGS) magnitude burst in the 5900 
pillar during blasting on 11/16/11, and its resulting extensive and 
- widesptead -damage, was-~very- much -unexpeded. - Such 
damage is not characteristic of a simple pillar burst. 
With the observed stress deterioration along the inner and outer 
edges of the pillar, the width to height ratio of the in-place, doughnut-
shaped pillar is actually 3 .5. This pillar is borderline stable based on 
mining history at Lucky Friday/Gold Hunter. 
3. Hence, the stress in the pillar was very near the unconfined 
compressive strength of the pillar, and any further loss of confinement 
could lead to a pillar failure. 
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burst this it cannot be totally eliminated. 
See id., Exhibit "6". 
61. Managers at the Lucky Friday Mine decided to rehabilitate the 5900 drift. On 
November 29, 2011 Doug Bayer issued a memo describing the rehabilitation plan for the 5900 
drift. See id., Exhibit "10" to the Rossman Affidavit. The repair of the area was planned for 
two stages. The first stage was to bolt and shotcrete the damaged areas. The second stage was to 
install a steel tunnel liner through the drift and fill the void around the liner with Techfoam (a 
compressible concrete foam). The initial stage ofrepair was completed on or before November 
29,-201 L 
62. The secondary long term repairs involved a steel tunnel liner that was to be 
installed through about ft of the 5900 drift. The rock burst of December 14, 2011 occurred 
while this liner was being installed. Seven of the eight miners working to install the liner were 
injured during the rock burst. 
63. After completing the first stage of the rehabilitation, Mr. Bayer considered the 
rock burst area to be stable and wrote that management of the mine would like to resume 
production prior to completing the installation of the tunnel liner.' On December 6, 2011, based 
upon reports issued by Hecla, MSHA authorized travel by trucks through the 5900 drift and 
mining was initiated. See Bayer Update, dated December 6, 2011, attached as Exhibit" 13" to the 
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stress measurements was gages 
an mcrease 1,000 additional stress imposed on the 5900 pillar in the 12 
day period leading to the rock burst of December 14. Although stress gages were not in place · 
from November 16 to December 1, 2011, it is reasonable to assume at least another 1,000 psi of 
stress was imposed on the column during this 14 day period. 
65. Disregarding the fact that the stresses in the pillar were increasing, mine managers 
continued with repairing the 5900 drift ignoring the warnings from Wilson Blake that the pillar 
was borderline stable and that the pillar had little or no margin of safety. 
66. The decision to send employees into the pillar to rehabilitate the pillar while at the 
same:time·initiating mining.was ·extremely ~~ .. , .... -k because it involved blasting at thl'ee 
different levels and at least 10 sites not far removed from the perimeter of the 5900 pillar. It was 
known that blasting triggered rock bursts and the pillar was at or very near its compressive 
with increasing monitoring stresses. 
67. From my review of the actions of the managers at the Lucky Friday Mine, I 
believe they were taking unwarrantable risk in deciding to rehabilitate the 5900 drift. I believe 
this risk became inexcusable when the stress gages in the 5900 pillar were clearly showing that 
the stresses, already at their limit, were continuing to increase. Finally I believe that Hecla 
management acted willfully with gross disregard for the safety of its employees when mining 
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action under circumstances or should have 
reasonably known that this conduct would.create an unreasonable risk direct physical injury 
and aggression to the miners and that there was a high degree of probability that such direct 
physical injury would actually result from the conduct. 
DATED this day of June, 2015. 
--
James W. Dally, Ph.D. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this __ day June, 2015. 
Notary Public for West Virginia 
Residing at __________ _ 
Commission expires: 
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(:onference Proceedings, Anaheim, Vol 2 pp 2138-2146 (June 1995). 
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CASE NO. CV 13-8793 
AFF1vA VIT OF RICK NORMAN 
RICK NORMAN, being duly deposes 
L I am over the age of eighteen 8) and competent to to the matters stated 
herein. 
2. I have personal knowledge of the facts contained herein and make this affidavit 
based upon my own personal knowledge. 
3. I was employed with Hecla in November and December, 2011 and still am an 
employee with Hecla. 
4. I was assigned to one of the crews responsible for rehabilitating the pillar at the 
5900 foot level of the Lucky Friday mine following the 2.8 Richter scale rock burst on 
November 16, 2011. 
5. I, and the other members of the crew, was seriously concerned about the safety of 
the pillar during the rehabilitation process. 
6. Throughout the process, we observed cracking, spalling and other indications that 
the walls of the pillar were carrying considerable stress. 
7. I, and other crew members, communicated our concerns on several occasions to 
John Lund, Doug Bayer and other members of Hecla management. 
8. A few days following the November 16, 2011 burst, I asked Wilson Blake Ph.D., 
the company's rock mechanics consultant, whether the pillar was still carrying This 
a following as . Blake was observing the pillar. 
AFFIDAVIT OF RICK NORMAN - 2 
E. 
rehabilitation was complete, Matt Williams and I asked Doug Bayer in his office if the 
employees driving.the trucks should be worried while driving through the pillar. Mr. Bayer's 
response was that there were no concerns about the safety of the employees while working in or 
travelling through the pillar. 
10. We were never shown by Hecla the reports prepared by Dr. Blake, nor did we see 
any monitoring or closure data that had been conducted. 
11. We were never told that the stress gages were showing significant increases in 
stress or that Dr. Blake believed that the reduced width of the pillar rendered it in serious risk of 
failure, Had I knowri these things, I would have refused to participate the rehabilitation 
process. 
DATED this __ day of June, 2015. 
Rick Norman 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this day of June, 2015. 
Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing at ___________ _ 
Commission expires: ________ _ 
Michael E. Ramsden 
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
700 Northwest Boulevard 
P.O. Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336 
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to Idaho Rule and is supported by 
pleadings on file 
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PLAINTIFFS' STATEMENT OF FACTS IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY 
Summary Judgment. 
L The Coeur D'Alene mining district has a long history ofrock burst activity that 
was well known within in the district and to any company mining within the district. See 
Deposition of Wilson Blake ("Blake Depo."), p. 33, LL 18-25, attached as Exhibit "1" to the 
Affidavit of Eric S. Rossman in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment ("Rossman 
Affidavit"). 
The Lucky Friday Mine was particularly susceptible to rock bursts given its high 
quartzite rock properties. See Blake Depa., p. 29, line 19 -p. 34, line 21. 
3. Since 2009, the mine had experienced a sharp increase in the number of violent 
seismic events. See Blake Depa., p. 41, line 20 p. 42, line 18; see also Email dated April 4, 
2011 (Exhibit 3 to the deposition), attached as Exhibit to the Rossman Affidavit. 
4. Dr. Wilson Blake is a geotechnical and consulting mine consultant who holds a 
Ph.Din mining engineering. Dr. Blake has specialized knowledge in rock mechanics. See Blake 
Depo, p. 31, LL 7-17. 
5. Rock mechanics is the science of the behavior of openings under different loading 
conditions, including open pits and underground mining. See Blake Depo., p. 31, LL 18-24. 
PLAINTIFFS' STATEMENT OF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
to 4 1 55, 5 8 
7. Specifically, Blake had informed Hecla that a activity in 
5900 level area occurred within pillars and that, at some point, the pillar was going to be a 
serious issue for Hecla. Hecla proceeded with mining that area anyway. See Blake Depo., p. 39, 
line 22 top. 40, line 11; p. 55, line 5 p. 59, line 8. 
8. Hecla had been seismic monitoring, stress monitoring and closure monitoring at 
certain areas of the Lucky Friday mine since 2006. See Deposition of Doug Bayer ("Bayer 
Depo.), p. 19, line 21 -p. 20, line 21, attached as Exhibit "3" to the Rossman Affidavit. 
9. Stress monitoring at the 5900 level showed dramatic increases in 2009 to the point 
where the mine was concerned about pillar failure. pressures did, however, tend to level out 
in the subsequent years. See Executive Summary dated March 22, 2010, p. iii, attached as 
Exhibit "4" to the Rossman Affidavit. 
10. Modeling of the 5 900 pillar was conducted by Rim as Pilkanis and Associates in 
2009. See Technical Memorandum dated March 22, 2010, p. 1, attached as Exhibit "5" to the 
Rossman Affidavit (Exhibit 5 to the depositions). Hecla was unhappy with the results of this 
modeling and retained Itasca, specifically Mark Board, to do further modeling in the spring of 
2010. See Blake Depo., p. 34, LL 1-15; see also Technical Memorandum dated March 22, 2010, 
attached as Exhibit "5" to the Rossman Affidavit 
PLAINTIFFS' STATEMENT OF FACTS IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 
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SUMMARY JUDGMENT -
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at but 
vsu.,,1..,v enough to handle the stress placed upon it unless the ration were to change. 
See Technical Memorandum dated March 22, 20 l 0, p. 1, attached as Exhibit "5" to the Rossman 
Affidavit; see also November 25, 2011 Blake Memo, p. 2, attached as Exhibit "6" to the 
Rossman Affidavit. 
1 Dr. Blake had been consulting for Hecla since 1975 and Hecla was a major client 
of his. See Blake Depo., p. 11, LL 10-12; p. 35, line 2 p. 36, line p. 36, LL 19-23; p. 37, LL 
17-22. 
13. Each time there was an incident at the Lucky Friday Hecla would call Dr. 
-Blake to consult. See BlakeDepo., 36, 6-18. 
14. Hecla did not employ a rock mechanics expert prior to the December 14, 2011 
rockburst and relied primarily on Dr. Blake's expertise. See Bayer Depo., p. 14, line 22-p. 15, 
line 3; p. 15, LL 11-16. 
15. Mine superintendent Doug Bayer testified that he did not consider himself to be a 
specialist in rock mechanics. See Bayer Depo., p. 14, LL 19-21. 
16. On November 16, 2011 a rock burst occurred which caused substantial damage up 
to the 5700 drift pillar effectively closing that pillar. The burst further caused isolated damage at 
the 5900 pillar involving large slabs of rock from the roof of the pillar, no fragmented rock or 
dust consistent a or failure, 
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1 Blake sent an on November 2011 inspecting 5900 pillar 
which he stated that the damage at the pillar was consistent with a fault slip. See Blake Depo., p. 
101, LL 4-16; p. 103, line 6- 104, line 10. See also, E-mail dated November 1 2011, attached 
as Exhibit "7" to the Rossman Affidavit. 
18. Dr. Blake also authored a memo, dated November 25, 2011, in which he indicated 
that the vertical and horizontal stress at the 5900 pillar leading up to the November 16, 2011 
burst was "very near the pillar's maximum confmed strength." See Memo dated November 25, 
2011, p. 2, attached as Exhibit to the Rossman Affidavit. 
1 Hecla instructed Biaketo send a~draft of his Bayer, the mine 
superintendent, before preparing a final draft because the report would ultimately be provided to 
Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA). See Blake Depo., p. 13, line 23 p. 15, 
7; p. 114, line 21 - 115, line 8. 
20. Hecla would not allow Dr. Blake to see the damage at the 5700 level after the 
November 16, 2011 rockburst. See Blake Depo., p. 96, line 21 p. 99, line 18; p. 100, line 15 -
p. 101, line 3. 
21. Dr. Blake testified that had he seen the damage and fault plates at the 5700 level, 
he would have clearly concluded that the burst was a fault slip originating at the 5700 level, not a 
strain or pillar burst at the 5900 Blake 99, 1 
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1 
also 
believed shift was and that 
believed they were working on the west wall at the time. See Blake Depo., p. 79, line 18 - p. 81, 
line 22; p. 82, 4-25. 
23. Employees were unable to get the East wall to take dwyidags, so they instead had 
to drive eight (8) foot split sets into the wall to hold ground support. See Affidavit of Rick 
Valerio, ~ 8; see also Bayer Depa., p. 139, LL 9-20. 
24. Hecla used a "jumbo" to drill the bores for monitoring gauges because it allowed 
them to be a sufficient distance from the wall during the drilling. The Geoken manual for the 
.. monitors states that.the 12, 
13, line 21 p. 14, line 5. 
Dr. Blake a report on November 18, 2011, Bayer's review, which 
states that the cause of the burst was a "strain burst" and that it could not be assumed that the 
pillar was destressed based on the fact that the upper ribs and back appeared to be solid. See 
Blake Depo., p. 106, line 19 - p. 102, line 15; see also Report dated November 18, 2011, 
attached as Exhibit "8" to the Rossman Affidavit 
26. Dr. Blake testified that one could not have expected much if any energy or strain 
release at the 5 900 pillar if it was concluded that the burst was a fault slip at 5700leveL See 
Blake Depo., 71, 9 l 
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a 17 p. 
p. 96, line 16; 98, 8-15 
. 28. Dr. Blake testified that, based on his prior research at the Galena mine in the same 
district and with similar rock properties to the Lucky Friday mine, he published a doctoral thesis 
on the relationship between pillar size and complete pillar failure in that area. See Blake Depo., 
p. 53, LL 7-16; see also Study, attached as Exhibit "9" to the Rossman Affidavit. 
29. Dr. Blake testified that the conclusion he drew from his research was that 8-10 
foot wide pillars that were 40 feet or less in height were at serious risk of complete failure due to 
their inability to carry a sufficient load. Dr. Blake testified that when a pillar is smaller than 40 
Blake 48, line 16; p. 
119, LL 16-25; p. 121, LL 11-25. 
30. Dr. Blake testified that the November 16, 2011 burst rendered the 5900 pillar to an 
approximate width/height ratio of 3 or 3.5 to 1. See Blake Depo., p. 89, line 4-p. 90, line 18. 
As a result, Dr. Blake included a sentence in his draft report on November 25, 2011 that stated 
the 5900 level pillar was "borderline stable" which, based upon Dr. Blake's research, was at 
serious risk of failure. Dr. Blake's memo further advised Hecla to proceed with caution in the 
rehabilitation process. See Blake Depo., p. 119, line 16 - p. 121, line 25; see also Memo dated 
November 25, 2011, attached as Exhibit "6" to the Rossman Affidavit. 
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1 
testified 
not know was borderline stable and not miners at 5900 level pillar 
had he thought the pillar was borderline stable. See Bayer Depo., p. 101, LL 6-8. 
33. Doug Bayer either removed the sentence from the report or requested that Dr. 
Black remove it. Dr. Blake testified that he removed the "borderline stable" language at the 
suggestion of Hecla. The sentence was not included in the report that was shared with MSHA. 
See Blake Depo., p. 123, LL 1-19. see also Revised Memo dated November 25, 2011. 
34. Bayer sent "updates" to MSHA on November 29, December 1, December 2, and 
December 6, 2011 asking for modifications to the 103k order which had allowed rehabilitation of 
the 5900 pillar and, ultimately on I)ec~mber 6, 2011, resumed mining operations at the Gold 
Hunter vein. The updates state that the November 16, 2011 burst destressed "a majority" of the 
pressures at the 5900 level, that stress monitoring readings had "stabilized" and that the mine did 
not expect "any measurable increase in to occur for weeks if not months. See Updates, 
dated November 29, December 1, December 2, and December 6, 2011, attached as Exhibit "10", 
"11" "12" and "13" respectively to the Rossman Affidavit. See also Bayer Depo., p. 121, line 12 
- p. 124, line 19; p. 128, line 23 - p. 129, line 17. 
3 5. Bayer also told MSHA that the stress monitoring information would be reviewed 
daily by mine personnel and Heda's rock mechanics consultant. See Bayer Depo., p. 127, LL 
21-24. 
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at LL 
further testified that his statement about amount that it would 
take the stress to build-up was based not on any statement from Dr. Blake, but rather from his 
own experience and history. See Bayer Depo., p. 129, line 25 - p. 130, line 15. 
38. Dr. Blake testified that, in fact, the 5900 pillar was at its maximum confined 
strength prior to the November 16, 2011 burst; that the fault slip in reality released little if any 
stress from the pillar; and that stress monitoring readings indicated that pressures increased every 
reading of every shift of every day between December 2, 2011 and December 14, 2011 (the burst 
that injured the plaintiffs) resulting in an increase 1000 psi in two weeks. See Blake Depo., p. 
line 1 line p. 1 8 line see Stress Monitoring graph, 
attached as Exhibit "19" to the Rossman Affidavit. 
39. Dr. Blake testified that he never told Hecla the information that Doug Bayer was 
reporting to MSHA regarding the alleged destressing at the 5900 level pillar or the estimate that 
it would take weeks or months for any measurable increase in stress to occur at the 5900 level 
pillar. Dr. Blake specifically testified that he did not tell Doug Bayer or anyone at Hecla that he 
believed that November 16th burst had dissipated a majority of the stress at the 5900 pillar. See 
Blake Depo., p. 137, LL 6-17; p. 140, LL 3-6. 
40. Dr. Blake admitted that Hecla showed him only 4-5 days of monitoring gauge 
readings beginning on December 2011. See Depo., 131, 1 
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1 
to 
See Blake Depo., 134, 3 - 135, 18; 136, 16-23. 
42. Hecla never communicated to MSHA that the East low gauges were improperly 
installed and providing inaccurate information. See MSHA Citation No. 8559615, dated May 
15, 2012, attached as Exhibit "20" to the Rossman Affidavit. Hecla never did anything to 
reinstall or check the placement of the East low gauge. See Bayer Depo., p. 41, line 14 p. 46, 
line 3; p. 46, LL 20-24. 
43. Hecla represented to MSHA that it would install three gauges immediately and 
that an additional three would be installed "immediately upon receipt" by Hecla which were to 
shipped from manufacturer on 2011 BayerDepo., 53, 24 54, 
line 12; see also November 29, 2011 memo to MSHA, attached as Exhibit "10" to the Rossman 
Affidavit. 
44. Hecla never installed the three remaining gauges. See Bayer Depo., p. 55, line 20 
p. 56, line 7. 
45. Hecla lied to MSR.t\ by submitting a modified November 25, 2011 memo that did 
not include Dr. Blake's conclusion about the borderline stability of the 5900 level pillar. See 
Blake Depa., p. 122, line 1 -p. 123, line 19; see also Revised Memo dated November 25, 2011 
attached as Exhibit "21" to the Rossman Affidavit. 
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1 1 1 1 . 
only allowed management to have access to stress and closure readings. 
Deposition of John Jordan ("Jordan Depo."), p, 46, LL 17-23, attached as Exhibit "14" 
the Rossman Affidavit; see also Affidavit of Rick Valerio. 
48. Hecla never informed employees that the November 16, 2011 burst did not relieve 
stress at the 5900 level pillar. See Affidavits of Matt Williams, Rick Valerio, and Rick Norman. 
49. Hecla never told employees that the 5900 level pillar was at its maximum confmed 
strength. See Affidavits of Matt Williams, Rick Valerio, and Rick Norman 
50. Hecla never told employees that stress readings showed steady increases in 
5900 leveLpillar. 
13-20, attached as Exhibit "15" to the Rossman Affidavit; see also Affidavits of Matt 
Williams, Rick Valerio, and Rick Norman 
51. Approximately two to three days following the November 16, 2011 burst, Doug 
Bayer was inspecting the pillar while mine employees were working on it. i\t that time he held 
what was represented to be a report from Wilson Blake and he said to the miners that he knew 
several of them were concerned about the safety of the pillar but, while waiving the report in the 
air, he stated the report indicated that "we don't have to worry about it for at least five years." 
See Affidavit of Rick Valerio, 1 
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E 
from me with 
no response. See Affidavit of Rick Valerio, iJ 8. 
53. When the company began running trucks through the pillar before the 
rehabilitation was complete, mine employees asked Doug Bayer in his office if the employees 
driving the trucks should be worried while driving through the pillar. Mr. Bayer's response was 
that there were no concerns about the safety of the employees while working or travelling 
through the pillar. See Affidavit of Rick Norman,~ 9. 
54. On 6, 2011, Hecla resumed "normal" mining activities which included 
blasting.at during both I .and.December 2011 
while knowing the relationship between blasting and rock burst activity in the mine. See Bayer 
Depa., p. 111, line 20 - p. 112, line 15; p. 112, line 13 -p. 115, 3; see also Shift Reports, 
attached as Exhibit" 16" to the Rossman Affidavit. MSHA was never informed of the full nature 
of the mining activities during this time and had only approved "very limited activity". See 
Bayer Depo., p. 106, line 5 p. 112, line 1; see also Modification Order 8605614-03, attached as 
Exhibit "1 7" to the Rossman Affidavit 
5 5. The mining resumed prior to the completion of the rehabilitation work on the 5 900 
level pillar and prior to the installation of the tunnel liner that had been ordered which was 
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1 
1 2011 was a pillar 16,2011 
and the changed width/height ratio of the pillar and continued stress from associated 
mining. See December 27, 2011 Mernorandurnfrorn Wilson Blake and Mark Board, p. 6, attached 
as Exhibit "18" to the Rossman Affidavit. 
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